Tuesday, December 3, 2019

Richard Koo, “The world in balance sheet recession: causes, cure, and politics”



Paper directly copied and posted from:
Richard Koo, “The world in balance sheet recession: causes, cure, and politics”, real-world economics review, issue no. 58, 12 December 2011, pp.19-37,


http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue58/Koo58.pdf
You may post and read comments on this paper at
http://rwer.wordpress.com/2011/12/12/rwer-issue-58-richard-koo/


Richard C. Koo (Nomura Research Institute, Tokyo)

A recurring concern in the Western economies today is that they may be headed toward a Japan-like lost decade. Remarkable similarities between house price movements in the U.S. this time and in Japan 15 years ago, illustrated in Exhibit 1, suggest that the two countries have indeed contracted a similar disease. The post-1990 Japanese experience, however, also demonstrated that the nation’s recession was no ordinary recession.


Recession driven by deleveraging leads to prolonged slump
The key difference between an ordinary recession and one that can produce a lost decade is that in the latter, a large portion of the private sector is actually minimizing debt instead of maximizing profits following the bursting of a nation-wide asset price bubble. When a debt-financed bubble bursts, asset prices collapse while liabilities remain, leaving millions of private sector balance sheets underwater. In order to regain their financial health and credit ratings, households and businesses are forced to repair their balance sheets by increasing savings or paying down debt. This act of deleveraging reduces aggregate demand and throws the economy into a very special type of recession.

The first casualty of this shift to debt minimization is monetary policy, the traditional remedy for recessions, because people with negative equity are not interested in increasing borrowing at any interest rate. Nor will there be many willing lenders for those with impaired balance sheets, especially when the lenders themselves have balance sheet problems. Moreover, the money supply, which consists mostly of bank deposits, contracts when the private sector collectively draws down bank deposits to repay debt. Although the central bank can inject liquidity into the banking system, it will be hard-pressed to reverse the shrinkage of bank deposits when there are no borrowers and the money multiplier is zero or negative at the margin.

As shown in Exhibits 2 and 3, massive injections of liquidity by both the Federal Reserve in the US and the Bank of England in the UK not only failed to prevent contractions in credit available to the private sector, but also produced only miniscule increases in the money supply. This is exactly what happened to Japan after the bursting of its bubble in 1990, as shown in Exhibit 4.

Nor is there any reason why bringing back inflation or inflation targeting should work, because people are paying down debt in response to the fall in asset prices, not consumer prices. And with the money multiplier negative at the margin, the central bank does not have the means to produce the money supply growth needed to increase the inflation rate.




More importantly, when the private sector deleverages in spite of zero interest rates, the economy enters a deflationary spiral because, in the absence of people borrowing and spending money, the economy continuously loses demand equal to the sum of savings and net debt repayments. This process will continue until either private sector balance sheets are repaired or the private sector has become too poor to save (i.e., the economy enters a depression).

To see this, consider a world where a household has an income of $1,000 and a savings rate of 10 percent. This household would then spend $900 and save $100. In the usual or textbook world, the saved $100 will be taken up by the financial sector and lent to a borrower who can best use the money. When that borrower spends the $100, aggregate expenditure totals $1,000 ($900 plus $100) against original income of $1,000, and the economy moves on. When demand for the $100 in savings is insufficient, interest rates are lowered, which usually prompts a borrower to take up the remaining sum. When demand is excessive, interest rates are raised, prompting some borrowers to drop out.

In the world where the private sector is minimizing debt, however, there are no borrowers for the saved $100 even with interest rates at zero, leaving only $900 in expenditures. That $900 represents someone’s income, and if that person also saves 10 percent, only $810 will be spent. Since repairing balance sheets after a major bubble bursts typically takes many years—15 years in the case of Japan—the saved $90 will go un-borrowed again, and the economy will shrink to $810, and then $730, and so on.

This is exactly what happened during the Great Depression, when everyone was paying down debt and no one was borrowing and spending. From 1929 to 1933, the U.S. lost 46 percent of its GDP mostly because of this debt-repayment-induced deflationary spiral. It was also largely for this reason that the U.S. money supply shrank by nearly 30 percent during the four-year period.

The discussion above suggests that there are at least two types of recessions: those triggered by the usual business cycle and those triggered by private sector deleveraging or debt minimization. Since the economics profession never considered the latter type of recession, there is no name for it in the literature. In order to distinguish this type of recession from ordinary recessions, it is referred to here as a balance sheet recession. Like nationwide debt-financed bubbles, balance sheet recessions are rare and, left untreated, will ultimately develop into a depression.


Significance of Japanese experience

Japan faced a balance sheet recession following the bursting of its bubble in 1990 as commercial real estate prices fell 87 percent nationwide. The resulting loss of national wealth in shares and real estate alone was equivalent to three years of 1989 GDP. In comparison, the U.S. lost national wealth equivalent to one year of 1929 GDP during the Great Depression. Japan’s corporate sector responded by shifting from its traditional role as a large borrower of funds to a massive re-payer of debt, as shown in Exhibit 5. The net debt repayment of the corporate sector increased to more than 6 percent of GDP a year. And this was on top of household savings of over 4 percent of GDP a year, all with interest rates at zero. In other words, Japan could have lost 10 percent of GDP every year, just as the US did during the Great Depression.


Japan managed to avoid a depression, however, because the government borrowed and spent the aforementioned $100 every year, thereby keeping the economy’s expenditures at $1,000 ($900 in household spending plus $100 in government spending). In spite of a massive loss of wealth and private sector deleveraging reaching over 10 percent of GDP per year, Japan managed to keep its GDP above the bubble peak throughout the post-1990 era (Exhibit 6), and the unemployment rate never climbed above 5.5 percent.

This government action maintained incomes in the private sector and allowed businesses and households to pay down debt. By 2005 the private sector had completed its balance sheet repairs.

Although this fiscal action increased government debt by 460 trillion yen or 92 percent of GDP during the 1990–2005 period, the amount of GDP preserved by fiscal action compared with a depression scenario was far greater. For example, if we assume, rather optimistically, that without government action Japanese GDP would have returned to the pre-bubble level of 1985, the difference between this hypothetical GDP and actual GDP would be over 2,000 trillion yen for the 15-year period. In other words, Japan spent 460 trillion yen to buy 2,000 trillion yen of GDP, making it a tremendous bargain. And because the private sector was deleveraging, the government’s fiscal actions did not lead to crowding out, inflation, or skyrocketing interest rates.


Post-1990 Japan also managed to keep its money supply from falling in spite of private sector deleveraging because government borrowing took the place of private sector borrowing and prevented a contraction of banks’ assets. This is shown in Exhibit 7. The post-1933 U.S. money supply also stabilized and started growing again because the Roosevelt Administration began borrowing money aggressively for its New Deal programs, as shown in Exhibit 8.
  


Many authors have argued that it was monetary policy that led to the post-1933 U.S. recovery, but they all failed to look at the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. From 1933 to 1936, only lending to the government increased, while lending to the private sector did not increase at all. And lending to the government increased because the government had to finance the New Deal programs. Both of the examples above indicate that fiscal stimulus is essential in keeping both GDP and the money supply from contracting during a balance sheet recession.


The world in balance sheet recession

Today private sectors in the U.S., the U.K., Spain, and Ireland (but not Greece) are undergoing massive deleveraging in spite of record low interest rates. This means these countries are all in serious balance sheet recessions. The private sectors in Japan and Germany are not borrowing, either. With borrowers disappearing and banks reluctant to lend, it is no wonder that, after nearly three years of record low interest rates and massive liquidity injections, industrial economies are still doing so poorly.

