Friday, November 15, 2019

Koito (TSE: 7276)



November 5, 2019   Koito Manufacturing (TSE:7276)


Brief Summary:

Market Cap ¥962-986B (USD9B)
Net sales ¥832B (USD7.6B)
Total Debt ¥29.6B (USD271M)
Cash ¥277.7B (USD2.5B)

Enterprise Value 986 + 29.6 – 277.7 = ¥737.9B (USD6.75B)
EBIT = ¥96.7B (USD885M)
FCF = ¥37B (USD338M)
Earnings power = ¥65-70B (USD640M)

Tangible Book Value = ¥507B (USD4.6B) 
Working Capital = Current Assets – Current Liabilities = 503 – 186 = ¥317B (USD2.9B)
Working Capital – Cash = ¥39.3B (USD 400M)
Net Property Plant & Equipment = Fixed Assets = ¥169B (USD 1.5B)

Capital Employed =
Debt + pensions + Fixed Assets + Working Capital -cash - goodwill - intangibles
= 235B yen (USD2.15B)
  
Capital Returned (Owner’s earnings) = ¥70B (USD640M)

ROIC = 12%
(ROIC for previous 4 years = 11-14%



Quick Summary:
Koito (TSE: 72726) is a Japanese automobile lighting OEM selling, as of November 2019, for 9x earnings, and only 7-8x earnings net of cash with a debt to equity of 7% and a quick ratio of 2.1x. Operating margins are 10%.
The company is a leader in automobile lighting and once captured 20-25% of the global auto-lighting market and was a target of T.Boone Pickens for a hostile acquisition back in the 1990’s which led Koito to change to a more protective ownership structure. Koito consists of 32 companies located in 12 countries worldwide, employs approximately 25,000 employees, and achieves annual sales of approximately USD 7 billion.
Koito has close ties with Toyota; Toyota owns 20% of Koito’s issued shares and makes up 21% of their orders and sales. Despite progress in North America and Asia, Koito’s global market share dropped from 18% to 13% when they got into a dispute with their Chinese partner Huayu, in which they had a JV in a company called Shanghai Koito. Huayu previously offered sales distribution, and the loss of a trading partner temporarily hit Koito’s sales in China.
Newer car models are switching from halogen bulbs to using Xenon Bulbs (gas filled) and now LEDs (light-emitting-diodes), which are more energy efficient. While LED’s average sale price may eventually drop, each set currently commands a 20-60% premium to halogen bulbs. When xenon bulbs were first released, its cost was 2-3 times more to produce than halogen bulbs.
While the automobile landscape is being changed by electric vehicles and autonomous driving, technological change will not render automobile lighting obsolete in the next decade. I also do not foresee a displacement of the current players by incumbents. Regulatory environment and significant funding for facilities create barriers to entry. Favorable new developments in Brazil, Asia, USA, and China makes Koito’s share price undervalued. 

Automobile Lighting Market Background:
A single car has about 30,000 parts, if you include parts down to the smallest screws. Many car models are released each year, and in terms of lighting for automobiles only, each model has a front lamp, rear lamp, signal lamp, fog lamp, interior lighting etc. Each lighting OEM bids for different sections for one vehicle model. For example, for the latest Toyota Camry, Koito may win the head lamp and signal lamps, while Japanese competitor Stanley Electric (TSE:6923) may win the rear lamp and interiors for a particular model. OEMs engage in a bidding process where quotations are submitted.

In the automobile supply chain, Koito is a Tier 1 supplier— they only supply parts directly to manufacturers and are tightly coupled with a few car brands and are at an arms-length relationship with others. Tier 2 suppliers do not supply directly to brands and may produce parts for non-automotive customers, while Tier 3 produces raw materials like metals or plastics.

Once automobile companies decide on successful bidder, there is a finalization on drawings and specifications. Koito and Stanley Electric was in trouble recently in an anti-trust litigation in Michigan for fixing prices and rigging bids in North America through their connections with Japanese automobile brands— Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Isuzu, etc.

Japanese car brands prefer maintaining a relationship rather than obtaining the lowest price on a tender— Japanese lamp OEMs have a small amount of shares of their Japanese customers and vice versa, and bids are “favored” towards particular OEMs, rewarding them with consistent demand. Corporate raider T. Boone Pickens was rattled about Toyota previously squeezing margins out of Koito as their favored supplier. While Koito is still Toyota’s preferred lighting supplier, Koito has a more diversified customer base now, including– Audi, GM, Geely, SAIC, thus Koito is not at the mercy of losing a particular customer. This is reflected in operating earnings of 10-15% today, when was only 5% a decade ago.

The automobile lighting market will grow from 30B in 2019 to 35-40B in the next five years. Of this 30B, 66% is predominantly passenger cars; 33% are vans, trucks, and larger vehicles. It makes sense to focus on the Asia Pacific region, as the compounded annual growth is 5-6%, while the U.S is 2-3.5% and China is also slowing down due to the trade war.




Competitors
To contrast this, in 2014, total operating profit was half of 2019, at 49B yen. Japan made up 60% EBIT at 30.3B yen, North America and Mexico had 3% of EBIT at 1.5B yen, China was 19% at 9.5B yen, and Asia was at 13% at 6.4B yen.


Situation in China:
China has the largest vehicle production in the world with a capacity for 35 million units, but only had a sales volume of 25-27 million units or less due to the termination of a tax exemption for small vehicles and the US-China trade-war.

