Monday, November 8, 2021

Don't play a game or invest in a company rigged by a "smart" fellow

Buffett used to convene a group of people called the “Buffett Group.” At one such meeting Benjamin Graham, gave them all a quiz. 

“He gave us a quiz,” Buffett said, “A true-false quiz. And there were all these guys who were very smart. He told us ahead of time that half were true and half were false. There were 20 questions. Most of us got less than 10 right. If we’d marked every one true or every one false, we would have gotten 10 right.”

Graham made up the deceptively simple historical puzzler himself, Buffett explained. “It was to illustrate a point, that the smart fellow kind of rigs the game. It was 1968, when all this phoney accounting was going on. You’d think you could profit from it by riding along on the coattails, but (the quiz) was to illustrate that if you tried to play the other guy’s game, it was not easy to do.

“Roy Tolles got the highest score, I remember that,” Buffett chuckled. “We had a great time. We decided to keep doing it.”

 reference:

 Benjamin Graham on Value Investing: Lessons from the Dean of Wall Street.

Monday, August 2, 2021

Buffett Dingell Letter

 

March 5, 1982

 

 

The Honorable John Dingell,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Rayburn House Building,
Washington, D.C. 20515

 

Dear Mr. Dingell,

This letter is to comment upon the likely sources for trading activity that will develop in any futures market involving stock indices.  My background for this commentary is some thirty years of practice in various aspects of the investment business, including several years as a securities salesman.  The last twenty-five years have been spent as a financial analyst, and I currently have the sole responsibility for an equity portfolio that totals over $600 million.  I am enclosing copies of several articles that relate to my experience in the investment field.

It is impossible to predict precisely what will develop in investment or speculative markets, and you should be wary of any who claim precision. I think the following represents a reasonable expectancy:

1.  A role can be performed by the stock index future contract in aiding the risk-reducing efforts of the true investor. An investor may quite logically conclude that he can identify undervalued securities, but also conclude that he has no ability whatsoever to predict the short-term movements of the stock market.  This is the view I maintain in my own efforts in investment management.  Such an investor may wish to "zero out" market fluctuations and the continual shorting of a representative index offers him the chance to do just that.  Presumably an investor with $10 million of undervalued equities and a constant short position of $10 million in the index will achieve the net rewards or penalties attributable solely to his skill in selection of specific securities, and have no worries that these results will be swamped - or even influenced - by the fluctuations of the general market.  Because there are costs involved - and because most investors believe that, over the long term, stock prices in general will advance - I think there are relatively few investment professionals who will operate in such a constantly hedged manner.  But I also believe that it is a rational way to behave and that a few professionals, who wish always to be "market neutral" in their attitude and behavior, will do so.

2.   As previously stated, I see a logical risk-reducing strategy that involves shorting the futures contract. I see no corresponding investment or hedging strategy whatsoever on the long side.  By definition, therefore, a very maximum of 50% of the futures transactions can be entered into with the expectancy of risk reduction and not less than 50% (the long side) must act in a risk-accentuating or gambling manner.

3.  The actual balance would be enormously different than this maximum 50/50 division between risk reducers and risk accentuators. The propensity to gamble is always increased by a large prize versus a small entry fee, no matter how poor the true odds may be.  That's why Las Vegas casinos advertise big jackpots and why state lotteries headline big prizes. In securities, the unintelligent are seduced by the same approach in various ways, including:

 (a) "penny stocks", which are "manufactured" by promoters precisely because they snare the gullible - creating dreams of enormous payoffs but with an actual group result of disaster, and 

(b) low margin requirements through which financial experience attributable to a large investment is achieved by committing a relatively small stake.

4.  We have had many earlier experiences in our history in which the high total commitment/low down payment phenomenon has led to trouble.  The most familiar, of course, is the stock market boom in the late 20s that was accompanied and accentuated by 10% margins. Saner heads subsequently decided that there was nothing pro-social about such thin-margined speculation and that, rather than aiding capital markets, in the long run it hurt them. Accordingly, margin regulations were introduced and made a permanent part of the investing scene. The ability to speculate in stock indices with 10% down payments; of course, is simply a way around the margin requirements and will be immediately perceived as such by gamblers throughout the country.