Flow of funds data for the U.S. (Exhibit 9) show a massive shift away from borrowing to savings by the private sector since the housing bubble burst in 2007. The shift for the private sector as a whole represents over 9 percent of U.S. GDP at a time of zero interest rates. Moreover, this increase in private sector savings exceeds the increase in government borrowings (5.8 percent of GDP), which suggests that the government is not doing enough to offset private sector deleveraging.

Flow of funds data for the U.K. (Exhibit 10) tell the same story, with the growth in private savings (7.7 percent of GDP) exceeding the increase in government deficit (7.0 percent of GDP). Once again, this means the UK government is not doing enough to stabilize the economy by offsetting private sector deleveraging.

Yet policymakers in both countries, spooked by the events in Greece, have pushed strongly to cut budget deficits, with the U.K. pushing harder than the U.S. Although shunning fiscal profligacy is the right approach when the private sector is healthy and is maximizing profits, nothing is worse than fiscal consolidation when a sick private sector is minimizing debt. Removing government support in the midst of private sector deleveraging is equivalent to removing the aforementioned $100 from the economy’s income stream, and that will trigger a deflationary spiral as the economy shrinks from $1,000 to $900 to $810.

Unfortunately, the proponents of fiscal consolidation are only looking at the growth in the fiscal deficit while ignoring even bigger increases in private sector savings. Indeed these governments are repeating the Japanese mistake of premature fiscal consolidation in 1997 and 2001, which in both cases triggered a deflationary spiral and ultimately increased the deficit (Exhibit 11).


The mistake in 1997, for example, resulted in five quarters of negative growth and increased the deficit by 68 percent, from 22 trillion yen in 1996 to 38 trillion yen in 1999. It took Japan 10 years to climb out of the hole created by this policy error. Japan would have come out of its balance sheet recession much faster and at a significantly lower cost than the 460 trillion yen noted above had it not implemented austerity measures on those two occasions. The U.S. made the same mistake of premature fiscal consolidation in 1937, with equally devastating results.

Except for certain countries in the eurozone which will be discussed below, there is no reason why a government should face financing problems during a balance sheet recession. The amount of money it must borrow and spend to avert a deflationary spiral is exactly equal to the un-borrowed and un-invested savings in the private sector (the $100 mentioned above) that is sitting somewhere in the financial system.
With very few viable borrowers left in the private sector, fund managers who must invest in fixed income assets without foreign exchange risk have no choice but to lend to the government, which is the last borrower standing. Although deficit hawks pushing for fiscal consolidation often talk about “bond market vigilantes,” the fact that 10-year bond yields in the U.S. and U.K. today are only around 2 percent—unthinkably low given fiscal deficits of nearly ten percent of GDP—indicates that bond market participants are aware of the nature and dynamics of balance sheet recessions. Indeed bond yields in the U.S. and U.K. today are equivalent to Japanese bond yields in 1997.

Reason for eurozone debt crisis

While western economies experience balance sheet recessions and most government bond yields fall to historic lows, investors continue to demand high yields to hold the debt of eurozone countries like Spain and Ireland. The reason behind this phenomenon is a factor unique to the eurozone: fixed-income fund managers can buy government bonds issued by other eurozone countries without taking on any exchange rate risk. If they grow worried about their own government’s fiscal position, they can simply buy other governments’ debt.

Spain and Ireland, for instance, are both in serious balance sheet recessions, with private sector deleveraging reaching 17 percent of GDP in Spain (Exhibit 12) and a whopping 21 percent of GDP (Exhibit 13) in Ireland, all under record low interest rates. Indeed the entire eurozone is in a balance sheet recession (Exhibit 14). Even though this means there is huge pool of private sector savings available in these countries, Spanish and Irish pension fund managers who do not like their own countries’ debt can easily buy German government bonds. That leaves the governments of both Spain and Ireland unable to tap their own private savings surpluses to fight the balance sheet recessions.

If the governments of countries like Germany and the Netherlands actively borrow and spend the money flowing in from Spain and Ireland, that will sustain economic activity in the broader eurozone economy and have a positive impact on Spain and Ireland as well. Unfortunately, the governments of Germany and the Netherlands are focused entirely on deficit-reduction efforts in a bid to observe the 3% ceiling on budget deficits prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty.











Countries in balance sheet recessions such as Spain are desperately in need of fiscal stimulus but are unable to take advantage of the rapid increase in domestic savings and are therefore forced to engage in fiscal consolidation of their own. That causes the aforementioned $100 to be removed from the income steam, prompting a deflationary spiral. And since the countries receiving those savings are not borrowing and spending them, the broader eurozone economy is rapidly weakening. It is no wonder that the Spanish unemployment rate is over 21 percent and Irish GDP has fallen more than 10 percent from its peak.

Fund flows within the eurozone were following the opposite pattern until just a few years ago. Banks in Germany, which had fallen into a balance sheet recession after the telecom bubble collapsed in 2000, aggressively bought the debt of southern European nations, which were denominated in the same currency but offered higher yields than domestic debt. The resulting capital inflows from Germany poured further fuel onto the fire of housing bubbles in these countries.

There is thus a tendency within the eurozone for fund flows to go to extremes. When times are good, funds flow into booming economies in search of higher returns, thereby exacerbating the bubbles. When the bubbles finally burst, the funds shift suddenly to the countries least affected by the boom.

The problem with these shifts is that they are pro-cyclical, tending to amplify swings in the economy. Countries that are in the midst of a bubble and do not need or want additional funds experience massive inflows. Meanwhile, countries facing balance sheet recessions and in need of funds can only watch as money flows abroad, preventing their governments from implementing the fiscal stimulus needed to stabilize the economy.


Solution for Euro: allow only nationals to buy government bonds

One way to solve this eurozone-specific problem of capital shifts would be to prohibit member nations from selling government bonds to investors from other countries. Allowing only the citizens of a nation to hold that government’s debt would, for example, prevent the investment of Spanish savings in German government debt. Most of the Spanish savings that have been used to buy other countries’ government debt would therefore return to Spain. This would push Spanish government bond yields down to the levels observed in the U.S. and the U.K., thereby helping the Spanish government implement the fiscal stimulus required during a balance sheet recession.

The Maastricht Treaty with its rigid 3 percent GDP limit on budget deficits made no provision for balance sheet recessions. This is understandable given that the concept of balance sheet recessions did not exist when the Treaty was being negotiated in the 1990s. In contrast, the proposed new rule would allow individual governments to pursue autonomous fiscal policies within its constraint. In effect, governments could run larger deficits as long as they could persuade citizens to hold their debt. This would both instill discipline and provide flexibility to individual governments. By internalizing fiscal issues, the new rule would also free the European Central Bank from having to worry about fiscal issues in individual countries and allow it to focus its efforts on managing monetary policy.

In order to maximize efficiency gains in the single market, the new restriction should apply only to holdings of government bonds. German banks should still be allowed to buy Greek private sector debt, and Spanish banks should still be allowed to buy Dutch shares.

In retrospect, this rule should have been in place since the beginning of the euro. If that were the case, none of the problems the eurozone now faces would have materialized. Unfortunately, the euro was allowed to run for more than ten years without the rule, accumulating massive imbalances along the way. It may take many years to undo the damage.

In the meantime, it will be necessary to continue financing certain countries with bonds issued jointly by a body like the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). But compared with the present situation, where there is no end-game, the declaration of an end to member state sales of government bonds to other nationals five or ten years from now should help restore confidence in the euro. This is because none of the problems that have plagued the euro up to now would be repeated if the new rule were adopted.

Ending the eurozone’s crisis will require a two-pronged approach. First, international bodies like the EU and ECB need to declare that member countries experiencing balance sheet recessions must implement and maintain fiscal stimulus to support the economy until private sector balance sheets are repaired. Second, eurozone member nations must declare that in ten years they will prohibit the sale of government debt to anyone other than their own nationals.