There are 5 dominant OEMs in the automobile lighting business:
      1.    Koito-Manufacturing;
2.    Japanese competitor Stanley Electric which has close ties with Mazda;
3.    French company Valeo, which acquired Japanese company Ichikoh, and dominates the European market;
4.    German company Hella, which initially cooperated with Koito to enter the American market and now in Mexico;
5.  German company Osram which licenses their technology to both Koito and Stanley Electric. 

Auto-lamp OEMs should be conservative in building facilities abroad and growth of fixed assets. In a recession, should there be less demand, unit volume produced may not come close to capacity— a low utilization rate results in losses and negative operating margins. It also helps to have ample working capital and even excess cash. Koito passes all of these tests.

French company Valeo has the largest market share in Europe and has acquired struggling Japanese company Ichikoh. The synergy has proven to be less than desirable, as utilization rates and penetration into Asian markets are poor. Each year, Valeo’s revenues from Europe alone amount to USD 10.6 billion, while their total sales is the largest among peers at USD20B. In terms market share, Valeo is the largest auto-lighting company with USD9.3B market cap. Valeo is over-leveraged with debt to equity significantly higher than peers at 139%. Valeo delays payment to suppliers— their days-payable is 109 days, when the industry norm is 40-50 days.

Koito was wise not to build factories over aggressively in Europe to gain market share. Czech Republic and U.K are Koito’s only centers. Europe has been dominated by Valeo, with Hella licking the remaining scraps in Germany. Each additional unit sold in Germany may require additional marketing, passing of bureaucratic regulatory requirements, and might not create additional shareholder value.

German company Hella previously collaborated with Koito to enter the American market and still work together for new factories in Mexico. As of November 14, 2019, Hella’s enterprise value USD 5.89B, and operating earnings of approximately USD 500 million, bringing its multiple close to 12x, similar to Valeo’s. However, Hella is more conservatively financed with a debt to equity of 50% and cash of USD1.6B. Return on capital is 7%.

Osram has negative earnings due to weak growth in China and problems in their supply chain. They are not a pure player in automobile lighting; segments include— digital products, photonics, opto-semiconductors.  Osram licenses a lot of their proprietary technology such as white LEDs, and adaptive beam lighting. Toyota Corolla uses Koito Signal Lamps which employ XLS LED Signal Emitters from Osram.

Japanese listed Stanley Electric’s large customer is Mazda making up 12% of their sales and has a 33% ownership in a listed company called Thai Stanley Electric which has a domestic (Thai) monopoly on motorcycle lamps. Stanley Electric boosts higher gross margins than Koito, but SG&A margins are double of Koito at 10%, and ROIC has been in fluctuating single digits near 5-7%. Stanley Electric is conservatively financed with a debt to equity of 5%. Its market cap is priced at 4.6B, with an equity base of 3.42B and generates operating earnings of USD456M.



Geographical Business Performance:
To understand Koito, we have to look at its efficiency and how it performs relative to its peers.  In order to calculate utilization rates and market cap, you need to distinguish units in terms of

1.      Vehicles with Koito’s lamps installed
2.      Actual lamp sets produced per year

Total automobiles produced in 2019 globally were around 95 million; assume 100 million to keep calculations simple. 13 million vehicles produced had Koito lamps, which gives Koito approximately a 13% global market share based on unit volume. Previously, it was as high as 18-21%.

In terms of market share, 50-65% of Japanese automobile and motorcycle brands use Koito’s lamp. Koito has actually improved their market share in USA & Mexico, currently owning 24% of the market in contrast to 10-13% in 2014; with Asia (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India) having a 13% market share. In 2019, Koito’s Chinese market share halved from 25% to 11.3%. What made this erode? Koito lost production due to an argument over Shanghai Koito which will be mentioned later.

Next we analyze utilization rates—Koito had 38-40 million sets of lamps produced in 2018-2019 when total capacity was 50-52 million, giving a net utilization rate of 72-75% and a net operating margin of 12%. Operating margins and utilization rate is directly proportional, and Koito’s Japanese factories have the highest EBIT margin due to utilization near 90%.

In terms of growth potential, China and Asia seems to be the greatest opportunity.  Gaining market share in Europe may be costly since it is dominated by Valeo and Hella; while Brazil may contribute to growth in the future, the incremental capital expenditure required to increase capacity may be higher than other countries. Production in Europe for Koito consists of the Czech Republic. 2-3 million lamp sets were produced when the total capacity was 4-5 million, bringing us to a utilization of 67% and an operating margin of 9%. Koito’s restraint in increasing European capacity is shrewd as there are other countries with higher growth.

In terms of fixed assets, in 2019, capital expenditures for machinery was— 22B yen in North America, 4.3B yen in Europe (UK & Czech), 12.3B yen in China, 8.1B yen in Asia, and 9.9B yen in Japan, and 2.1B in Brazil. Most machinery is concentrated in China, America, and Asia, which is justified, while Japan will be shrinking its production facilities due to smaller demand.




Total operating profit in 2019 was 101B yen, and Japan contributed to 56% of all operating profits at 57B yen, whereas America contributed 17% at 16.8B yen, China 13% at 12.8B yen, Asia 12% at 11.8B yen, and Europe 3.4B yen, with Brazil bleeding—its operating profits are a negative 1.5B yen.