5.  Brokers, of course, favor new trading vehicles. Their enthusiasm tends to be in direct proportion to the amount of activity they expect. And the more the activity, the greater the cost to the public and the greater the amount of money that will be left behind by them to be spread among the brokerage industry.  As each contract dies, the only business involved is that the loser pays the winner. Since the casino (the futures market and its supporting cast of brokers) gets paid a toll each time one of these transactions takes place, you can be sure that it will have a great interest in providing very large numbers of losers and winners. But it must be remembered that, for the players, it is the most clear sort of a "negative sum game". Losses and gains cancel out before expenses; after expenses the net loss is substantial.  In fact, unless such losses are quite substantial, the casino will terminate operations since the players' net losses comprise the casino's sole source of revenue. This "negative sum" aspect is in direct contrast to common stock investment generally, which has been a very substantial "positive sum game" over the years simply because the underlying companies, on balance, have earned substantial sums of money that eventually benefits their owners, the stockholders.

6.  In my judgment, a very high percentage - probably at least 95% and more likely much higher - of the activity generated by these contracts will be strictly gambling in nature.  You will have people wagering as to the short-term movements of the stock market and able to make fairly large wagers with fairly small sums. They will be encouraged to do so by brokers who will see rapid turnover of customers' capital - the best thing that can happen to a broker in terms of his immediate income. A great deal of-money will be left behind by these 95% as the casino takes its bite from each transaction.

7.  In the long run, gambling-dominated activities that are identified with traditional capital markets, and that leave a very high percentage of those exposed to the activity burned, are not going to be good for capital markets. Even though people participating in such gambling activity are not investors and what they are buying really are not stocks, they still will feel that they have had a bad experience with the stock market.  And after having been exposed to the worst face of capital markets, they understandably may, in the future, take a dim view of capital markets generally. Certainly that has been the experience after previous waves of speculation.  You might ask if the brokerage industry is not wise enough to look after its own long-term interests. History shows then to be myopic (witness the late 1960s); they often have been happiest when behavior was at its silliest. And many brokers are far more concerned with how much they gross this month than whether their clients - or, for that matter, the securities industry – prosper in the long run.

We do not need more people gambling in non-essential instruments identified with the stock market in this country, nor brokers who encourage them to do so. What we need are investors and advisors who look at the long-term prospects for an enterprise and invest accordingly.  We need the intelligent commitment of investment capital, not leveraged market wagers. The propensity to operate in the intelligent, pro-social sector of capital markets is deterred, not enhanced, by an active and exciting casino operating in somewhat the same arena, utilizing somewhat similar language and serviced by the same work force.

In addition, low-margined activity in stock-equivalents is inconsistent with expressed public policy as embodied in margin requirements. Although index futures have slight benefits to the investment professional wishing to "hedge out" the market, the net effect of high-volume futures markets in stocks indices is likely to be overwhelmingly detrimental to the security-buying public and, therefore, in the long run to capital markets generally.

                                                                                                                                                              Sincerely,
Warren E. Buffett

 


Wednesday, July 28, 2021

The Dangers of Leverage – Jorge Paulo Leman's brokerage firm and Belgium mines

 During his time forming a brokerage, Lemann met a famous speculator called 'Mendoncinha'. 'Mendoncinha' decided that he would take control of the steelmaker Belgo Mineira (Belgium Mines), a giant of the sector at the time.

Mendoncinha was leveraging more and more and, in the end, in addition to giving Belgo Mineira's own shares as collateral, he gave Bill of Exchange for a financial company and everybody thought that was a good ballast, because if the stock market fell, there would be collateral. 

According to Lemann, at one point the prices of the assets collapsed, the money of the 'Mendoncinha' ended and everyone with whom the speculator dealt had losses. Also according to the businessman, the bills of exchange given in guarantee were false.