The first prescription would provide the international organizations’ seal of approval for the fiscal stimulus needed to stabilize economies afflicted by balance sheet recessions, while the second would prohibit savings in countries like Spain from being invested in German government bonds. Without these two “game changers,” forcing eurozone nations in balance sheet recessions to engage in fiscal consolidation will simply make the problem worse.

Unfortunately, both ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet and BOE Chairman Mervyn King are still pushing for additional fiscal retrenchment. Among international organizations, only the IMF appears to have recognized the need for fiscal stimulus in countries facing balance sheet recessions.


Difficulty of maintaining fiscal stimulus in democracies

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke understands the risk of balance sheet recessions and has been warning since early 2010 that now is not the time to engage in fiscal consolidation. Given that he was once a believer in the omnipotence of monetary policy, this represents a dramatic change of heart. Unfortunately, he and National Economic Council Chairman Gene Sperling are the only two officials openly pushing for fiscal stimulus: everyone else, including President Obama himself at times, seems to be in favor of fiscal consolidation. But with the U.S. private sector still deleveraging massively in spite of zero interest rates, nothing is potentially more dangerous for the U.S. economy than premature fiscal consolidation.

More broadly, recent developments in Washington, London, Madrid and other western capitals have proven that it is extremely difficult to maintain fiscal stimulus in a democracy during peacetime. This is a crucial problem during a balance sheet recession because fiscal stimulus must be maintained for the duration of the private sector deleveraging process in order to minimize both the length and the final fiscal cost of the recession. Unfortunately, in most democracies fiscal hawks are out in numbers demanding an end to fiscal stimulus as soon as the economy shows the first signs of life.

For example, many on both sides of the Atlantic have grown complacent after seeing certain economic and market indicators improve from their trough in the first half of 2009. The stock market, for example, was up nearly 60 percent at one point. Industrial production, which fell back to the level of 1998 in the U.S. and to the level of 1997 in the eurozone following the Lehman collapse, climbed back to the level of 2005 on both sides of the Atlantic, although it remains far below the peak levels of 2007.

This “recovery” has prompted a huge backlash from the Republican and Tea Party opposition in the U.S. seeking immediate fiscal consolidation. They argue that big government is bad government and that pork-barrel fiscal stimulus is costing future generations billions if not trillions. In the U.K., the Brown government, which implemented fiscal stimulus in 2009, was promptly voted out of office and replaced with the fiscal hawks of the Cameron government. In the eurozone, fiscal consolidation is now the only game in town. Even in Japan, the new DPJ government is pushing for a tax hike to pay for reconstruction work in the wake of the March 11th earthquake-tsunami-nuclear power plant disaster.

As a result of this backlash from fiscal hawks, the fiscal stimuli implemented by these countries in response to the Lehman–induced financial crisis are being allowed to expire. Private sector deleveraging, on the other hand, continues unabated at alarmingly high levels in all of these countries. Consequently, all of these economies are decelerating if not contracting altogether.

If the contraction appears serious and painful enough, the governments are likely to implement further fiscal stimulus, only to be forced back into fiscal consolidation once the stimulus breathes life back into the economy. This pattern of on-again, off-again fiscal stimulus is the reason why it took Japan 15 years to climb out of its own balance sheet recession. As shown in Exhibit 11, this policy zigzag, especially the austerity initiatives in 1997 and 2001, prolonged the recession by at least five years if not longer and added at least $1 trillion to the public debt unnecessarily. This policy zigzag also caused the disastrous collapse of the US economy in 1937.

Something else that slows down the implementation of fiscal stimulus in a democracy is the issue of how the money should be spent. As the previous example of 460 trillion yen in fiscal stimulus buying 2,000 trillion yen in Japanese GDP during the 1990–2005 period demonstrates, how the money is spent is largely irrelevant during a balance sheet recession: the important thing is that the money be spent.

In a democracy, however, where most people see only the trees and not the forest, even those few political leaders who understand the need for stimulus end up arguing endlessly about which projects the money should be spent on. In the meantime, the economy continues to shrink in the $1,000-to-$900-to-$810 deflationary spiral described above. Only during wartime, when it is obvious where the money should be spent, can democracies implement and sustain the kind of fiscal stimulus needed to overcome a balance sheet recession in the shortest possible time.

Even those who manage to prevent an economic meltdown by implementing necessary fiscal stimulus before the crisis are likely to be bashed instead of praised by the public. This is because the general public typically cannot envision what might have happened in the absence of fiscal stimulus. Seeing only a large deficit and no crisis, they assume the money must have been wasted on useless projects. That is exactly what happened to Liberal Democratic politicians in Japan, President Barack Obama in the U.S. and former Prime Minister Gordon Brown in the U.K. Although their actions saved their economies from devastating deflationary spirals, they were bashed because the public is unable to contemplate the counterfactual scenario. The man or woman who prevents a crisis never becomes a hero. For a hero to emerge we must first have a crisis, as Hollywood movies will attest.

It has also become popular in some circles to talk about medium-term fiscal consolidation while pushing for a short-term fiscal stimulus. Although this sounds responsible at one level, it is totally irresponsible at another. When the private sector is deleveraging in spite of zero interest rates, a condition that has never been anticipated in the economics or business literature, it is safe to assume that the private sector is very sick. Talking about medium-term consolidation in this environment is like asking a seriously injured person just admitted to an intensive care unit whether she can afford the expensive treatment needed. If asked this question enough times, the patient may become so depressed and discouraged that her condition will actually worsen, ultimately resulting in an even larger medical bill.

It has become commonplace to talk about the so-called policy duration effect of monetary policy. The July 2011 announcement by the Fed that it will not raise interest rates until well into 2013 was a prime example of maximizing this effect. For some reason, however, we hear nothing about the policy duration effect of fiscal policy. Talk of medium-term fiscal consolidation effectively minimizes the policy duration effect of whatever stimuli that are still in place, which in a sense is highly irresponsible. Since the patient must be cured somehow, the government should work to maximize the policy duration effect of both monetary and fiscal policies in order to minimize the final cost of treatment. It is never a good idea to depress both the brakes and the accelerator at the same time.

The above reality, together with the recent push for fiscal consolidation in Western capitals, suggests that it is difficult to maintain fiscal stimulus in a democracy during peacetime. Recovering from a balance sheet recession will therefore take a long time in a democracy.


“Exit problem” in balance sheet recessions

The long time required for the economy to pull out of a balance sheet recession means the private sector must spend many painful years paying down debt. That in turn brings about a debt “trauma” of sorts in which the private sector refuses to borrow money even after its balance sheet is fully repaired. This trauma may take years if not decades to overcome. But until the private sector is both willing and able to borrow again, the economy will be operating at less than full potential and may require continued fiscal support from the government to stay afloat. Overcoming this trauma may be called the “exit problem.”

In Japan, where the private sector has grown extremely averse to borrowing after its bitter experience of paying down debt from 1990 to 2005, businesses are not borrowing money in spite of willing lenders and the lowest interest rates in human history. As a result, the 10-year government bond is yielding only around 1 percent even though government debt amounts to nearly 200 percent of GDP. 

thirty years, until 1959 (Exhibit 15). The fact that it took the U.S. three decades to bring interest rates back up to 4 percent even with massive fiscal stimuli in the form of the New Deal and World War II suggests the severity of the trauma. Indeed many of those Americans forced to pay down debt during the Depression never borrowed again.

The experiences of post-1929 US and post-1990 Japan suggest that interest rates will remain low for a very long time even after private sector balance sheets are repaired. The governments of countries facing exit problems should therefore introduce incentives for businesses to borrow. Such incentives, which may include investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation allowances, should be exceptionally generous in order to attract private sector attention. The sooner the trauma is overcome, the sooner the government can embark on fiscal consolidation. The generosity will more than pay for itself once the private sector trauma is overcome.