In five years, operating profits in Asia doubled, China shrunk 3.3B yen, Japan almost doubled, while America spectacularly grew 11 times in operating profit. Koito has made in-roads in the American market by pulling in GM and Fiat Chrysler automobiles and by having facilities to back it up.

Koito has the largest capacity for lamp sets in North America and Mexico, with a combined output of 18 million lamps sets, and 12 million actually produced in 2019, which gives a utilization rate of 67%, leading to poorer operating margins of 9%. The American market, which includes Mexico, had 14.7 million vehicles produced for 2019 of which Koito had 3.5 million vehicles, which means that Koito has approximately 24% market share of North America and Mexico combined. Plans to increase production capacity by 50% at its plant in San Luis Potosi, Mexico was implemented in 2018.

Koito has saturated Japan in terms of market share for auto-lamps, but the entire market is shrinking. Domestic bases are concentrated in Shizuoka, with an additional plant in Kyushu. Japan produces 9.6 million cars annually and the amount is shrinking due to an inadequate labor force and a withering population. Koito is most dominant in Japan by owning 46% of the market— producing lamps for 4.47 million vehicles.

Utilization rate is the highest in Japan—ranging from 90-95% and producing 11.2 million lamp sets in 2019. This monopoly in Japan is one of Koito’s strengths, Stanley Electric only had 166B yen of sales in Japan compared to the 412B yen of sales Koito had. No matter how bad other geographic regions slump, Koito has Japan to rely on.

In October 2017, Koito invested BRL 221 million (USD 52.6M) for a factory to produce headlights and taillights in Sorocaba, Brazil. Brazil was a market Koito recently targeted, and the utilization rate was not up to par at 7-10%, causing operating earnings to be negative. The maximum capacity for lamp sets in Brazil is 3-5 million sets. Despite negative operating profits, production has increased 1529.2%. Hopefully in the next 2 years, Brazil will show its first profit.




Asia for Koito comprises of Malaysia, India, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand. In 2018, Koito capital expenditures were for increasing production capacity by 50% at a manufacturing plant in Indonesia, which previously produced 1.3 million units annually. In December 2019, Koito’s 2 year project for establishing a new factory in Malaysia cost 5B yen. Koito estimates the factory will be able to produce head lamps and signal lamps for 250,000 cars per year.

Compared to America’s 12 million sets produced in 2019, Koito’s Asia segment produced 4.8-5 million units. Total capacity for Asia is 6.5-7 million units bringing utilization rate to 75%, and operating margins at 11%. Koito has been increasing capital expenditures in Thailand with its 3 already established factories. Asia is a segment which has untapped potential, especially since India is not a separate segment measured in itself and has untapped potential. 




Koito in 2019 has 11% market share in China–supplying lamps to more than 3 million vehicles. In terms of lamp per unit sets, Koito’s China operation has the capacity for 9 million sets of lamps. Approximately 7.5 million lamp sets were produced in 2019, giving a utilization rate of 70-80% and operating margins of 11-13%. These lamps are supported by 3 factories in GuangZhou, a joint venture with DaiYi (TSEC:1521) Taiwan in FuZhou with 3 plants, and a newly established factory in Hubei with also additional capital infusion for Daiyi.

One of the main problems in China was a joint venture dispute with Shanghai Koito. Koito and Huayu joint ventured to create Shanghai Koito, which helped them gain customers through Huayu’s connections with SAIC-GM, SAIC-Volkswagen, FAW Group, Dongfeng Group, bringing in a vast amount of sales and a production capacity of 3 million lamp sets. These customers were cultivated by Huayu for decades in China— Koito provided technology and capital injection for the factory, and Huayu provided investment, distribution, and sales into China.

Huayu argued that Koito was not providing the most advanced technology developed in Japan. Thus, Huayu started developing technology on their own and started shipping overseas. Koito wanted to keep the joint venture, but deemed Huayu’s international sales a conflict of interest due to overlap and cross-selling of lamp products. Huayu Automobile eventually bought back the 50% of the remaining shares for USD243million in which Koito hesitantly agreed.

This separation from Huayu resulted in a 40.6% decrease in China sales to 93.7B yen from 2018-2019. Koito knew separation was inevitable and had been preparing since 2014 to double production capacity after the split by building a new factory in Hubei with shared capital from Koito’s Taiwan distributor and partner of 30 years, Daiyi. Daiyi’s capital injection into Hubei, will allow them to directly share profits.

Toyota Motor's Chinese factory is the largest customer of Hubei Koito. Koito also relies on the Daiyi’s manufacturing expertise and Daiyi’s distribution network for orders  to help Hubei Koito— their aim is to grab previously lost Shanghai Koito Huayu customers, such as SAIC and Shanghai GM.

A joint investment with Daiyi was made previously for the factory in FuZhou. In January 2018, Koito’s plan was to increase production capacity by 70% in Fujian Province, which previously produced 1 million units annually. The main customers for Koito FuZhou Daiyi are Geely Automobile, Southeast Auto, and Mazda, which is exported to Japan. When Koito’s FuZhou division joined Geely’s supply chain, the initial product development costs were high. Utilization rates and raw materials were left stagnant. The profit contribution of the plant initial years were poor – production only covered USD 2.8million of sales. In the first half of the second year, growth returned and the production capacity increased by 30% for Fuzhou. In the second half of the second year, the company continued to grow orders and expanded production in response to Geely demand of USD 7.2 million of sales for 2 new automobile models. Under the continuous growth of the mainland auto market, DaiYi is optimistic that the Fuzhou plant will surpass the entire Taiwan production in 3 to 5 years with a 3rd plant now in FuZhou. Fuzhou plant revenue was USD427million, about half of Koito’s Taiwan subsidiary, Daiyi.

