Saturday, September 12, 2020

Li Lu's 2016 New Year's Speech--- Human Nature and Financial Crisis

This is a translation from Li Lu's Weibo (blog) from a post in 2016 which talks about CDS, Paulson, and finding the next Big Short.

https://www.weibo.com/p/23041813182fc6f0102wdsd

January 3, 2016 16:32 Sina Blog

At the beginning of the year in 2016, I watched the movie "The BigShort". The film is adapted from the novel of  Michael Lewis. It tells the legendary story of several investors who first discovered the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007-08 and the loopholes in the entire US financial system and set out to make profits by shorting. 

I have personally experienced some of the events involved in the film; when I watched it, I have a more immersive perception of the events, which triggered a few things that came to mind--

Beginning in 2005 and 2006, I accidentally discovered CDS (collateralized debt securities), and did some research, as I was preparing to enter it on a large scale in short-selling through CDS. Later, after several conversations with Charlie Munger, this idea was gradually dispelled. 

The reason for Charlie’s objection is also very simple: if my analysis is correct, it means that in the end either the counter party to undertake these products-- the large financial companies, may not be able to cash out because of bankruptcy; or these large financial institutions will be bailed out by the government.

The money you make is actually the taxpayer’s and the government’s money. Later, the unfolding of events really confirmed Charlie’s judgment that the money made from the biggest short in history was actually obtained directly or indirectly from taxpayers around the world. Therefore, I have never regretted not making taxpayers' money.

Investment itself is a prediction of the future. Although the prediction may be correct, it will bring some joy to a certain extent, but the different means and results of making money still count.

After the publication of Michael Lewis’s book, I had several exchanges with Charlie and talked about my decision at that time. He said that if you made a lot of money from doing CDS, maybe you would still be looking for the next big Short. 

This is human nature.

Hedge fund investor John Paulson was the biggest winner of this big short. 

In the past few years, I have monitored the performance of John Paulson since 2008, and it has verified Charlie's judgment. 

Most men have an affinity for wealth and status, but if it is not obtained in a benevolent means, a gentlemen should not accept it. To Charlie, the results in making money is important, but the means of income is just as important. I deeply agree with this point.

The money made by these big shorts came from the majority of taxpayers. Ordinary taxpayers are not only the biggest victims of the global financial crisis, but are also the ones who ultimately pay for the financial crisis. Making money in such a crisis is really unbearable. But this unforgettable experience made me even more frightened about the dangers of the financial industry.

More importantly, the film uses the experience of short-sellers as an introduction, revealing the various human affairs in the 2008 global financial crisis triggered by the United States, and the profound human reasons that led to this crisis.

In a large sense, this financial crisis was caused by the characteristics of the financial industry. Because unlike any other services industry, most people do not have the financial knowledge to judge the pros and cons of financial products. This has created a natural soil for corruption in the financial industry. 

The global financial crisis triggered by the United States in 2008 is just the most extreme example in recent years. Friends who work in finance, no matter whether the movie has been introduced in China or not, should find a way to understand the crisis.

The Englishman Sir John Dalberg-Acton famously said: Power leads to corruption, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. More than two decades of experience in the financial industry often make me feel that power is tilted is due to information asymmetry-- couple this with the temptation of huge financial profits-- corrupting the entire financial industry and triggering a systemic financial crisis.

However, before 2008, the mainstream concept of Western regulatory agencies tended to believe that free market economies with our government intervention should be universally applied in the financial industry. This concept was most revered by the former Federal Reserve Bank President Alan Greenspan.

The free market economy is certainly the greatest institutional innovation in human history, but there are indeed exceptions. These exceptions are defined as market failures. 

But so far, these market failures are considered to mainly exist in the areas of public services and  natural monopolies, while market failures in the financial sector have been less discussed. 

However, according to my own experience and observations, market failures are actually widespread in financial markets. Therefore, freedom and leniency to players in the financial field is often more destructive than restriction. The global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 gave us an extreme lesson.

In 2015, the use of extreme leverage in China's over-the-counter financing also gave Chinese people a brief thrill. If the government did not take effective measures, the consequences would be disastrous.

Recently, due to a well-known acquisition spree in China, I had the opportunity to read the so-called universal insurance products and contracts of some insurance companies. After reading it, it sent shivers down my back. If I were in the position of the supervisory authority today, such a product would never become popular, and it would definitely keep me awake at night.

Financial markets are a mechanism that exposes human weaknesses, and it hasn't changed much since the inception of modern financial market. Today, China's financial integration seems to be imperative, and direct finance will also become one of the most important drivers for the development of the real economy in the future. 

In this context, people from financial supervision to financial professionals should be more aware of the challenges faced by the financial industry to human nature. Because of the characteristics of human nature, financial liberalization will definitely lead to corruption; absolute financial liberalization will often lead to huge financial crises.

