AJIS “All Japan Inventory Service”
Japan Stock Exchange 4659
As of March 2020
Market Cap 14-15B (USD 130M)
Total
sales 28.2B
(USD 256M)
EBIT 3.9B (USD 35M)
Debt 71M (640K)
Cash &
S.T Inv. 9.65B (USD87M)
Permanent Employees 780
Temporary
Employees over 1500
Enterprise Value: 19.59B – 9.65B = 9.94B
FCF = 1.7B
Fixed assets = 1.9B
Working Capital = Current
Assets – Current Liabilities = 12.70 – 3.100 = 9.6B
Working Capital = cash
Tangible Book Value = 11.5B =
fixed assets + working capital
Capital Employed =
Tangible Book + Working
Capital
= 11.5 - 13B
Average Owner’s Earnings = 1.6B
to 2.1B
ROIC = 14%
Average ROIC for previous 5
years = 10%
Book value in 2014 7 to 8B
Book value in 2020 12 to 13B
2014-2020 CAGR approx. 9-12%
History and Introduction
Founder Shigeaki Saito established “All
Japan Inventory Service Co., Ltd.” (AJIS) in 1978 and hired Jack M. Boone, previous
CEO of Muscolino Inventory Services, as its
first president. AJIS became one of the initial supermarket inventory
management companies in Japan.
Today, AJIS is known for its third
party inventory data management/stock count/stock auditing. Akio Saito, a
family member of Shigeaki Saito, is now the current CEO. He spent a year at
Muscolino Inventory Services in Arcadia, California from 1994 to 1995 to expand
his knowledge about the trade (Muscolino, which was a pioneer for inventory
counting, started in the 1940’s and is now owned by Phyle Inventory Services (http://www.picsinv.com/)). Akio caught on to a trend— big retail companies
like Walmart were outsourcing stock taking to prevent stealing, reduce staff count,
improve stock count and auditing accuracy, and free up time for core staff to
focus more on customers.
Akio returned back to Japan and tried to
engage stock taking within retailers. His business flourished, and in 1996,
AJIS was listed on the Japanese stock exchange. In 2000-2010, there were 6-8
players in Japan. In 2010-2015, there were practically 4 players in the stock
counting industry in Japan— there was AJIS, P and P— a Japanese corporation
that was listed but slowly became obscure, WIS (https://w3.wisintl.com/), and Asset
Inventories (http://www.assetinventories.com/)
(which was bought by WIS later), a private American company which focuses
mainly on the US market and has diversified into other segments.
Today, in Japan, there is only WIS and other
tiny players who are unable to challenge AJIS. The only problem with having a
75-80% market share in Japan is staffing and growth. Japan’s growth in retail
chain stores and AJIS’s revenue growth are both similar— 1-2% annually. Stock
count requires hiring and firing staff and keeping temporary staff available.
Business Segments & Financial Analysis
AJIS currently has 75-80% or more of
Japan’s market and has expanded abroad. Assume in 2019 there were 60,000
convenient stores operating in Japan, a conservative estimate of 65% of the
market would mean that 30,000-40,000 convenient stores are being audited by
AJIS. While Japan’s total retail sales amounted to almost 145-150 trillion
Japanese yen, domestic convenience stores generated revenues worth
approximately 12 trillion yen.
AJIS operates over 90 sales offices globally, with
3 franchisees and 15 subsidiaries. It has captured its local market
successfully, but has failed to turn its foreign expansion efforts into
contributing factor towards its operating profit. With slowing growth
domestically (Japan), AJIS needs to focus on growing South East Asian
countries. Convenience stores and supermarkets which includes Philippine’s SM
mart and certain grocery retailers in South East Asia have experienced almost
17-20% growth on the number of outlets.
AJIS serves 70 of the top 100
retailers in Japan. They serve approximately
2,500 customers globally with a network with 90 offices/sales
branches. In Japan, AJIS serves over 2,000 companies which makes up 90,000 stores, including— Daiyu Eight, Izumi Seiyu(TSE:8273),
Seiyu (Japanese Wal-Mart subsidiary), Seven
& i Holdings Co., Ltd. (TSE:3382), Sundrug Co.,Ltd. (TSE:9989), Seven
Eleven, Adidas, Giorgio Armani, Lawson, Inc. (TSE:2651), Mr Max (TSE:8203),
Retail Partners (TSE:8167), Seria (JASDAQ:2782) Gap, Triumph, Coach, Zara, etc.