Taiwan Daiyi is also speeding up exports from China to North America, shipping out 50% of the orders in anticipation of any impending tariffs from a trade-war, with two new orders for car models expected from Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA). The North American market is expected to grow 10% as long as a recession does not hit. Feng Shi Zhong, the general manager of DaiYi, says that 25-30% of all exports are for Fiat Chrysler Automobiles.   


Shareholders and Toyota’s influence-

Toyota Motor Corporation owns 20% of Koito’s issued shares, while Japan’s master trust combined with Japan’s trustee services own 9.2%. Effectively, Toyota, trusts, and management own all voting shares to elect board of directors. 22% of all sales for Koito are from Toyota as a single customer. All other automobile customers take up less than 10% of sales. As with Japanese corporate culture, buybacks are not in their arsenal for creating shareholder value. However, another listed company was acquired by Koito called KI holdings and shareholders received a reasonable premium for Koito’s tender offer. Gross margins are slightly lower for Koito than its peers due to lower prices offered to Toyota. Toyota’s global dominance for automobiles and Koito’s monopoly in Japan ensures a minimum number of sales each year. New factories are built opportunistically and not solely for the benefit of Toyota.


Product Differentiation, Pricing Power, and Competitive Advantages
The questions to ask as a shareholder for Koito are – how will Koito look 10 years from now? What is causing Koito to succeed and have a sustainable competitive advantage? What will erode this advantage? How much product differentiation technology-wise is there, assuming all bids were fair?
Koito should still be the market leader in the next 5 years. Management might change and it is too hard to predict what will happen in the next decade, although I think there is a high probability that the industry will still exist. Pricing power and competitive advantage for Koito comes from connections with Japanese manufacturers, patents enforced, and technology licenses granted from other firms. Operating margins will improve from 7-10% to 15-18% when factories bring their utilization rate from 65-70% over 80%.
In terms of product differentiation, competitors can all build halogen, xenon, and LED lamps. Despite LEDs selling for a premium now, pricing will eventually taper off. Koito is investing in R&D and has patents of their own, but how much of these advances will benefit customers and how much will benefit owners/shareholders?
Koito has various patents and developed the first headlamp that was mercury free and has developed a lamp with an adaptive driving beam. Recently, Koito acquired 11,927,189 shares for 37% of an Isreali company called Bright Way Vision for USD 24M. Bright Way Vision has high-accuracy peripheral recognition sensors— fast gated-camera equipped with a unique Gated-CMOS sensor and a laser pulsed illuminator. These sensors are synchronized in specific domain which can handle rain or fog and conditions which impairs vision by generating a clear long-range image of the road ahead which are essential for the future of autonomous driving vehicles.


Risks-

Should demand contract in Koito’s main markets, financial results will be adversely affected. In particular, 56% of operating profits is contributed by Japan alone. While Koito is geographically diversified, production needs to increase in other countries also. Since 56% of operating profits derive from Japan, earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, are all a very realistic possibility. In particular, Koito’s production bases are concentrated in the Shizuoka prefecture, which is within the vicinity of Chubu Electric Power Inc., Hamaoka’s nuclear power station.

Changes in legal regulation and safety standards for vehicles will may affect Koito as certain molds or electronic components may need to be changed to cater to a particular market. A subsidiary, Koito Industries, faced an incident over aircraft seat quality in 2009 and was reestablished in 2011 as KI holdings.

Koito still has 3-4% of their business selling aircraft parts, railroad-car parts, various electric equipment, measuring instruments, and other products. This is a distraction to their main business and only a focused business can generate excess profits.

 As most of Koito’s lighting has an acrylic plastic cover, the prices of plastics, which is a key raw material in Koito’s business has been rising due to the market prices of crude oil. This rising trend could cause a rise in procurement costs for Koito.

Another complaint I have is that management could be more transparent with utilization rates and bad news. Shanghai Koito’s termination and the loss of customers with HuaYu’s connections required me to dig for news articles.


Valuation-



Koito’s owner’s earnings is 85B-90B yen or USD770M-800M. From 2014-2015, equity doubled. Capital employed, which included working capital and fixed assets, is prudently employed by Koito. While working capital has increased threefold from 108B yen to 330B, fixed assets only increased 28%, from 114B yen to 158B yen. Koito has been cautious in Europe and understands the shrinking demand in domestic production (Japan).

With a conservative growth rate of 3-4%, a discount rate of 15%, Koito would have to be at a market cap of USD5-6B to bring a greater margin of safety. It is currently selling at USD9B. Koito should be selling near 1400-1600Byen or USD13-14B. If Koito were to drop anywhere near USD 4-5B, it would be a solid buy.

Koito intends to double China’s production, and bring up capacity in Asia. Global utilization rates are only 70-75%, if Koito manages to bring this up to 85% and if EBIT margins go up to 15-18%, it is possible for Koito to reach over USD12billion in market capitalization.