Ending panic was the easy part; rebuilding balance sheets is the hard part

A distinction should also be drawn between balance sheet recessions and financial crises, since both are present in the post-Lehman debacle. The former is a borrower’s phenomenon, while the latter is a lender’s phenomenon. This distinction is important because the economic “recovery” starting in 2009 has been largely limited to a recovery from the policy mistake of allowing Lehman Brothers to fail. The collapse of Lehman sparked a global financial crisis that weakened the economy far more severely and rapidly than what would have been suggested by balance sheet problems alone.

Unlike balance sheet recessions, in which monetary policy is largely impotent, financial crises can and must be addressed by the monetary authorities. Available tools include liquidity infusions, capital injections, explicit and implicit guarantees, lower interest rates and asset purchases. According to IMF figures, the Federal Reserve, together with governments and central banks around the world, injected some $8.9 trillion in liquidity and guarantees for this purpose in the wake of the Lehman shock.

The Lehman panic was caused by the government’s decision not to safeguard the liabilities of a major financial institution when so many institutions had similar problems. Consequently, the panic dissipated when the authorities moved to safeguard those liabilities. That was the “recovery” observed in some quarters since the spring of 2009.

Although the panic has subsided, all the balance sheet problems that existed before the Lehman failure are still in place. If anything, the continuous fall in house prices since then has exacerbated these problems. Balance sheet problems are likely to slow down the recovery or derail it altogether unless the government moves to offset the deflationary pressure coming from private sector deleveraging. In other words, the recovery so far was the easy part ((B) in Exhibit 16). The hard work of repairing millions of impaired private sector balance sheets is just beginning ((A) in Exhibit 16).

Conclusion

It is laudable for policy makers to shun fiscal profligacy and aim for self-reliance on the part of the private sector. But every several decades, the private sector loses its self-control in a bubble and sustains heavy financial injuries when the bubble bursts. That forces the private sector to pay down debt in spite of zero interest rates, triggering a deflationary spiral. At such times and at such times only, the government must borrow and spend the private sector’s excess savings, not only because monetary policy is impotent at such times but also because the government cannot tell the private sector not to repair its balance sheet.

Although anyone can push for fiscal consolidation in the form of higher taxes and lower spending, whether such efforts actually succeed in reducing the budget deficit is another matter entirely. When the private sector is both willing and able to borrow money, fiscal consolidation efforts by the government will lead to a smaller deficit and higher growth as resources are released to the more efficient private sector. But when the financial health of the private sector is so impaired that it is forced to deleverage even with interest rates at zero, a premature withdrawal of fiscal stimulus will both increase the deficit and weaken the economy. Key differences between the textbook world and the world of balance sheet recessions are summarized in Exhibit 17.

With massive private sector deleveraging continuing in the U.S. and in many other countries in spite of historically low interest rates, this is no time to embark on fiscal consolidation. Such measures must wait until it is certain the private sector has finished deleveraging and is ready to borrow and spend the savings that would be left un-borrowed by the government under an austerity program.
There will be plenty of time to pay down the accumulated public debt because the next balance sheet recession of this magnitude is likely to be generations away, given that those who learned a bitter lesson in the present episode will not make the same mistake again. The next bubble and balance sheet recession of this magnitude will happen only after we are no longer here to remember them.





Aaron’s, Inc (NYSE: AAN)


December 2, 2019



With the S&P 500 and DJIA at an all-time high, most investors find it hard to find bargain securities at depressed prices. Stocks are rising despite a lack of corresponding real performance in earnings or production; coupled with the trade war and a changing yield curve, investors anticipate a dip looming, but no one truly knows when.

Lease to own, virtual leasing, and retail companies have benefited from this boom. However, the lease-to-own industry is changing to an online business model, and as consumers get more financially savvy, they may opt for credit cards instead. Important industry metrics for lease-to-own goods are comparable store sales, invoices grown, and invoices per active door count.

Aaron’s has taken advantage of this boom by buying up Progressive’s product leasing division for approximately $700million in 2014. Aaron’s higher operating margins are due to Progressive’s cooperation with large enterprise accounts vs purchasing store owned merchandise. Progressive Leasing acts as a lease to ownership facilitator— Progressive partners with different retailers to provide customers with poorer FICO (600-700) or credit ratings with lease-to-own agreements for products outside of Aaron's coverage. 

In 2019, Progressive partnered with BestBuy in February and Wayfair in October. Despite these positive partnerships, the nature of the lease-to-own retail industry is that it will experience cyclical downturns especially with Aaron’s heavy product range in appliances and furniture. Before the Progressive acquisition, Aaron’s legacy business’ operating margins were still in single digits.

John Robinson, Aaron’s current CEO, previously ran an auto-title lender called TitleMax, growing the company from approximately 100 stores to more than 750 stores. Robinson and has team have now solidified Aaron’s position as the US lease-to-own market leader with a capitalization of 4 billion with 1689 stores and operating margins of 13.8% as of December 2018. Competitor Rent-A-Center has a capitalization of 1.4 billion, has 2561 stores, but almost half the operating margins at 6.2%. Both companies are benefiting with E-commerce, with Rent-A-Center generating 80% of its new customers online, while Aaron’s saw a 68% increase in e-commerce lease-to-own revenues in 2019.

Progressive now carries the weight for Aaron’s future prospects, since its legacy leasing and brick and mortar business is deteriorating. Invoice numbers are an excellent predictor of revenue performance, while other figures come with a trade-off. Since acquisition, Progressive has grown customer leasing invoice volume from 471 million in 2014 to 1.49 billion in 2019, with 2.46 billion of lease agreements in effect.

Progressive’s leasing business uses proprietary algorithms to determine whether customers meet leasing qualifications with the ability to turn on and off different pools of opportunity and approval rates. Progressive’s system is really agile, while on the other hand, there are many problems with Aaron's legacy retail business–their old technology makes them non-competitive. Progressive has been helping Aaron’s make a transition, by having 40-50 trial stores with new technology and trained staff, but whether this strategy proves successful and well executed poses a risk to shareholders.

Most of Progressive’s transactions are completed online or through a point of sale integration with retail partners. Contractual payments are usually based on a customer's pay frequency and are typically processed through automated clearing house payments. If the payment is unsuccessful, collections are managed in-house through a call center, customer service hubs, and a proprietary lease management system. The call center contacts customers within a few days after the due date to encourage them to pay on time. If the customer chooses to return the merchandise, arrangements are made to receive the merchandise through retail partners, or Aaron's operated stores.

Despite Progressive’s complex algorithms to screen candidates for credit-worthiness, their rapid and aggressive expansion always makes me consider whether there are conservative factors embedded in screening candidates.

Progressive calculates, at the end of each period, the allowance for loan losses based on actual delinquency balances. Delinquent loans receivable are those that are 30 days or more past due based on their contractual billing dates. Progressive then evaluates the historical average loss for the prior eight quarters on loans receivable by aging category.

Aaron’s places loans receivable on nonaccrual status when they are greater than 90 days past due or upon notification of client bankruptcy, death or fraud. For loans in nonaccrual status, Aaron’s discontinues accruing interest and fees. The allowance for loan losses is maintained at an adequate level to cover probable losses of principal, interest and fees in the loans receivable portfolio.

Loans receivable are removed from nonaccrual status when payments resume, the loan becomes 90 days or less past due and collection of outstanding amounts is deemed probable. Payments received on nonaccrual loans are allocated according to the same payment ranking system applied to loans accruing interest. Loans receivable 120 days past due are charged off at the end of the month following the billing cycle.