Six months after the 'Mendoncinha' break the stock market recovered and had a strong high. "I was 24 years old and I saw all that. It gave me a good sense of timing. If he had endured, he would probably be the richest man in Brazil. “

The entrepreneur remembers that his financier lost some money but did not do so badly of the operation. How could it be otherwise, he took an apprenticeship out of the situation: "I had a lesson in timing, that is, how important it is to do the right things at the right time.“

Decades later, when buying the Anheuser-Busch, Lemann would remember again that such 'Mendoncinha': "In the purchase were indebted by 54 billion dollars. Several times I thought of him. Is it Mendoncinha of the time or is this business going to work?"

It worked. Anheuser-Busch was acquired by InBev as the world's largest brewery and Lemann continues to search good deals. The 'Mendoncinha' was never seen again. 



Monday, July 19, 2021

Bloomberg Wealth with David Rubenstein: Blackstone's Jon Gray

Original Interview from

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKkykksZHOU

Transcript

“When I met my wife in English class I showed up wearing a suit and tie. Everyone else was in Birkenstocks. It was clear I'd made a decision which path I was on.” 

“I think it's still pretty good time for real estate. Texas and Florida are well-positioned. You should stay away from buggy whip businesses.” 

"Go where the creative and technology types are because those are the markets where they'll be the most economic activity." 

"I say to my kids all the time luck is a core competency but it wasn't all luck."

 - Jon Gray

 

Jon Gray went from aspiring journalist to become one of the top real estate investors in the world.

Jon joined Blackstone in 1992 and was the second employee in its real estate division.

I've had the opportunity to do work with Jon since his second day of Blackstone when he had just gotten out of Penn. Well I think to a degree luck is you know involved in anybody's success. I think with John it's a gross overstatement. I think it is. It is just simply raw talent.

By 2005 Jon was running Blackstone's real estate unit and spent the next 13 years building it into a behemoth with about one hundred and nineteen billion dollars of assets.

I think he has a very unique ability to combine tremendous amount of vision and understanding trends generally ahead of a lot of other people and conviction.  And he turns that conviction unlike few people I have seen into very bold big moves that have generally paid off.

What put Jon on the map was Blackstone's 26 billion dollar deal to buy Hilton on the eve of the financial crisis.

There were a lot of things going really, really wrong. I'd say Jon's leadership throughout was what I would describe as sort of a steady hand on the wheel. 

The Hilton deal ultimately became one of the most successful private equity investments of all time reaping more than 14 billion dollars in profits and catapulting Jon to the number two job at Blackstone.

He’s a natural. He's just got it all.

Seems like journalism's loss has become private equity’s gain.

 

 

David R: 

When you're growing up in the Chicago area. Did you say one day I want to be the greatest real estate investor in the world?

 

Jon G: 

No, I got here as an accident. I had grown up in suburban Chicago. I've never really been to the East Coast prior to going to college. And when I got to college I decided that I really wanted to be an English major.  I wanted to be a journalist. I wrote for the Daily Pennsylvanian and about a year into school I realized a bunch of my friends and fraternity brothers liked business.  They were in Wharton and I owned a few stocks. I liked numbers.

So I decided to get a dual degree. And that was really important for me because my senior year in college I met a young woman who was an English major. A few weeks later I got a job working for a small investment advisory firm— that was about 30 years ago. And that was Blackstone and that was my wife Mindy. So that really set me off.

And so I went from Philadelphia. I came to New York and I started at Blackstone in the private equity area and in the MBA area. And I was mostly running numbers doing pitch books for clients and ordering dinner. I had to make sure the associates got their food by seven o'clock for about a year.

And two things—

1.    The real estate market had collapsed.

2.    The visionary founders of Blackstone Steve Schwartzman and Pete Peterson said look real estate is a place we should go.