While Koito’s market capitalization may seem expensive at USD8.97B, it has USD2.5B in cash and relatively little debt at USD272M, which leaves us with an enterprise value of UD6.6B generating an operating earning almost double of Stanley electric at USD890M. The multiple for enterprise value to operating earnings is similar for both at 8x, but due to Koito’s entrenched competitive advantage in Japan and connections with Toyota with a double digit ROIC of 12-13% which has been sustained over more than a decade, Koito provides better value at a similar multiple.  Koito’s cash conversion cycle is the shortest in the auto-lamp industry at 35 days. In terms of inventory turnover, Stanley Electric is 32 days and Koito is 35 days. Japanese companies have inventory turnover which is efficient than its European peers. Japanese auto-lamp manufacturers Koito and Stanley Electric have the lowest debt to equity of its peers at 7% and 5% respectively.




Catalyst

Despite not having the practice of repurchasing shares, management at Koito is disciplined and won’t over expand capital employed and won’t over-leverage, thus ensuring double digits for return on capital. Koito also has slight pricing power with connections to Japanese manufacturers, patents, and economies of scale which is sustainable for the next decade. Plans to increase production capacity in Mexico, Indonesia, China’s Fujian province and new factories in Brazil and Malaysia will eventually pay off when utilization rate is adequate.
Management paid 14.7B yen in dividends for 2019 when operating cash flow was 93.6B yen, which is 15% of total operating cash-flows.
Migration to LED automotive lamps from halogen and xenon lighting will also bring higher margins. Koito plans to double the ratio of LED headlamps to total headlamp shipments for overseas markets to 50% in five years. Koito will develop LED headlamps with a simplified pricing structure, and increase its LED headlamp production capacity in emerging markets particularly electric vehicles in China.

Sources:
Koito Annual Report
Thai Stanley Annual Report
Stanley Electric Annual Report
Marklines.com
Chinese news articles from the Huayu breakup
Chinese news articles regarding Taiwan Daiyi cooperation


Wednesday, November 6, 2019

Shibuya (TSE: 6340)



Oct 31 2019                     Shibuya (TSE: 6340)            Jeffrey Au



Brief Summary:

Market Cap ¥79-81B (USD735M)
Net sales ¥108B (USD998M)
Total Debt ¥5.4B (USD50M)
Cash ¥30B (USD277M)


Enterprise Value 80 + 5 – 30 = ¥55B (USD508M)
EBIT = ¥10.3B (USD95M)
FCF = ¥6-7B (USD60M)
Earnings power = ¥8-11B (USD92M)


Tangible Book Value = ¥60B (USD554M) 
Working Capital = Current Assets – Current Liabilities = 88 – 56 = ¥32B (USD295M)
Working Capital – Cash = -¥1B (USD -9M)
Net Property Plant & Equipment = Fixed Assets = ¥33.5B (USD 309M)


Packaging plants 56% (EBIT margin 15%)
Mechatronic Systems 29% (EBIT margin 5%)
Agricultural Facilities 15% (EBIT margin 7%)
Overseas sales ratio 27%


Capital Employed =
Debt + pensions + Fixed Assets + Working Capital - cash – goodwill - intangibles
= 41B yen (USD378M)
  
Capital Returned (Owner’s earnings) = ¥11B (USD 101M)

ROIC = 26%
(ROIC for previous 4 years was 8-10%)


Investment Thesis

Shibuya holds 70% market share for Japanese aseptic packaging for consumer goods – food & beverage, pharmaceuticals, regenerative medicine, and cosmetics—as an integrated systems supplier. Through customer Nipro, Shibuya also has a 20% domestic market share in dialysis machines. Shibuya has a healthy quick ratio of 1.2x and a debt to equity of 8%.   

Shibuya has 3 main divisions:
1.      Aseptic packing which makes up 65% of Shibuya’s sales in 2019 with operating income of 9.87B yen.

2.      25% of sales in mechatronics (cutting & grinding machines, medical equipment –dialysis & laser dermatology, semiconductor equipment) with an operating income of 1.6B yen.

3.      10% of sales in agriculture (vegetable and fruit sorting machinery) with an operating income of 1B yen.

After taking into account for unallocated adjustments, total operating income was 10.3B yen (USD95M). The bulk (80-85%) of operating income came from Aseptic packaging, while 13-15% EBIT came from mechatronics and 5-7% EBIT from agricultural sorting equipment.  


A third of Shibuya’s sales, mechatronics— has too many divisions and lacks product focus. Shibuya’s management made a terrible decision to acquire semiconductor equipment manufacturer Kaijo in 2012, resulting in poor margins and an operating loss for more than a decade until 2016. The operating margins of Shibuya’s packaging division are 9-10%; in contrast, the operating margins of the Mechatronics division are 5%.

Mechatronics has too many subdivisions—cutting systems including: laser-processing, water-jet, and hydrogen-gas; semi-conductor soldering systems and mounters, medical equipment, laser surgery, dialysis equipment, ultrasonic generators and hydraulic-press, etc. Mechatronics received the most of 2019’s R&D budget with the highest capital expenditures of all divisions— 2.7B out of a total 4.7B CapEx in 2019— whether this translates into consistent cash flows with operating margins higher than 5% is yet to be seen. Trying to be everything to everyone leads to satisfying no one.
The agricultural equipment segment includes fruit and vegetable grading and sorting. Shibuya should be cautious since this is not a stable segment— clients depend on Japanese government grants for funding.