Domestic revenue is spread pretty
evenly across a broad range of industries, namely supermarkets, general
merchandise stores, book stores, hardware stores, convenience stores and drug
stores.
75% of AJIS’s domestic revenue is from
chain stores—if we count supermarkets, specialty stores, discount stores, and
drugs stores into one category (see below). These are high volume, cheap, and
in demand, daily goods that compete on price. Malls and department stores only
make up a small part of AJIS’s total sales. AJIS’s
stocktaking business generates 73% of revenues and 1% from royalty income from
three franchises (Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido).
The AJIS Group (AJIS, AJIS Kyushu,
AJIS North Sea, and AJIS Shikoku) also manages inventory of actual products
displayed in bookstores— there are more than 5,000 bookstores audited annually.
However, this only brings in 663M yen of revenue—a small part of the whole
picture.
With inventory services as its main
business, AJIS also provides complementary retail support services which make
up 28% of revenues—mainly distribution and merchandizing software and solutions
for temporary staffing. Other complementary services include: logistics
warehouse inventory, collection inspection, inventory and merchandising data,
and loss prevention services.
For example, AJIS tries to strengthen
support services such as the arrangement of sales floors for the peak season
and tries to mitigate sales decrease when demand drops later. Other benefits to
customers includes tracking product prices which fluctuate— mistakes in price
changes and paying the right invoices to suppliers and consignees is critical
for operations.
Since errors such as purchase items and
placement often occur, periodic scanning inspections can be performed to
clarify problems in store operations, improve the management level of each
store and each department, and enhance the store's grasp of the accuracy of
product data.
Domestic revenue makes up 62-65% of
total sales and generates 75-81% of total operating profit. Overseas inventory
services revenue is only 8-10% of total revenue at 2.7B yen. Overseas operating
earnings are 202M, which is only 5% of total operating earnings.
The future prospects of AJIS all depends on
foreign growth. While the company derives the majority of AJIS’s business from
Japan, it has been expanding across Asia with offices in Korea, Taiwan,
Malaysia and China. In China it has 15 offices including Dalian and Shanghai;
in Korea it has 6 offices including Seoul, Busan and Daejeon. Lastly it has one
office each in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand and 5 offices in Taiwan. Most of
capital expenditures are for building new sales offices and for new scanning
equipment.
From 2012-2019, domestic revenues only grew
a paltry 1.4% annually, from 15.4B yen to 17.4B yen. From 2012-2019,
international or overseas revenues grew from 720M to 2.7B yen, an annual growth
of 21%.
In addition, operating margins are
only 7% abroad, while domestic operating margins are at a healthy 18%. One can
assume two things from low operating margins abroad—
1. Management is doing a lousy job
abroad- there aren’t enough managers to train staff and not enough people to
keep track of hiring and firing. Keeping both a permanent and temporary staff
force requires fine tuning.
2. Tendering for jobs is more
competitive abroad, and margins are better at home due to monopoly status
I would venture to say it’s a bit of both,
but management doing a lousy job is only part of the story. Out of the 780 or
so permanent staff—278 inventory counting staff are located in Japan, 124 for
complementary services, and 378 staff are for inventory counting abroad. There’s more permanent staff abroad for stock
counting than at home. There is also more growth abroad— 21% of international
growth vs. 1.4% of domestic growth is a huge difference— despite cheaper labor
costs, this may also be hypothetically offset by cheaper contracts abroad.
There are no breakdown of margins within
each specific foreign country AJIS is in, so it is hard to determine whether
margins are low because staff aren’t working at the efficiency required since a
new market was just entered, contract are awarded at a low sum and accepted by
management, or if there’s not enough staff to cater to the amount of jobs won.
These are all guesses and need further investigation.
Return on assets is approximately 20%
in Japan, while ROA abroad is lower at 13% with 1.5B yen of assets. There are a
lot of things AJIS can implement to improve margins and efficiency abroad. AJIS is in countries such as China, Malaysia, Thailand, etc. Through
a wholly owned subsidiary, AJIS entered South Korea. AJIS has entered
Philippines through an affiliated company. Recently, foreign earning’s growth
has been reduced in 2019 when Vietnam became a consolidated subsidiary. While
competition is not known in other South East Asian countries, bidding in China
results in lower prices for contracts, so Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines
may be friendlier and easier locations to make progress on. For Korea, AJIS has one of the top four
dominant players, and the rapid growth of convenient stores with longer hours
creates greater demand for inventory management.