Progressive Leasing had 953,000 customers at September 30, 2019, a 17.9% increase from September 30, 2018. Despite sales are growing about 30% year on year, Aaron’s quickly depreciating merchandise (Progressive and Aarons has roughly half of its leasing in furniture, a quarter in appliances, and a quarter in electronics) and poor same store sales growth (-7% in 2017 and -1.5% in 2018) in an attempt to restructure its legacy business makes investing in Aaron’s fraught with risk. Aaron's lease ownership requires significant levels of merchandise inventory available for lease in order to ensure timely delivery of products for store-based and e-commerce operations. Therefore, Aaron's most significant working capital asset is merchandise inventory on lease.

Aaron’s has 1312 stores which are wholly owned, and 377 franchised stores. Aaron’s also has its own furniture brand called Woodhaven. About a third of Aaron’s stores are franchisees, and that number is shrinking. In 2017, Aaron’s largest franchisee, SEI, was acquired in an all cash transaction for 140 million which included coverage of 11 states and 90,000 customers mainly in the North East.

Company-operated Aaron’s stores had 963,000 customers in September 30, 2019, a 2.6% decrease from September 30, 2018. This transition turns Aaron's Business segment into a more capital-intensive business model due to real estate and additional costs associated instead of collecting a franchise fee.

When Aaron’s enters into franchise agreements, they govern the opening and operations of franchised stores. Under the standard agreement, Aaron’s receives a franchise fee for a term of ten years, with one ten-year renewal option from $15,000 to $50,000 per store depending upon market size. Franchisees are also obligated to remit to royalty payments of 6% of the weekly cash revenue collections from their stores.

Same-store revenues for franchised stores increased 1.7% and same-store customer counts declined 3.7% for the third quarter of 2019 compared with the same 3rd quarter in 2018. Franchised stores had 241,000 customers at the end of the third quarter of 2019.

Aaron’s tried to minimize expenses after acquisition of SEI by shutting down 155 stores in 2019. To a certain extent, gaining ownership of retail franchise stores is a liability rather than an asset. The good news is, in Aaron’s recent conference call, directors claim— “We do not have any material franchise acquisitions planned at this time. However, we would certainly evaluate the right opportunity were it to present itself.”

Another risk with from significant increase in deliveries results in insufficient labor to handle the workload in stores. Aaron’s provides durable household goods such as furniture on monthly, semi-monthly, and weekly installments. Aaron’s also guarantees same or next day delivery for customers ten miles from the store. This labor shortage hampers collections performance, which had an unfavorable impact on lease revenues and write-offs.

Aaron’s also experienced a decrease in active door count primarily due to a reduction in locations in mattress and mobile phone segments. Q3 2019 active door count was approximately 19,900, down 1.6% from the third quarter of 2018. In terms of active doors, a metric for Progressive’s virtual lease to own transactions there were 24,198 in 2018 and 21,840 in 2016.

Management and Aaron’s CEO John Robinson believes that invoices per active door count has become less predictive as a leading indicator of future revenue growth, particularly as overall mix shifts towards larger footprint locations and e-commerce transactions (virtual leasing) or larger footprint type doors. A new influx of invoices can come in without necessarily moving the door metric as seen in the past.

Should a recession scenario occur, Aaron’s might gain more customers, due to customers with poorer credit ratings seeking to purchase goods. But there is also a chance the legacy business might fail weather the storm. Factors to consider are with Aaron’s being more lenient in accepting leasing for goods—will there be increasing defaults? Will the business model become obsolete as customers get more responsible?

Aaron’s customers are non-sophisticated customers with limited access to traditional credit based bank financing, installment credit cards. This is bad since the majority of Americans are in the upper tiers of the FICO scoring distribution—nearly 57% of Americans have a FICO score of 700 or higher. This has historically been the case, but in the last eight or ten years of steady economic growth since the 2008 financial crisis most American consumer’s credit profiles have improved significantly. As Americans become more responsible and credit worthy, they would gradually make the switch to credit cards and traditional bank financing.

Another factor to consider is – with electronics and mobile phones depreciating at a quick rate and since only a certain amount of consumer durables are considered a necessity, would people stop buying and leasing certain goods in a recession? Progressive’s average lease life is 7 months and has superior analytics and faster collection compared to Aaron’s legacy business. Despite Aaron’s being able to buy at better rates due to relationships with large electronics manufacturers like Samsung, too many goods in electronics and appliances become obsolete within a year.

From 2017-2019, the write-offs for damaged, lost or unsaleable merchandise ranged from 5-8% of gross revenues. There was a slight increase in writes-offs due to a reduction in collections from the implementation and adoption of new sales programs, and store closures. Bad debt ranged from 10-13%. Performance differed due to restructuring of legacy stores and an increasing mix of virtual leasing added to the revenue stream.

For Aaron’s you can expect annual capital expenditures to continue to be in the 100-130 million dollar range. With 60-70 million for maintenance capital expenditures and the rest for expansion. Expansion or growth capital expenditures is focused in 3 areas—

1.      Due to the change in lease accounting, Aaron’s reevaluated their vehicle acquisition strategy and plans to purchase trucks in the Aaron's Business instead of leasing them going forward. The incremental capital expenditures for trucks should be approximately $15 million for 2019.

2.      Another $15 million relates to both hardware and software to complete the rollout of rapid customer onboarding, centralized processing, and IT based customer support for Aaron's Business.

3.      Finally, the new store concept and the restructuring of stores is being implemented. The improvements include an increase in deliveries in excess of 30%. Aaron’s has increased their sample set by 40 to 50 locations during 2019. We expect to spend approximately $30 million for these real estate-related improvements.

Aaron’s management deems it prudent to confirm results of these 40-50 locations before deciding on a possible broader rollout.

During Q2 2019 Aaron’s returned approximately $27 million to shareholders through buybacks repurchased approximately 243,000 shares, returning approximately $17 million to shareholders. In Q3 2019, with 150 million in cash, Aaron’s repurchased 399,424 shares for 25 million at an average price of 62 dollars per share. Despite buybacks and dividends, one negative sign suggesting management may not be aligned and incentivized in the same interests as shareholders is that the board of directors and executive team own less than 2% of Aaron’s. Aaron’s has had one 3-for-2 stock split in 2011 and hasn’t had any splits since.

Aaron's, Inc. directors raise quarterly cash dividends by 14.3% from $0.04 per share from $0.035, and declared the first such dividend payable January 6, 2020 to shareholders of record as of the close of business on December 19, 2019.
Aaron’s dividend has been raised for 17 consecutive intervals and has not been omitted.

Credit and appliance rentals a 20-25 billion market in the US. With approximately 40% of the US population carrying a FICO score under 700, there is still a large enough addressable market that the business can continue growing. Of the whole market, if Aaron’s targets the 40% within its FICO range, this mean 8-12 billion of Aaron’s customers are untapped. Being conservative, if the market doesn’t grow, due to an inability to partner with enterprises or consumers becoming wiser and not leasing goods to own them later; at most, there is room for Aaron’s market capitalization to double or maybe, very remotely, triple. I don’t foresee Aaron’s expanding internationally soon.  

One positive sign is that Aaron’s return on capital has been continuously increasing, and is now at 14%. Days-payable has decreased from 68 days in 2014 to 15 days in 2019, which warrants further investigation. Tangible book value has more than doubled since 2014, from 360 million to 933 million in 2019.

Debt to equity has decreased from 50% in 2014 to 38% in 2019. Aaron’s amended its revolving credit facility and term loan agreement to increase its term loan by $137.5 million, to $225 million. Aaron’s also amended its franchise loan facility to reduce the total commitment amount from $85 million to $55 million and extend the maturity to October 22, 2019.

Will Aaron's be able to turn its legacy business around? Will the 40-50 trial stores work out and be rolled out nation-wide? Or will this legacy business cancel out benefits accrued from Progressive? Despite partnerships with Bestbuy and Wayfair, will bigger players like Walmart and Amazon disrupt this field?