They found a guy in Chicago, John Schreiber – a terrifically talented investor and they formed a real estate business and they had no people.  I had been helping them draft their private placement memorandum for the first real estate fund. They said you seem like a reasonable person. Do you want to move over and join this group? And I talked to Mindy and to my parents and I came back and said yes— and that's how I ended up in the real estate business.

 


David R:

Ok, so what did you all do in the beginning that you have money to invest because you didn't have a fund I presume in real estate? So what did you do to raise money?

 

Jon: 

We had very little deals to begin. So the first deal I worked on was a shopping center in Chesapeake Virginia. The Great Bridge shopping center.  It was a $6 million transaction. We borrowed $4 million, so it was a $2 million equity check. And you would have thought I was buying the island of Manhattan. I was down there for three weeks. 

I mean I was down there for three weeks. I met every tenant. I was counting the car traffic. I was learning the business. And it was an amazing experience because I was the chief bottle washer. I was the waiter. I was the maître d – we were this tiny little business and I was learning it firsthand.

 


David: 

Let's talk about two deals that you did eventually that became two of the best known deals in the history of U.S. real estate I would say. The first is EOP built by Sam Zell. Can you explain what that deal was? Why was it such a risky deal and why it turned out to be for you, a very good deal?  (Blackstone sold 2/3s of the EOP portfolio, 27 billion worth of Assets, within 3 months of closing)

 

Jon G: 

I stumbled on the public real estate markets when there were companies that owned real estate that were trading well below where these buildings traded out individually.

During that time, there's this new commercial mortgage backed securities debt stack which is much lower cost than leveraged loans, and high yield that you typically use in a buyout. And we convinced the banks to let us use that to go buy real estate companies.

And beginning in late 03 through 07, I think we did 12 of these deals— where we started buying these big public real estate companies.

We used the public CMBS stack and then in many cases we would sell off pieces.

Think about it as a fruit basket. You'd sell the grapes to the people who wanted that and the bananas over here.

And that's what Equity Office was all about. We bought the biggest collection of office buildings in the United States. And so it's like running a store, where in the front end you're taking in the merchandise and in the back and you're selling it.

And so within 60 days we ultimately won the auction. We sold almost two thirds of the real estate. We paid down our debt, and we ended up owning really great real estate.

One thing people don't focus on is we kept the assets in California, New York, and Boston.

Had we kept suburban assets like Chicago and Stamford, Connecticut, our results would not have been so good.

So at the end of the day— it was a wholesale to retail arbitrage.

But the key was what we kept and held, which ultimately tripled investor capital.

 


David:  In the end it turned out to be a great deal for you.

Jon:  Yeah, right.

 

 

David: 

That people you sold the real estate to. It wasn't so good for them because the real estate market collapsed— more or less when you completed the deal.

So ultimately, did you ever buy some of that stuff back from the people you sold it to before?

Jon:  We ended up buying some of it back. And a lot of those people are my friends. No one knew at the time the music was going to stop.

 

 

 

David:

Let's talk about another deal you did that. This also turned out to be probably the most profitable buyout of all time. It is real estate related— right before the market crashed in 2007-08, you bought the entire Hilton Hotel Company. What was your thinking about buying Hilton Hotel? Was it a real estate play or a corporate play?


Jon:

It was a bit of both. We did the transaction with our real estate private equity funds, and our corporate private equity fund, because Hilton owned great real estate, like the Waldorf Astoria, the Hilton Hawaiian Village. But it also had this amazing management franchise business.

And when we bought the company it was similar to the Equity Office transaction in that we thought we were able to buy something because of the scale and because it was in the public markets more inexpensively than we could buying these assets individually.

And we also believed that the multiple was reasonable. We were paying 13 or 14 times cash-flow for what we thought was a great business. Our mistake, of course, was that our timing was terrible. We closed on the transaction at the end of 2007.

In less than a year, of course, Lehman would collapse, the global economy would be melting down, and global travel would decline dramatically.

This company's revenues would go down 20 percent. Cash flow would go down 40 percent. And we marked our largest investment ever as a firm down by 71 percent. That was not a good feeling. But what I would tell you is we believe the decline was cyclical in nature.