Risk—
Overseas Competition & Failure to bring
additional growth abroad
WIS international is a privately owned
company with approximately 5200-5800 permanent staff and 9000 temporary staff.
They have revenues of USD 750-800 million per year. Currently, in 2019, AJIS is
doing USD 250-275M of sales. WIS has more than 200,000 physical inventory
counts taken every year and is a power house.
The reason why I advocate for not trying to
force progress in China is despite its huge potential, competition is fierce—
which naturally brings down margins.
WIS has locked in with the following customers—Walmart, Vanguard,
Carrefour, Better Life (步步高), Wumart (物美), Bailian Group (百聯集團), Yonghui
Superstores (永輝超市), COFCO (中粮), Alibaba Group(盒馬), Family Mart,
Apple, Texhong (天虹集團), SevenEleven, Nick, LV, PVH, Shanghai Securities, etc.
捷诚盘点has
Zara,
北京躬行益远企业管理咨询有限公司 (躬行盘点) has H&M.
There are numerous smaller players such as
China
Tally 广州中联理货有限公司,
QiMing
Inventory,
深圳市佳创盘点科技有限公司,
etc.
You get my point. There are too many
players who have already taken the big brands. Other South East Asian countries
offer more opportunities.
Risk
–Customer decides to do Inventory
Counting In-house or becomes Insolvent
During bad times such as the Corona Virus
–the current predicament we’re in, retail is hit hard and many big names can go
bankrupt if their balance sheets aren’t solid. Doubtful accounts will increase
if a customer’s financial condition worsens, and it is very likely AJIS will
have to write it off as bad debt.
Also, in order to cut costs, AJIS’s service
may be seen as extravagant, and low cost retailers might also find developing
proprietary systems may have a higher up front cost, but customization helps
out in the long run. Who could know your own business better than the people currently
running it?
Risk
– Control of Temporary Staffing and warning from Japan’s labor ministry
AJIS has so many temporary staff
since retail is seasonal— there are 780 to 800 full time staff and an abundance
of approximately 1000 to 3800 staff on standby for stock take. Most of the stock take is done during the
night and is charged per item. More than two thirds of AJIS’ expenses are
staffing costs. During peak seasons, sometimes even senior executive management
will help out with stock taking.
The goal of having temporary staff is
to optimize use of the workforce to reduce SG&A expenses by turning it into
a variable cost. The 800 full time employees are paid a full salary and the
4,000 temporary workers are employed and pushed to the maximum during peak retail
seasons. Less than 1,000 temporary
workers are employed during quiet periods.
AJIS injects a lot of staff coupled
with a proprietary terminal and scanner for every project, but if they fail to
complete the work by next morning, they will have to resume the next night.
AJIS was slapped with a labor ministry warning after cases of more than 100
hours of monthly overtime were confirmed at four locations in Japan. AJIS
became the first publicly identified employer with multiple sites violating
overtime law under the ministry's new policy of releasing such information.
AJIS has been convincing customers
for almost a decade to transfer their stock taking from the traditional once or
twice a year to multiple sessions throughout the year, to make it easier on
more manageable.
For temporary staffing, AJIS uses
their expertise in hiring and firing temporary staff—they transfer temporary
workers in cashier and clerk jobs across the Japan for a fee. This earned a great fee in the past, when
finding good cashiers and clerks at the right price was really tough. However,
there are certain times when there’s an abundance of clerks and cashiers, and
this is where AJIS’s demand shrinks.
Risk –
Technological Obsolescence
10 years
from now, stock taking by manual labor gone. Staffing so many people to
manually count inventory is time consuming and requires a lot of firing and
hiring.
In the
future, whether it is through RFIDs or 3D x-ray scanners, there will be a
better method for stock count which will disrupt the entire industry. Will AJIS
or its competitors invent this technology? A new disruption in payment system
or scanning technology, may incur catastrophic risk (bankruptcy) for inventory
management and stock count companies.
Will it be
disrupted by an incumbent? Amazon and Alibaba are
changing the face of retail by cooperating with retailers and incorporating new
scanning and pick-up technologies. Who will the winner be? I don’t know. But this brings a great risk to AJIS, which is why the
holding period can be greater than a year or 3-5 years, but anything beyond
that poses as a threat to permanent loss in capital.