If I were in charge of Shibuya, I would cut out the agriculture business and restructure the mechatronics division— I would spin off the grinding/cutting machinery and semiconductor equipment and keep the dialysis business, as they already have 20-25% market share in Japan. From the proceeds, I would distribute dividends, or announce buybacks (highly unlikely for Japanese management and Shibuya’s historical record).

Another alternative would be to increase international sales, which currently makes up 25% of total sales. Previous international projects include American customers such as Mott’s (manufactures juices), HP Hood (dairy company), a Thai beverage company (beers and juices), etc.


Comps

Shibuya has a predictable business and is currently cheap relative to its peers. There are more than 11,000 aseptic packaging systems in operation supplied by more than 30 companies. However, only a few companies have the size, experience, and capitalization to gain economies of scale.

Amcor specializes in flexible and rigid packaging for consumer goods with a huge market-cap of 15B, while Italian company IMA (market-cap 2.7B) specializes in pharmaceuticals resulting in slightly higher gross margins than Shibuya. Both have catastrophic risk from leverage (Amcor at 109% debt to equity, IMA at 184%).

Krones AG, with a 2B market-cap has poor operating margins 3.8% due to a poor European market and required new financing to support its equity base.

Italian company GIMA at USD 735M is the closest competitor in terms of Shibuya’s market-cap (685M) and has ridiculous operating margins of 35% and an ROIC of over 30% due to their packaging for cigarette brands. Should new regulations or competitors be introduced, GIMA’s earnings may be hampered.




Balance Sheet

Shibuya is incredibly cheap compared to its peers at a market cap of USD735M. At 3-4x TEV/Ebit, it should be worth at least three times market capitalization – USD 2.1B, to bring it to a level multiple similar to its peers. Cash is about a third of capitalization at USD 276M with very little debt (USD 50M). Shibuya’s debt to equity has decreased from 46% in 2014 to 8% in 2019 and completely eliminated short term debt.

Shibuya has significant advance payments of ¥10.4B (USD 96M) in 2019 from undisclosed customers in the latest annual report which counts as current liabilities; the previous year was only ¥4.1B. This skews working capital and makes it seem like receivables are inadequate after deducting cash. Whether advanced payments will remain the same size every year is yet to be seen. To be conservative, Shibuya is at least worth USD1.7B.

Should Shibuya remove low margin operations (5%) in the Mechatronics division and increase regenerative medicine sales, boost sales in the packaging division, and ramp up dialysis sales, operating margins should go up to 13-20%. Mechatronics had negative operating cash flow for a decade until the last few years.

In this article, I will only elaborate on the strong segments of Shibuya’s business—aseptic packaging for food & beverage, and regenerative medicine; and dialysis—under mechatronics. Agriculture, and semiconductor and grinding equipment under Mechatronics are poor segments which need to be eliminated.


Aseptic Packaging – Consumer Goods

Aseptic packaging for consumer goods contributes to the bulk of Shibuya’s operating profit and 60% of sales. Shibuya is a systems integrator for sterilized packaging—integrating all equipment operations—sterilizing/rinsing, filling, capping, and labeling for glass bottles, cans, PET, and cartons. It is safe to say Shibuya has a domestic monopoly— filling 70% of aseptic packaging for Japanese food and beverage manufacturers. Shibuya now consists of 16 subsidiaries with a U.S partner, Hoppmann.

Beverage and liquor bottling (juices, soft drinks, dairy, beer, sake, and spirits) accounts for 25% of Shibuya’s total packaging sales. Food (seasoning, cooking oils, noodles) accounts for 53% of packaging sales. Cosmetics vials, detergent packaging, and medical ampules accounts for 23% of sales. Packaging systems include casers and un-casers, carton-machines, multi-packers, pouch filling machines, etc.

Well-known clients include—
Drinks- Kagome, Sapporo, Asahi, Kirin, Mott’s, HP Hood, Thai Beverage,
Hokuriku Coca Cola Bottling (Tonami Plant) – “Coke” branded products - Aquarius, Georgia Coffee etc.
Regenerative Medicine – Helios, Promethera
Pharmaceuticals – Astella, Mochida

Global demand for aseptic packaging machinery is USD 40 billion and will reach USD 55 billion by 2025, growing 3-6% year. China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia will grow faster than mature markets such as Western Europe, Japan, and the U.S.

Food brands reduce their costs by switching from cold chain logistics or preservatives & retort (lamination) methods, to sterilized cartons, plastics, or cans. They pay Shibuya a high initial investment to install packaging machinery customized to their processes, but will see a return on investment in two to five years. Customization for packaging is based on the customer’s budget and floor area.

Shibuya’s in-house proprietary technology keeps products sterile without heat, so thinner plastic bottles can be used while filling bottles with room-temperature liquids. Older systems cost more due to higher energy consumption— ultra-high-temperature (UHT) to kill bacteria, retort systems, preservatives which required chilling, etc. Shibuya acquired the approval of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for its overseas beverage plant installations which is crucial, since 60% of Shibuya’s aseptic filling systems are expected to be shipped overseas.

Shibuya’s rotary filler was the first FDA-accepted filler for low-acid beverages validated in 2005—the packaging line at the Sacramento plant is one of the fastest and most sophisticated low-acid aseptic lines. Regarding sterilization, Shibuya also has a proprietary aseptic Electron-Beam-Filling-System.
    