We still saw tremendous opportunity to grow the company around the world, and so we invested $800 million more at the bottom, we stuck with the company, it started growing. There was a cyclical recovery.

We ultimately took it public, we broke it into three different companies: a management franchise, time share, and real estate business, and we made $14 billion for our investors. So it ended well.

 

 


David: 

So, when it wasn't looking so good that you go home to your wife and say you knew told me to go into real estate and maybe it wasn't a good thing? You didn't say that?

 

Jon:  

You know it's funny in all seriousness. My wife and my children. And that that was really important.

As you know in a period of time when things are stressed— having people you can rely on and talk to and who still believe in you is really important. And it was hard because you felt terrible. You felt badly with your colleagues with your investors.

But we never lost faith in and really, for me, that experience— that searing experience at Hilton was probably the most important thing for me as an investor— because what I learned was we bought it the worst time possible and we ended up having the most successful deal of all time.

And what that said is— we had bought a really great business in what we call a great neighborhood— it had terrific tailwinds people global travel to growth industry. These brands were super valuable. And so what it's led me to think is, too often when we invest capital we focus on. I'll call it the individual house— not am I in the right sector? Do I have those tailwinds?

And in this case, this was a fundamentally great business— and we could afford to have paid too much and do it at the wrong time. But ultimately with the right management team, the right financial support— we made a bunch of money and that has really impacted everything I've done since then.

I think this shortage in housing will become more acute. And so we continue to like it as a sector to invest in. 

 

 

David Rubenstein

Call it the incredible shrinking office building— As more Americans work from home, demand for office space is plunging. The result— big investors are putting their money into warehouses that have centers and studios and other production spaces used for streaming. In January Blackstone took a majority stake in dozens of warehouses— most of them in California and Seattle. The rise of online shopping has made warehouses and other logistics properties more valuable.

Last month Blackstone bought data center operator UTSA Realty Trust for roughly 10 billion dollars. The numbers tell the story. Office space in the U.S. made up 90 percent of Blackstone's portfolio in 2015. Now it's 4 percent. Hotels where twenty three percent of the firm's portfolio in 2015 now 6 percent. But logistics properties have surged from 9 percent in 2017 to 38 percent now.

 

 

David R:

Let's talk about different two different types of real estate is residential and there's commercial. So is residential less risky or more risky than commercial?

 

Jon G:

If you talk about for-sale, single-family housing, there’s probably more risk, in the sense that you’re building something and you’re selling it, and it’s a function of the market. If you’re talking about rental housing – think about an apartment complex – that tends to be less risky because it’s less cyclical. People don’t give up their apartments when there’s some volatility but nothing like, say, office buildings or hotels.

So I would say, residential rental rates in real estate is safer and less volatile. And then commercial real estate involves office buildings; warehouses— which has been the biggest theme for us over the last 10 years. Hotels, shopping centers, senior living facilities; all of them have different risk returns depending on geography.

 

 


David: 

Another way of looking at real estate are things that are already existing and things to be built. So is it riskier and higher reward to build something, or are you more in the category of trying to buy things that already exist?

 

John: 

We generally are in the business of trying to buy existing real estate at a discount. So we bought that cosmopolitan hotel and casino in Las Vegas and we bought it for less than half of what it built for because it was built during the financial crisis.

So that to me is ideal.

Occasionally we'll build things. But in general we like to try to get into real estate at a lower basis when it's already producing income.

The problem with development is it's a bit like saying I'm an IPO three years from now. When you show up to lease up your building, you could be in a different economic environment and therefore, you may not have tenants, you may not have revenue. So we've generally bias towards existing real estate.



David R: 

Now as a general rule of thumb over the last hundred, two hundred thousand years, real estate prices generally go up— values increase generally.  But why is it that sometimes real estate developers— you read about them going bankrupt— is it because of leverage or because the values actually went down?