We can't rule out that one day the
technology will be cheap enough and accurate enough to take share from
traditional inventory stock takers— the use of IC tags and RFID technology for
organizing inventory is a real risk to AJIS’s business—especially for clothing
and jewelry which could make outsourcing redundant. Radio tags at H&M,
Zara, and clothing at Wal-Mart tracing purposes (not counting/checking) and low
volume, slow-moving, high price tag items (like jewelry).
High volume, fast-moving, cheap, and
perishable goods are still counted mostly by hand in most developed countries
(including the US).
On RFID tags— as of now, cost is an
issue, but Moore’s law dictates that prices decrease over time. Sensor tags cost about USD 7-10 cents (or 6-9
Yen) each. That's cheaper than what they
used to be (USD 50 cents, or 43 Yen), but still expensive enough to require
Wal-Mart to subsidize their clothing suppliers to accommodate the sensors in
their clothing labels. AJIS management believes the tags need to cost far less
than 1 Yen each before it will hurt them, but I think this is naïve thinking. They claim that adding a 6-9 Yen sensor on top of a 100 Yen price tag is simply too
severe a handicap in a country with anemic consumption. While Seiyu
and big department stores are not changing to sensor tags any time soon, it
doesn’t mean they won’t transfer to a better technology when the price is
right.
WISard 750- a competitor’s scanner
AJIS
uses Keyence’s Scanner
AJIS has a scanning device to identify
items faster and reduce unknown losses –the use of a cash register still poses
a threat for employee theft. According to FTC’s (Federal Trade Commission)
survey 0.8-9.1% of the products displayed in the store is not consistent with
the price entered in the cash register.
While WIS has their own scanner, Keyence
Corporation (TSE: 6861), provides barcode scanners for AJIS. This scanner
prevents cases of pricing mismatches between prices seen on shelves and the
price paid at the cashier—an incident which causes customers to lose trust in
certain retail stores.
Risk— Working Capital Management
Most of AJIS’s customers are required
to pay up in 45-50 days, while most of its expenses, staff costs, are due
monthly or 30-31 days. This can make the average cash conversion cycle as fast
as 15-25 days.
The levered cash flow margin follows
in line with the net profit margin. In 2012, it was around 3%, today it is
around 9-10%. Such a vast improvement can be traced back to the change in
working capital as seen in the balance sheet in cash flow statement.
Working capital to total revenue was
17-18% in 2005-2009, 21-25% from 2010-2016, and from2017-2019— 30-33%. If we
inverse these numbers and get the working capital turnover (revenue/working
capital), over the span of the decade (2009-2019), the ratio dropped from 6x to
3x. The change in working capital during this time fluctuated from positive to
negative 300 million yen (USD 2.5-3million). Working capital is basically
funded by AJIS itself, and AJIS doesn’t rely on external debt such as revolving
loans or a line of credit. There are no suppliers or heavy machinery to pay for
except staff.
AJIS had a higher working capital turnover
ratio at the start of the decade—management was very efficient in using a
company’s cash and limited liabilities to supporting sales (generating a higher
dollar amount of sales for every dollar of the working capital used). The fact
that the ratio halved by 2019 may indicate that AJIS is investing too much to
open up new accounts receivables in foreign countries, as payables is almost
not a factor with limited suppliers and just staff. Not all accounts
receivables are positively generating sales turnover.
Description of Product
& Services
Stock Count
As mentioned before, CEO Akio Saito
spent a year from 1994-1995 to learn about inventory counting. Akio saw during
his time at Muscolino in the United States that there was a dedicated
computer—the National Data Computer— a highly reliable machine that responds to
fast input speeds. Akio then proceeded to hire engineers to create AJIS's
proprietary product display inventory management system, the 'AJIS System',
which double and triple checks data – after stock count has been completed,
results are aggregated and assigned to a specific location, so it is possible
to verify per location immediately. Single item products are assigned as SKU or
Stock Keeping Unit— a specific code is assigned to the display inventory
management service to input inventory quantity.
Inventory Classification and Management
Inventory Management Services
displays the amount of products by sales price and quantity to determine the
amount of inventory for each division (classification) and location. It is used
to estimate the amount of inventory required for cash management and to
approximately determine and forecast profits.