For foreign customers, components are built at the Kanazawa facility, shipped abroad, and assembled on-site. There have been requests from Chinese and Southeast Asian beverage manufacturers and rivals to share Shibuya’s systems integrations technology by building components abroad. However, Shibuya would rather produce domestically to retain quality— "if you think about maintaining quality and cost, overseas production is actually very costly; we compete on our technological ability, without licensing contracts," President Hirotoshi Shibuya said.

Shibuya dominates packaging with sterilization technology since they require less equipment space without sacrificing utilization rate or raising prices. In one of Shibuya’s projects, a Thai beverage maker requested for lower prices which spurred Shibuya to cut costs by 30% on its main factory in Kanazawa. "We will simplify the structure of not just filling equipment, but also peripheral equipment such as liquid processing," said President Hirotoshi Shibuya. Shibuya redesigned the mechanical parts of its equipment and shrank the floor area by two-thirds; which was required to install a unit which fills 600 bottles a minute, slashing the production cost by 35%. 


Aseptic Packaging – Regenerative medicine

Shibuya’s packaging segment, which dominates the Japanese market with proprietary sterilization technology, is expanding into regenerative medicine for its incredible growth. Shibuya has launched full-fledged production for aseptic cell culture by leveraging on previous bottling technology gained from pharmaceuticals.

Regenerative medicine involves culturing large quantities of cells for bone marrow therapies, and stem cell research. Cell processing centers require a germ and contamination free operational environment which is recreated inside an isolator.
The isolator completely separates the technician from the process.

Shibuya started joint development with the Yamaguchi University on sterilized cell culturing for liver cirrhosis treatments, while receiving venture support from the Riken research institute. Cell processing isolators have also been joint developed since 2017 with Belgium Promethera Biosciences. Shibuya has an exclusive license for spinal cell administration therapy.

Sales related to regenerative medicine was approximately 500 million yen (USD 4.86 million) in 2014, but has impressively grown 29 fold to 15.6 billion yen (USD 144 million) in 2019, which exceeded the president’s original goal of 10 billion yen within five years. Shibuya has built a new factory for regenerative medicine equipment in an industrial park in the Kanazawa suburbs.


Mechatronics- a cluttered, disappointing tumor

Shibuya’s mechatronics segment covers a broad range –medical, semiconductor bonders and mounters, inspection equipment, and laser applications. It suffers from a lack of management and focus. The mechatronics segment existed since early 2000s, but sustained negative operating profits until 2016. While the packaging segment has operating margins of 9-10%, mechatronics in 2019 only has 5% operating margins.



Most of mechatronics divisions have a fixed cost burden with poor utilization rates and lack of pricing power. Mechatronics system business sales are expected to decline due to inventory adjustments for medical equipment, while the number of cutting machines will increase slightly due to an increase in new fiber laser machines. Semiconductor equipment sales have fallen significantly due to the effect of US-China trade war – Shibuya focused on manufacturing for optical communication parts compatible with 5G.
           

Mechatronics – Dialysis

The only saving grace of the Mechatronics sector is the dialysis segment. A dialysis device artificially purifies blood, removes waste, and adjusts water levels by compensating for declined kidneys. Shibuya has developed medical equipment with Nipro since 1987, utilizing liquid control technology developed from beverage filling machines— accurately controlling the flow of dialysate and blood. 3 million Dialysis treatments have been carried out in Japan, and may increase to 3.7 million within a decade.

Dialysis makes up of 15% (15.6B) of Shibuya’s total sales (108B). In Japan, two companies dominate dialysis treatment equipment with 70% of the market— Nikkiso has 45-50%, and Shibuya has 20-25% as Nipro’s supplier.

The spread of medical insurance and the number of patients with diabetes and chronic renal failure increases in proportion with emerging countries where middle-income group rise—leads to the expansion of dialysis treatment. Expensive dialysis treatments are expected to continue to grow at an annual rate of 5-6%.

China, India, South America all have a huge demand for dialysis equipment— In 2018, Shibuya expanded facilities to double production capacity from the current 10,000 to 20,000 in Kanazawa City by investing approximately 2B yen. Capital expenditures include the dismantling of an old building and equipment costs. The new factory was rebuilt in one of four production buildings in Kanazawa with 4 floors and an area of ​​about 8,000m2.

Competitor Nikkiso manufactures for Japanese and European customers at its plant in Kanazawa. Nikkiso, with 50% domestic market share, has bigger ambitions by completing a second production base with local production in China through a joint venture with Wei-Gao Group in Shandong Province. They aim to increase capacity by 5 times in less than a decade.


Capital Allocation- CapEx, working capital, and change in equity

In the last five years (2014-2019), capital expenditures were 22.2B (USD205M) –capital was allocated towards buying additional fixed assets such as machinery and buildings to increase domestic production capacity, particularly for packaging, and to replace depreciating tools and equipment.

In a five year time frame, 15.29B (USD146M), the bulk of capex, was correctly spent on expanding the packaging segment; 5.2B (USD48M) of capex were for mechatronics; with 1.69B (USD15M) for agriculture equipment.



In 2019, total capital expenditures were 4.7billion yen (USD43M). 1.75B yen of capital expenditures in 2019 was for improving the packaging business, particularly for the new Negami headquarters.