Jon G:

I'd say that the classic sin in real estate is you have long duration assets and people finance them short term. And so, for developers who often rely on a lot of leverage— that can get them into trouble.

The other thing that could impact real estate— particularly today, are changes in technology the ways we live and work.

So if you think about enclosed shopping malls. They were from really the postwar period until a decade ago— the best assets. A large shopping mall anchored by department stores lots of retailer’s food court. They grew value 5 percent a year on leverage 40-50 years because they were very hard. They were really fortresses.

And what's happened of course is the Internet showed up. E-commerce showed up. And that's really impacted those businesses. And we've seen sharp declines. But that happened over a long period of time. So it can be secular changes in the way we live in work. But the bigger thing generally to your point has been leverage.

 


David: 

Some people say that real estate is favorably taxed by the US government. I assume that's because of depreciation and other kinds of things. One of the most favorable parts of the US tax code for real estate is the “like-kind” 1031 exchange. President Biden has proposed changing that. Will this affect real estate?

Jon G:

It will affect individual investors who've owned assets for long time, who will harvest gains and then buy a new piece of real estate. For the institutional investors, it's less of an impact because we're selling, and we're paying taxes. The way may impact us is if there's less selling as a result.

The same thing could happen if capital gains go up. You could see some individual owners of real estate be more reluctant. But I don't think as much of an impact on the institutional market.

 

 

David: 

New York City has seen a lot of people leave during Covid. Do you expect that people will come back, work five days a week, and use all the office space in New York or similar cities that they did before?

 

John: 

There is sort of a recent bias -- that because we’ve been home, we assume that’s the way it’ll be. When we think about our company, we know we’re better together. We don’t have the formula for Coca Cola, but we have a lot of smart talented people who are connected by culture. Being together matters. It’s really an apprenticeship business, learning how to invest.

I would point out, though, outside the U.S. -- for instance, in China -- buildings are back to full capacity, and in Europe people don’t have as much space in their home lives. So not all geographies are the same. And even here, I think there’ll be a bias toward going back to the office, even though it won’t be like it was before, in full.

Yes, some companies will conclude they don’t need quite as much space, so that’ll create some additional vacancy. People will be concerned about owning office buildings, and that may create an opportunity. There will be some headwinds for a number of years and then, over time, things will recover.

 

 

David R:

A lot of people have moved to Florida and Texas, maybe for warm weather, maybe because those states don’t have income taxes. Do you think that trend will continue? And is that a good place to invest in real estate now?

 

Jon G:

It’s a bit of both. The weather, the lower cost of living, lower taxes, concerns about quality of life, crime rates— Texas is one of the fastest-growing states in the country, even though it’s enormous.

I think that will continue, and it was accelerated a bit by the pandemic. On the other hand, New York City, San Francisco— these are amazing places. And when you think about technology and innovation, entrepreneurship, immigrants – there will be a rediscovery of these cities.

My daughter is graduating from college; she wants to live there. But I think longer term the policymakers in these cities can have a big impact.

We saw it, obviously, in the 60’s, 70’s, and 80’s when these cities suffered. I don't believe that's what's going to happen.

I think with the right policy I think these cities can really thrive.

But, yes, Texas and Florida are well-positioned.

 


David: 

When you were growing up, and certainly when I was growing up; I'm older than you—

People really wanted to own their house. It was part of the American dream— to own your own house. But you've been buying a lot of rental housing. 

Now is that because you think young adults are not as interested in buying their own home and they want to rent now?


John: 

No. Home ownership rates have gone down a bit, but if you look in the last 12 months, during Covid, there’s been a surge in people wanting to own homes.

Our investment in rental housing is based on the fact that we just haven’t built a lot of housing since 2008-09.

So we've averaged less than a million homes built in the United States during that period, versus probably a million five to keep up with population and obsolescence. And so that's created support for single family values but also rental values. And I think now as the economy reopens here I think this shortage in housing will become more acute.

So we continue to like it as a sector to invest in. 