There are many cases which makes
inventory management difficult— for most goods, it is inevitable that discounts
are offered for stock clearance, and that some items may be loss or stolen,
etc. To solve this problem, Point of Sales or POS data can be utilized to
investigate unknown logs, update modified inventory information— this is the
premise of an automatic replenishment system— it eradicates certain products
and provides aging for inventory. The SKU codes collected are responsive to a
wide variety of adopted barcodes.
AJIS's Asset Product Display
Inventory Management program collects data for database by attaching a unique
barcode by examining the actual equipment and fixtures (in the case of offices,
computers, furniture, furniture, etc.) fixed assets in accounting but also
small assets and leased items in a unified way leads to more functional
productivity.
AJIS’s system is responsive not only
to JAN (Japanese Article Number) bar codes, but also other customer systems and
specifications such as Code 39, Interleaved 2 of 5, and NW7. In addition, since
service results can be delivered in a designated file layout, it is possible to
outsource product display inventory management without changing the current
system.
Customer Service Check
A researcher or field surveyor
pretends to be a customer enters the store as a “mystery shopper” to report on
the service level, cleanliness, and product management status of the store, noting
customer's reaction to store staff.
Management Quality, Owners
Dividends per share have been
increased 25-30% per year for the last five years. AJIS is cannibalizing its own shares through
continuous buybacks.
17-20% of the company is foreign
owned or owned by foreign hedge fund managers. The company holds 18% of its
treasury stock, and manager Akio Saito owns 10-13%, while his Saito family holdings
owns an additional 13-17%, making insider holdings a healthy 25-30%, with the
Saito family having the controlling shares. A quarter of the company eats its
own cooking. Management has a significant stake in the company which is always
a good sign.
Incentives
AJIS has a well-designed compensation
system which runs from top down; in the last few years a minimum of 20-30% of
total compensation for the average employee was in the form of a bonus. AJIS
retains their staff quite well, and the average is about a decade. Not only
does AJIS have a highly variable workforce, it also has a highly variable compensation
structure to go with.
Stock Splits
Source: Toyo
Kaizen Japanese Company Handbook
Stock splits have not been that
prevalent in the last decade and we hope, as long term shareholders, that AJIS
will not split it in the following decade.
Buybacks
Source: CapitalIQ
and Annual Reports
Stock purchases are being ramped up
in the latter half of the decade of 2010-2020. The company had problems with
working capital management in 2010-2014, but this has been largely resolved.
1.28B yen was purchased in 2019, and AJIS may or may not do buybacks in 2020’s
Corona Virus situation if they need the cash for contingencies.
Analysis
of AJIS’s Operating History
Millions, yen
For every annual 200-300million yen
of capital expenditures, AJIS generates 28B of revenue. Capital expenditures
are 1-2% of revenues. AJIS has been flooding with cash, and it is the very
opposite of capital intensive—from 2005-2019, 4B yen or USD 36M was invested,
and only 497 or 500 million yen of debt was employed—USD 4.5M. From 2005-2019,
24B yen was generated, or USD216M. This is exceptional—from 2005-2019, USD216M
was generated, and a capital expenditure and debt of USD 40M was deployed. A
500% return for capital deployed (CapEx and Debt), if you don’t include
pensions and other liabilities.
Valuation
The important question to ask when
valuing AJIS is— what amount of foreign sales is required to be significant
enough to influence to bottom line?
As of now, foreign sales makes up
only 6% of total sales (2.7Byen out of 27.6Byen) at an operating margin of
roughly 7% (202M yen of operating profit out of 2.7B yen of sales). In order
for the growth of foreign sales to be felt, it has to make a significant
contribution to the bottom line. For this to happen, annual sales has to
increase to 4-5x current sales.
For this to happen the current 20%
growth rate of foreign sales, in five years, sales will grow 2.5x. Assume the
Corona Virus has a significant impact on retail, and there’s a 15% growth in
convenient stores, which will roughly take 5 years to double. In the unlikely
but optimistic scenario that retail will grow at 30%, then foreign sales will
roughly grow 4x in five years.
Growth in tangible book value has
been 11-13% from 2014-2019 for AJIS. We expect this to shrink if AJIS is unable
to execute on making foreign sales a significant contribution.