At a present price of about 4.5 billion inclusive of debt, and a predicted consistent earning power of 300 million a year, 15 times earnings seems to be a bit too expensive despite Aaron’s growth potential should it fix its traditional business and expand further. While Aaron’s is by no means very cheap at 8.4x enterprise value to operating earnings, it is cheaper than its peers which are near 15-16x earnings.

I would wait until there’s a dip of 50-70% so enterprise value is closer to 2 billion or not buy at all. Even if I were to own this business, I don’t see it as a great business model over the next decade. 

Thursday, November 28, 2019

Li Lu's 2019 Annual Book Review

Li Lu's 2019 Annual Book Review
The Age of the Great Recession: The Other Half of Macroeconomics and the Fate of Globalization
November 19, 2019
The book I want to recommend this year is “The Age of the Great Recession: The Other Half of Macroeconomics and the Fate of Globalization,” written by Mr. Koo Chao Ming (Richard C. Koo).

This book is about the big issues in the world today.

1.      First— Monetary policy. 

Basically all the major economies today, such as Japan, the United States, Europe, and China are over issuing currencies on a large scale. The over issuance of base currency has reached astronomical numbers, resulting in low interest rates, zero interest rates and even negative interest rates in the Euro, which has never happened before in history. At the same time, the contribution of currency issuance to real economic growth is minimal. Except for the United States, the economies of major developed countries are basically minimal or zero. Another consequence of this situation is that the debt levels of various countries relative to GDP are increasing, and at the same time, all asset prices, from stocks to bonds, and even real estate, are at historical highs. How long will this abnormal currency phenomenon last? How will it end? When this ends, what does it mean for global asset prices? No one can answer these questions, but almost everyone's wealth is closely related to this.

2.       Second— globalization. 
Globalization in the past few decades has closely linked the fate of all countries in different stages of development, but global trade and capital flows have been separated from the monetary and fiscal policies and are independently exercised by each country. Therefore, globalization and global capital flows have formed considerable conflicts with each country's own economic and domestic policies, and have also made relations between countries increasingly tense. For example, we are now seeing an ever-increasing China-US trade conflict. We are also seeing such instability within many countries and regions around the world, from Hong Kong to Paris to Chile, street politics is becoming increasingly fierce in various places. At the same time, within these countries, far-left and far-right political forces have gradually replaced the moderate and rational forces, making the entire world more uncertain. Under such circumstances, no one can predict what the future global trade and capital flows will look like.

3.       Third— in such an international environment, how should the macroeconomic policies and fiscal policies of various countries respond? What policies should be implemented for different countries at different stages of development?

All three issues are of paramount importance in today's world. Someone who is able to answer these questions with a reasonable theory deserves respectable academic achievement, as simultaneously answering all three questions is almost impossible. In this book, Koo Chao Ming provides a convincing perspective, and put forth some basic concepts with a complete logical framework. Although these three questions do not have straight-forward answers, they at least give a very important perspective. Whether you agree with his theory or not, it is worth pondering and considering.

Now a brief background about the author Koo Chao Ming. He is the chief economist at the Nomura Securities Research Institute and has had a broad influence on the Japanese government over the past three decades. I first heard him about a decade ago at a YPO (Young Persons Organization) international conference in Japan. He gave a keynote speech at the conference, explaining what Japan called the "lost decade" (of course it is now "lost twenty years", or even "lost thirty years").

Koo Chao Ming explained these economic phenomena following the burst of the Japanese bubble such as zero economic growth, currency oversupply, zero interest rates, large government deficits, and high debt. There are different interpretations of these phenomena in the West, but they are basically believed to be caused by the failure of Japanese macroeconomic policies. But for the first time Koo Chao Ming gave another completely opposite but more convincing interpretation. He put forward a new concept of his own unique economics—balance sheet decline. He attributed the economic recession in Japan at that time of the Great Economic Recession caused by the rapid expansion and decline of the private sector (business and household) balance sheet after the asset bubble burst. 

In the Great Recession caused by balance sheet decline, he put forth one of the most unique views, claiming that the goals of the entire private sector have changed fundamentally, they are no longer in pursuit of maximizing profits, but in minimizing liabilities. So at this time, no matter how much the currency is issued, the first thing the private sector and individuals do when they get money is not to invest and expand their business, but to pay off their debts. 

Because the sharp decline in asset prices at that time put the entire private sector and households in a state of technical bankruptcy, what they had to do to repair their balance sheets, was to keep saving and pay off debts. In this case, the economy will inevitably lead to a large-scale contraction. This decline is like the 30 years US economic crisis, once the economy begins to shrink, it will spontaneous head into a downward spiral. In the Great Depression, within just a few years, the entire US economy shrank by nearly 46 percent.

The method adopted by the Japanese government is to issue currency on a large scale, and then, with large-scale government borrowing, directly invest in infrastructure to digest and residents' idle large-scale savings. With this method, Japan has kept the economy at the same level for more than a decade. Although the economy experiences zero growth, there is also no decline or recession. According to Koo Chao Ming, this is the only correct macroeconomic policy choice. 

As a result, the Japanese economy has not experienced a massive 46% reduction like the United States in the 1930s, while giving the private sector sufficient time to slowly repair its balance sheet. So until recently, the private sector and households have started to return to normal. Of course, due to this, the government's balance sheet was seriously injured. The Japanese government's debt is the highest in the world today. But this is still the best policy choice compared to other options. This was the most distinctive interpretation of Japan I heard at the time. The observation of the Japanese economy since then has confirmed his idea to some extent.

The West has always has been critical of Japan's policy, and its attitude towards Japan did not change until after the 2008-2009 Western Great Recession. Years later in 2008-2009, all of a sudden the entire West encountered a similar situation to Japan in the 80s with a big bubble burst at the end of the decade. At this time, the main assets of the West also began to depreciate sharply, and the entire private sector fell into technical bankruptcy, so the situation was very similar. The policies adopted by the major western countries were all excessive currency issuance. 

Then only main experience influencing the Western central bank was of the 1930s, in the Great Depression era. In the summary, of the last 30 years, the main conclusion of the economics professor Milton Friedman was that a fundamental error has occurred in monetary policy in treating an economic policy crisis. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in 2008 was a strong supporter of this view. He even thought that in extreme cases, banknotes could be sprinkled directly from helicopters. Therefore, in response to the 2008 crisis, Western countries began a large-scale currency oversupply. But contrary to expectations, the result of currency oversupply did not bring about a rapid recovery of economic growth. These large amounts of over-issued currencies were actually utilized by the private sector to pay off debt, so economic growth remained sluggish. Except for a small amount of economic growth in the United States, the Euro zone economy was still basically stagnant.

The government's first response was to increase the issuance of currencies. For this reason, central banks in various countries even invented quantitative easing (QE) which previously not deployed. Central banks traditionally regulates the money supply by adjusting reserves (the most important part of the base currency). After the implementation of QE, the Fed's excess reserves have reached 12.5 times the statutory reserves. Afterwards, the major western central banks followed QE, and the corresponding multiples reached 9.6 times in the euro area, 15.3 times in the UK, 30.5 times in Switzerland, and 32.5 times in Japan! That is to say, under normal economic conditions, if the private sector can effectively use these new currencies, inflation can reach the same multiples (such as the US— 1250%). In other words, if these currencies enter the asset investment class, asset prices can rise sharply several times to levels of a speculative bubble, there might be a chance to strongly stimulate GDP growth.