 

 


David: 

So what's the pleasure of being a real estate investor which you've been doing for almost 30 years as opposed to being a private equity investor or being some other type investor? What is it that you liked about real estate that kept you in it for 30 something years?

 

John:

I would say I love the people, I love learning about all these different places. I mean, I got to see all of the United States, and virtually all of the developed world.

You know, when you're investing in pharmaceutical businesses or other companies, it's harder to say I have real expertise about the efficacy of this drug versus that drug. But as an individual you can say—

“I've been in the neighborhood here.  I'm in Oakland today. Gosh it feels a lot like Brooklyn did. They are starting to gentrify the area. I'll connect the dots and do that.”

So I think the tangible nature of it, the experience, if you love to travel if you love to see places I think real estate's hard to beat.



David: 

So let's suppose somebody is watching this, and I say OK this guy has done a great job of building a great real estate business. I want to invest with him or I want to invest in real estate as an individual investor. What is the best way to invest in real estate?

 

John:

So for the individual investor I'd say there are a couple of ways. One is there's a public reap market where you can invest in some excellent companies here in the United States. There are REITS frankly around the world. That's one way to do it. Another way to do it today is we have things called private rates.

We have Blackstone have a vehicle called Beat which today owns primarily logistics, and rental apartments, across the southeast and southwest the United States. And that's another way to do it. There are others who offer similar products.

For some who are more adventurous, they can partner with local developers. The challenge I worry about is just misalignment of interests and liquidity. How do you get out at some point? You’re investing and you're generally not getting a lot of diversity with that approach.

 

David: 

Are you worried about the economy now? Its economy has been pretty good but it probably will head down at some point. Economy's always correct. So if I say I won't invest in real estate is now a good time or should I wait a while before the economy to correct?

 

Jon G: 

It’s still a pretty good time for real estate for a couple of reasons. The warning signs are twofold -- too much leverage, too much capital -- and we don’t really have that in the real estate system today. The other is too many cranes, and too much building, and we’re actually below historic levels in terms of new supply.

The other thing I’d point out is that— the S&P 500 delivered something like four-times the return of public REITs since the beginning of 2020, before Covid.

So real estate is lagging coming out of the recovery, because obviously, people have been concerned about the physical world.

As the economy reopens, people go back into spaces, real estate is going to see a little bit of a bounce. I think the risk is, if interest rates move a lot.

One positive thing about real estate also, is inflation drives up the replacement cost of buildings. And that gives you a little bit of a cushion on existing real estate.

 



David:

Where should I not invest my money? 

 

Jon G:

You should stay away from buggy-whip businesses. You should stay away from landline phone companies, and some of the legacy retailers, some legacy media businesses. You want to focus on the future.

On real estate in particular, if I had one piece of advice— go where geographically the creative and technology types are, because those are the markets where they'll be the most economic activity.

So the West coast of the United States, Austin, Texas; Cambridge; Shenzhen; London; Amsterdam; Tel-Aviv; Bangalore. Tech is driving so much of the growth in this global economy. Those are the most interesting places to invest.

 



David:

Do people come up to you at cocktail parties and ask you for investment advice?

 

Jon:

You know, it's funny— they often ask me residential home prices which is not my area of expertise.

I tend to tell people to focus on the longer term. Focus on you know.

I think the danger in the world is that we live in the sort of Snapchat, Tik Tok era which is dangerous.

To be a high-conviction investor — that when you dabble, and just put a bunch of money here on things you don’t know or understand, it tends to work out badly. But when you see something, single-family housing, global logistics, the movement of everything online, and you lean into that, that’s when you have the best outcomes.

What you want to say is, “Is this fundamentally a good business? Is it in a good sector? Is this a good piece of real estate, where supply is limited, demand is favorable?” And if you own something good, hold it for a long period of time. Find those right neighborhoods to invest in, deploy your capital and then be patient.

 

 

David:  

John, thank you for a great overview of the real estate investment world and I appreciate you're giving us this time.

John:  

Thank you David. It's been terrific.