Over the last five years (2015-2019),
annual growth for sales was better than the last five (2009-2014), at 6%,
however, this is still bad. Remember, foreign sales is growing at 20% or more,
but the contribution is still insignificant to total revenue. Annual operating
income fluctuated from 2009-2014, while from 2015-2019, AJIS final realized how
to solve their temporary staffing problems and made in-roads. Equity soon
compounded at 11% instead of 7%. What will the next 5 years bring? Should AJIS
be able to increase their operating margins abroad and make the sum big enough
to influence the bottom line, equity can grow at 15-17% per year. But as of
now, after the Corona Virus, retail has been hit badly in Japan and South East
Asia, so it is best to remain pessimistic and assume 8-10% for the next 2
years.
Therefore, at current price, don’t be
greedy and sell AJIS when the stock price doubles from a market capitalization
of 14-16B yen to 32-38Byen. Unless management really improves the operating
margins from 7% to a 14-18% range, and unless they really show improvement in
foreign sales, treat this company as a cigar butt and don’t be overly
enthusiastic about the upside.
With no debt, to calculate enterprise
value, I am not deducting cash, which is 9.6B yen or USD 87M. As passive
investors, we cannot influence management to pay more dividends or increase their
already high rate of buybacks. So at a market cap of 14-15B with an earnings
power of roughly 3B, there’s an earnings yield of 20-25%, and I assume the
pessimistic scenario of management not being able to expand fast enough in
Asia, so growth in intrinsic value should be about 5-10%.
ROE averaged 15% over the last decade
despite a sizable net cash balance. Capital employed has doubled in a decade,
but capital returned has increased tenfold from about 200M yen in 2010 to 2B
yen.
To demonstrate AJIS’s monopoly in
Japan in convenient store stock take is slowing down to 1-2% while some
south-east Asian countries are growing at 15-25%, I illustrate with examples
below.
Slowing Sales in Japan-
Future Prospects for AJIS - Little Room
for Growth in Japan’s Saturated Convenience Store Market
Japan’s convenience stores have enjoyed
uninterrupted growth since they were first introduced into the country in the
early 1970s. According to the JFA, there were around 58,000 convenience stores
nationwide as of April 2019, roughly a 1.5-fold increase from 20 years ago.
Annual total sales in fiscal 2017 exceeded 11 trillion yen.
Convenience store sales growth is starting
to slow in a heavily saturated market. A survey by the Japan Franchise Association
found that total sales for all convenience stores in the country went up by
only 2.7% in April 2019 as compared to the same month in 2018. Overall sales
for stores in continuing operation over the period increased by only 1.3%. The
growth rate continues to show ups and downs, reaching as high as 9.6%
year-on-year in January 2019, but has been generally slowing since around 2015.
The conventional business model for
convenience stores is starting to change as franchises struggle with slowing
sales and labor shortages. Japan is suffering from an aging and shrinking
population with not enough people joining the workforce.
To give you an idea of hard it is to
sustain convenient stores in Japan— in February 2019, franchise owners in Osaka
Prefecture decided to shorten their store hours due to lack of personnel. When
the franchise headquarters protested, this sparked a public debate on the
conventional expectation that convenience stores should be open 24 hours. The
practice of throwing away food products after their expiration date and the
prohibition against discounting prices have also attracted considerable public
criticism. In response, the major convenience store chains are beginning to
change their policies, opening fewer new stores to cope with the labor
shortage, allowing shorter hours on an experimental basis, and allowing point
“refunds”—in effect discounts—on food items that have passed their expiration
date. This will directly and negatively impact AJIS’s domestic revenues.
Conclusion
AJIS has no debt, a lot of cash, and
operates in a high tax jurisdiction with a high ROIC and is not capital
intensive, but if they fail to increase sales and generate higher operating
margins abroad, they may not generate enough value for shareholders in a slowing
economy in Japan with a shrinking labor force for convenient stores— in this
case, AJIS should be treated as a cigar butt. AJIS has competitive advantages,
but they may not sustainable for a decade. Technology also poses catastrophic
risk.
What AJIS has achieved in the Japanese
labor market, which is notoriously inflexible, is nothing short of a miracle. But
I don’t believe in miracles. I believe in sure things.
References
Japan Company Handbook-
Toyo Kezai
AJIS Annual Reports
AJIS announcements
https://www.ksg.co.kr/news/news_print.jsp?bbsID=news&bbsCategory=KSG&pNum=9267
Value Investor
Club – Author JT1882
Mizuho, a Japanese
bank’s report
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