But the actual situation is that the economy is still growing only slightly, and some asset prices are gradually rising. The biggest consequence of this policy is the formation of interest rates close to zero, and even the negative interest rates of about $15 trillion in the euro zone today. This has shaken the fundamental assumptions of the entire capitalist market mechanism, but at the same time it has not brought about the expected economic growth. At this time, the phenomenon in Europe as a whole began to look more and more like Japan. Everyone started to rethink the Japan’s previous experience. Koo Chao Ming's summary of Japan and Japan's fiscal policy have regained interest from major western countries.

Koo Chao Ming used a relatively simple framework to explain these phenomena. He said that according to the saving and investment behavior in the economy, an economy will always be in one of the following four situations, as shown in the following table.



Borrower/Investor
Savings/Deposit
The First Situation
(Economy is normal stages of growth)
Y
Y
The Second Situation
(The first stage of economic crisis)
Y
N
The Third Situation
(Japan in the 90's)
N
Y
The Fourth Situation
(2008-2009, and America's Great Depression in 1929)
N
N

Under normal circumstances, there should be both savings and borrowed investment in an economy. This way, the economy is in a state of relatively positive growth. When the general economic crisis comes, savers lack money, but there are still borrowers and investors, and investment opportunities. In this case, the central bank’s role as the last resort currency provider is very important. This is the most important conclusion of the 1930’s Great Depression— the central bank as a lender of last resort, the last provider of funds. It provides funding and then lends to the private sector.

However, what everyone did not expect is the third and fourth situations which have not occurred before—what will happen to the economy when the borrowers and investors are missing? For example, in Japan, there are savers, but in the past few decades, the private sector has no incentive to borrow and invest.

What should we do? By 2008-2009, the situation in the entire West was that there were neither savers nor borrowers, and the savers themselves disappeared when the crisis occurred. There were almost no savings in the United States, and assets fell on a large scale. Technically they were under bankruptcy. At the same time, there were basically no investment opportunities in Europe. After several rounds of QE, with the base currency issued on a large scale, and with no one willing to invest— there is no investment opportunity in the economy. People get their money back from the bank in the form of negative interest rates. This has never happened before.

The main contribution of Koo Chao Ming's basic research framework is the third and fourth cases, that is, the phenomena in absence of borrowers. For example, Japan belongs to the third case, where some people save but no one borrows. In this case, he believes that the government must bear the responsibility of the ultimate borrower, and through fiscal policy, the government directly invests. Because if you do not do this, the private sector will not be willing to be a borrower, and the economy will start to shrink, and once the economy starts to shrink, it will itself have an accelerating downward spiral mechanism. This acceleration can even lead to halving the economy and mass unemployment, and the social consequences are unimaginable. Hitler came to power in the 1930s, and the resurgence of Japanese militarism was directly related to the Great Depression of the time.

The fourth scenario is what happened in 2008-2009, with neither savers nor borrowers. At this point, the government should act as both the ultimate funding provider and the ultimate borrower. For the United States, from 2008 to 2009, it passed the central bank's oversupply of currency and the Treasury Department passed the TARP bill, which directly injected capital into all systemically important commercial and investment banks, which simultaneously solved the problem of lacking both investors and depositors, thereby stabilizing the economy. Western Europe may still be in the third or even the fourth situation to this day. There are neither savers nor borrowers, and because of the limitations of within the Euro zone, European countries can only use monetary policy (control of interest rates and money supply). The binding Euro contract has limited European countries, especially Southern European countries using the same fiscal policy (control of tax rates and government budget/spending) to expand domestic demand, and such restrictions could have disastrous consequences in the future.

Koo Chao Ming used the above framework to analyze the unique economic phenomena facing the world today (the third and fourth situations), and also put forward some views on the economic policies of developed countries.

He then considered the question: Why did asset bubbles occur in both Western Europe and the United States? Why did they not find a way to grow after the asset bubble burst (except for the United States, which has relatively weak growth)? In order to answer this question, he put forward in my book what I think is the second more unique perspective. This perspective is particularly meaningful for China today. He proposed that there are three different stages of economic development in the context of globalized trade.

First we introduce in development economics is an important concept—Lewis Turning Point (economic development where surplus rural labor is fully absorbed into the manufacturing sector). In the early days of urban industrialization, surplus rural labor is continuously migrated to urban industry, and once industrialization develops to a certain scale, the surplus rural labor force experiences shortage, since the economy enters full employment. This turning point is called the Lewis Turning Point. This observation was first made by British economist William Arthur Lewis in the 1950’s.

The first stage was the early urban industrialization process before the arrival of the Lewis Turning Point. The second stage is that after the economy has passed the Lewis turning point, society has entered a state of interactive growth of savings, investment, and consumption, also known as the golden age. The third stage, which is a unique stage proposed by Koo Chao Ming, is globalization, after the economy has matured and entered the advanced economy stage, it will enter the stage of being chased by other developing nations. 

Why does this happen? Because in this period, as domestic production costs increase to a certain level, investment in other developing countries overseas become more advantageous. In the early days, the advantages of overseas investment were not clear because of various cultural and institutional obstacles, but when the domestic production costs reach a certain level, and after some basic capabilities for overseas investment were established in other countries, overseas investment becomes far more beneficial and lucrative than domestic investment. At this time, capital inflow and investments into the country will deteriorate and domestic wages will begin to stagnate.

1.      In the first stage, that is, during the early industrialization of cities and towns before the arrival of the Lewis Turning Point, capitalists had absolute control, and it was generally difficult for laborers to have pricing power and bargaining power, because there were many surplus people in the countryside, and with many people looking for work— companies will naturally exploit workers.

2.       The second stage, that is, after the Lewis turning point, has entered the mature stage of economic development. At this time, the company needs to increase investment by increasing investment in production equipment to meet the needs of employees, increase wages, and improve the working environment. And production equipment, etc. During this period, because the labor force has begun to be in short supply, economic development will lead to rising wage levels, rising wages will cause rising consumption levels, saving levels and investment levels will also rise, and the company's profits will rise, forming an interaction. Upward positive cycle. At this stage, almost everyone in the society can enjoy the fruits of economic development, and at the same time, a consumer society dominated by the middle class. Even for people with low education, wages are increasing. Living standards are improving. So this stage is also called the golden age.

3.       In the third stage, society began to divide. For the labor force, only those jobs with relatively high technical content, such as science and technology, finance, trade, and international markets, will continue to get good job returns, and those with lower education levels in traditional manufacturing jobs will gradually receive lower wages. The gap between the rich and the poor in society has further widened. The domestic economy and investment opportunities have gradually depleted, and investment opportunities have been transferred overseas. During this time, GDP growth mainly depends on continuous technological innovation. If the ability in this area is relatively strong (such as the United States), GDP will still grow at a low rate; if the ability to innovate is not strong and the rate of innovation is not fast (such as Europe or Japan), the domestic economic growth is weak, and investment is transferred to overseas or irrational areas.

Koo Chao Ming believed that Western society entered the third stage in the 1970’s, when it was mainly chased by the four dragons of Japan and Asia. To a dozen years later, 80 years, China began to enter into the international economic cycle, the Japanese have begun to enter into the catch-up phase. After catching up, the opportunities for domestic economic growth have sharply decreased, and it is easier for economic growth to enter areas prone to formation of bubble, whether in Japan, the United States or Western Europe. Derivative securities caused the formation of huge bubbles and subsequent bubble bursts. After the bubble burst, because domestic economic growth opportunities are still limited and growth potential is still small, the private sector on one hand needs to repair its balance sheet and on the other hand lacks investment opportunities, making its economic behavior no longer pursue maximization of profit, but to change to minimizing debt. In this way, some predictions based on traditional economic theory have basically failed.

Koo Chao Ming pointed out that at different stages of economic development, the government's macro policies will have different functions, and therefore need to employ different policy or tools. This view is most inspiring to China today.