What worries me is that mechatronics had the highest capital expenditures in 2019, since it was ramped up to 2.7B yen, with only an average annual expenditure of 500M yen in previous years. Part of these expenditures for mechatronics is a medical equipment factory at Wakamiya. While the capital expenditures of medical products are said to be reverse osmosis related (RO systems) in the annual report, hopefully it will be for dialysis equipment. If this is true, we can expect a lot of growth and adequate return on investment.

As mentioned earlier, Shibuya has paid off all short term debt, which resulted in an incremental increase of 13B yen (USD120M) in working capital from 14.8B (USD 136M) in 2014 to 27.8B (USD256M) in 2019. Operating cash flow doubled from 5.3B in 2014 to 10.9B in 2019.

Equity increased by 24B from 2014-2019. Equity was 38B in 2014 and grew to 62B in 2019. Equity increased due to an increase in fixed assets (29B to 33B) and retained earnings (12B to 43.9B) and a decrease in long term debt from 9.6B in 2014 to 3.68B in 2019. Equity grew at 8% per annum in a 5 year time frame.
      

Owner’s Earnings, capital employed and ROIC

If we look at a five year time frame of 2014-2019, Shibuya had a cumulative owner’s earnings of 25-35B, with 4.8B paid in dividends with 40.6B of debt issued.

Each year, about 10-15 billion yen of operating cash flow is generated by Shibuya. To be conservative, we assume annual capital expenditures of 4 billion, with 2 billion for maintenance, and 2 billion for growth expenditures. 1 billion will be deducted for payment for long term debt annually, and 2 billion will be paid out in the form of dividends. This leaves 3-5 billion per year for retained earnings.



Total Capital employed (equity, deferred obligations, leases, debt, less goodwill) decreased by an increment of 10.8B from 2014(51.9B) to 2019(41.9B). Of the 41.9B approximately 11B of owner’s earnings was produced, producing an ROIC of 26%. 2019 may be an exceptional year and may not be sustained, as capital employed in previous years was also around 40B, but owner’s earnings returned was only near 3-5B, bringing ROIC to a lower 8-11%.

Approximately 25-35B of owners earnings were produced in 5 years. Going forward, I do not expect capital employed to decrease, but expect it to increase slightly due to additional fixed assets and level off— Shibuya’s president has mentioned his commitment to keeping factories domestic.  


Risks-

With Shibuya’s cash reserves amounting to a third of market capitalization and low amount of leverage, Shibuya risk does not come from its balance sheet, but rather from its ability to execute and allocate capital. Management will most likely continue what they have done before— issue higher dividends and not entertain buybacks or cut off poor segments in its business.

Customer concentration is not a risk, as the only customer who exceeds 10% of revenues is Nipro at 15%, which Shibuya partners with for dialysis machines.

Shibuya has monopolized local food and beverage brands which serve as a healthy base to rely on. They should not be complacent and seek customers in to south-east Asia. Management also hopes to expand sales channels in the United States and other countries and increase sales of medical equipment by 70% in 5 years.

One concern is keeping utilization rates or capacity over 80%. There is a lack of technical laborers in Japan— most engaged in production for Shibuya are mainly temporary workers. A robotic assembly fleet is being introduced by Shibuya in response to labor shortages.

Additional data I would have liked to include in this report but could not obtain include– average sales price for different equipment, the number of contracts and equipment sold, terms and duration of contracts, breakdown of cost of goods sold, and the utilization rates of individual factories.

The demand for aseptic packaging for consumer goods should be steady unless regulation tightens or a recession occurs. A changing regulatory environment, a weak mechatronics division, disruptions in technology, and volatile raw material prices, and foolish acquisitions are all threats to shareholders. 

Pricing power for Shibuya’s should not decrease in the near future, as brand owners view Shibuya’s service as value added. In the same token, pricing power is stronger domestically due to connections in Japan but weaker abroad despite Shibuya’s proprietary technology and FDA approvals as there are more competitors globally. While Shibuya may not be able to command the highest prices, quality components and experience in design gives them a competitive advantage and secures a reasonable price and deposits for advanced payments.  


Catalyst and Valuation

Owner’s earnings are currently USD110M, which can potentially double in 3-5 years to 200M. Assuming an owner’s earnings of 150-170M and multiplying by 10, we have a market capitalization of USD 1.5-1.7B. As mentioned before, Shibuya is trading at 3-4x EV/EBIT, while peers are trading at 11-12x EV/EBIT.

Even if the 25% of the business with poor operating margins is not eliminated— mechatronics (5%) and agriculture (7%), the bulk of operating profit comes from aseptic packaging at 85%. The market should eventually realize the value of Shibuya’s domestic earning power in aseptic packaging, and with elimination of short term debt and decreasing long term debt with increased dividends, there should be greater shareholder value despite the hesitance for share buybacks.

If management doesn’t make any foolish acquisitions, any improvement in margins or utilization rates should allow retained earnings to grow equity from 8-10% a year to possibly 15-25%.

Market performance from 2014-2019 for Shibuya reflected by the Tokyo stock exchange compounded at a poor rate of 3-5% per annum. In an optimistic scenario, I expect Shibuya to compound 35% annually from USD735M to USD1.7B in 3-4 years. Consider a pessimistic scenario—3-5% per year or market gains, or owner’s earnings could drop to USD35-50M, dividends get slashed in half from 2B yen to 1B (USD18M to USD9M), but there’s still USD277M in cash and decreasing liabilities, which means at most Shibuya will drop to USD400M .


Sources:
Shibuya annual reports, announcements, financial reports
Capital IQ