In the early industrialization process, economic growth mainly depended on capital formation, manufacturing, and exports. During this time, the government's fiscal policy will play a huge role. The government can concentrate limited resources and invest in infrastructure, resources, export-related services, etc. These will help emerging countries to quickly enter an industrialized state. Almost all countries have adopted active government with supporting policies at this stage.

Entering the second stage, the main driver of economic growth are wages and consumption. During this stage, with society fully employed, so as long as wages increase in any sector or field, increase in wages in other sectors will inevitably occur. Increased wages lead to increased consumption and savings, and companies will use these savings to increase investment in equipment in order to increase output, thereby achieving further profit growth, so they are more able to attract more employees by increasing wages. This repeated cycle brings positive growth. 

This growth mainly comes from the spontaneous growth of the domestic economy. At this time, mainly the investment and consumption behavior of entrepreneurs play a decisive role— individuals and families at the forefront of the market, because they can better grasp the rapidly changing business opportunities in the market. So at this time, the most effective is monetary policy rather than fiscal policy, because fiscal policy and private investment both come from limited savings, and the poor use of fiscal policy will cause conflicts with private sector investment by competing for resources and opportunities.

In the third stage, the stage of being chased, fiscal policy becomes important again. Because the domestic investment environment is deteriorating and investment opportunities are reduced, the private sector is reluctant to invest in China because of higher returns on overseas investment, but there is still a lot of savings in the country. 

During this time, the government will come forward, such as in a large-scale social investment such as Japan, investing in infrastructure, basic education, basic scientific research, etc. Although the profit is not high, it can make up for insufficient domestic private sector investment and household savings. Too much and insufficient consumption can ensure social employment and keep the level of GDP from a spiral decline, which is more suitable for economic development at this stage. Instead, monetary policy often fails at this stage.

The discussion on the use of macro policies is very meaningful for China's current development. Although different observers have different opinions, in general China should have passed the Lewis inflection point in the past few years and started to enter a mature state of economic development. We have seen that wage levels, consumption levels, savings levels, and investment levels have all accelerated in the past decade. However, because the government's inertia is usually strong, when the economic development stage changes, there will be a lag effect in the formulation and implementation of the policy, often staying in the successful experience of the previous development stage. These dislocations in macroeconomic policies and stages of economic development have occurred in all countries and stages. 

For example, in the West today, macro policies are employing monetary policies that were still relatively effective from the golden age. However, actual results show these policies are very ineffective, so many Western countries today, especially Europe and Japan, have a case of currency surplus, zero interest rates and even negative interest rates. The inflation rate is still very low, economic growth is still extremely slow, and debt has increased dramatically. Similarly, after the Chinese economy has entered the mature stage of the post-Lewis inflection point, the government is still focusing more on the fiscal policy in the first stage. 

We have seen in the past few years, a series of measures on economic reform with good intentions to adjust problems brought by the previous stages of industrialization and large-scale development of manufacturing. However, the actual implementation has accelerated the withdrawal and closure of private enterprises, forming a certain degree of national retreat. This hurts the confidence of private entrepreneurs, causing a certain degree of turbulence in consumer confidence. The shortcomings reduced the potential level of economic growth during this period.

Today, China’s net exports have contributed negatively to GDP growth, while consumption has contributed 70-80%. Of these, private consumption is particularly important and will be the most fundamental driving force for China’s economic growth in the future. In the golden age, the most important roles were entrepreneurs and individual consumers. The focus and starting point of all policies should be on enhancing the confidence of entrepreneurs— how to establish relatively clean, fair, and standardized market rules, how to reduce government power over economic operations, reduce decentralization, reduce taxes, and reduce burdens. From the experience of other developed countries in the golden age, monetary policy is even more important during this period.

1.      In the first phase, China's main financial policies were an indirect financial model, which was practically a compulsory large-scale saving system, with a government-controlled banking system introduced on large-scale and low-cost capital into manufacturing, infrastructure and later into strategic industries such as exports. These policies were successful for China's rapid industrialization.

2.      In the second stage, a major direction should be how to gradually liberate the entire society's financing direction and methods from the above-mentioned system, from indirect finance to direct finance, so that private entrepreneurs and individual consumers can have the opportunity to become the main ultimate borrower. We have seen loosening in this area in the past few years. For example, with the help of financial technology, we have seen the initial development of consumer credit. Of course, in the long run, whether we can make real estate mortgage loans better and unleash the potential of secondary re-mortgage loans are all issues worth studying. 

Important macro policy include— increasing the proportion of direct finance, speeding up the registration system, enhance the stock market's ability to finance private enterprises, and establishing an efficient bond market and equity market. In addition, whether the government's functions can be shifted from guiding the economy to supporting and serving the economy, and further reduction in power are also the biggest tests of macro policy at this stage.

In the past few years, although some of the macro-policy's original intentions were good, the actual results were not satisfactory because they served administrative means. In a great sense, this also provides another perspective and lesson for studying and observing the economic characteristics of this stage. In the second stage of the golden development period, some policies may be more effective if they are adjusted through market spontaneity. However, some man-made practices may fuel growth. These are the most important topics for China at present.

Now Japan, Western Europe, the United States and other countries are in the third stage, while China is still in the second stage, China's future growth potential is still great. China's per capita GDP of US $ 10,000 still has a cost advantage for western developed countries, while other emerging developing countries (such as India) have not yet formed a systematic competitive advantage. China may be in a period of opportunity for golden development for quite a long time. Today, China ’s per capita GDP is around US $ 10,000, but the population with a per capita GDP of US $ 20,000 has exceeded 100 million, mainly distributed in southeast coastal cities. In fact, China ’s leap from a per capita GDP of 10,000 US dollars to 20,000 US dollars did not require the most advanced technology.

China only needs to spread the living standards and lifestyles of southeast coastal regions on a large scale in-land. This is the driving force for consumption growth, and the main driving force is envy and the "neighbor-effect". I also want to have what other people have— media, such as television and the Internet, etc. to spread this lifestyle of 100 million people to the southeast coast of more than one billion people, reaching a per capita GDP of 20,000 US dollars. In the next few years, China's wages, savings, investment and consumption levels will continue to catch up and spiral up. In a positive cycle of mutual promotion, investment opportunities will remain abundant and excellent.

 If China can learn from the monetary policies of Western countries in the golden age and make some adjustments to the relationship between the government and the market, it will be of great benefit to unlock its economic growth potential. On the other hand, if the West, and especially Western Europe, can learn some of Japan’s and China’s fiscal policy experiences and let the government assume the role of ultimate borrower, and invest in infrastructure, basic education, and research on a larger scale, it will be beneficial and they will sustain economic growth.

Adopting different policies and approaches at different stages of economic development is also a great contribution to economics itself. Economics is not physics. There are no axioms and theorems. It must be studied constantly— to propose the most important policies suitable for this period requires an understanding of changing economic phenomena and its reality. So in this sense, the theoretical framework in this book is a breakthrough and a useful attempt for the study of economics itself.

Of course, these three questions to be answered in this book are the most difficult and important questions in the world today, and it is unlikely to have a perfect answer. The author has a deep understanding of Japan's experience, and many points in the book also use this as a starting point, but whether Japan's experience really applies to European countries and the United States remains to be discussed. Quantitative easing, currency over issuance, zero interest rates and negative interest rates, inflated asset prices, social inequality, the rise of populist politics – these international phenomenon caused mainly by developed countries still plagued by policy makers in all countries and ordinary people for a long time. 

For China, because it is still in the golden development period of the post-Lewis inflection point, developed countries such as the West and Japan that have passed this stage have left a wealth of reference experience for this stage of economic policy, especially monetary policy. As long as policy makers can recognize their current stage and make appropriate adjustments, it is possible to fully release the huge economic growth potential during the golden development period. China's future is still promising.