I am not advocating absolute financial control, nor am I advocating that the free market do not play an important role in the financial industry, but historical experience has shown that maintaining a high degree of vigilance against the natural risks of the financial industry is always a wise strategy. 

2016 is the first year of China's 13th Five-Year Plan. Direct market financing will become more important, and mixed operations will also become a trend. Against this backdrop, I made this article by collecting my thoughts, to make myself more introspective during the beginning of 2016.



李录2016年新年感言---人性与金融危机

2016年1月3日 16:32 阅读 10万+ 新浪博客

李录2016年新年感言---人性与金融危机

2016年新年伊始,观看了电影“大空头”(The BigShort)。影片自MichaelLewis的同名小说改编,讲述了几位最早发现07-08年次贷危机以及美国整个金融系统的漏洞、并着手做空来获利的几位投资人的传奇故事。影片中涉及的许多事件,我都亲身经历过;影片中的各色人物,我都或多或少有过交集,所以观看起来,更多了一些身临其境的现实感,由此也引发了一些感想。

从05、06年开始,我个人也因为偶然的原因发现了CDS这个产品,并做了一些研究,也一度准备大规模进入,通过CDS做空。后来在和芒格师的几次谈话之后,逐渐打消了这个念头。查理反对的原因也很简单:如果我的分析是正确的,那就意味着最终要么承接这些产品的交易对方,那些大的金融公司可能因为破产而不能兑现;要么这些大的金融机构被政府通过纳税人的钱救活了,这时你赚的钱其实也是纳税人、政府的钱,于心并不踏实。后来结果果然证实了查理的这个判断,那些从这次历史上最大空头中赚的钱其实最终都是直接或间接从全球纳税人手中拿到的。因此我也从来没有因为没有赚到纳税人的钱而后悔过。

投资本身就是对未来的预测,虽然预测得对,多多少少会带来一些愉悦感,但是不同的赚钱方式导致的结果还是不一样。后来在MichaelLewis的这本书出版之后,我又和查理有过几次交流,谈到当时的这个决策,他说当时如果你因为做CDS赚了很多钱,可能你直到今天还在寻找下一个大空头的机会。人的本性就是这样。对冲基金投资人鲍尔森(JohnPaulson)是这次大空头最大的赢家。这几年,我观察JohnPaulson自2008年以后的业绩,倒是又一次验证了查理的这个判断。君子爱财,取之有道,指的不仅是赚钱的方式、方法,在查理看来,所赚之钱的来源也同样重要。在这一点上,我也深以为然。这些大空头赚的钱,其实最终还是由广大的纳税人填补上来的。普通纳税人既是这次全球金融危机最大的受害者,又是这次金融危机最终买单的人。在这样的危机里赚钱实在是于心不忍。但这次刻骨铭心的经历,让我对于金融行业的危险更加胆战心惊。

更重要的是,影片以做空人的经历为引子,揭示了由美国引发的08年全球金融危机中的种种人事,以及酿成这次危机的深刻的人性原因。

酿成这次金融危机,在很大意义上是因为金融行业的特点。因为与其他任何服务行业不同,金融产品在绝大多数时间里对绝大部分人来说,都很难判断优劣。这为金融行业腐败缔造了天然的土壤。08年从美国引发的全球金融危机仅仅是近年来最极端的一个例子。从事金融工作的朋友,无论国内有没有引进这部电影,大家都应该想办法找来看一看。

英国人阿灵顿有一句名言:权力导致腐化,绝对权力导致绝对腐化。二十几年从事金融行业的经历,常常让我觉得,由信息不对称引起的权力倾斜,加之巨大的金融利润诱惑,对整个金融业的腐化更甚,更能引发系统性的金融危机。

然而至少在08年以前,西方监管机构的主流观念倾向认为,自由市场经济在金融行业内同样普适,所以以少干预、不干预为优。这一观念最为前联邦储备银行行长格林斯潘所推崇。

自由市场经济当然是人类历史上最伟大的制度创新,不过确确实实也存在例外。这些例外被定义为市场失灵。但到目前为止,市场失灵被认为最主要存在于公共服务、自然垄断及外部性领域,对金融领域内的市场失灵则讨论较少。然而据我本人的经验和观察,市场失灵实际上广泛存在于金融市场。所以在金融领域里,负面清单式的自由比起正面清单自由,常常更具破坏力。08、09年全球金融危机就是一次极端性的教训。

我们刚刚经历过的2015年,中国场外融资极端杠杆的使用也让国人经历了一次惊险。如果政府当时没有及时采取有力措施,后果实在不堪设想。

最近一段时间,由于一桩众所周知的收购风波,我有机会阅读了一些保险公司的所谓万能险产品合同,读后让我后背发出阵阵寒意。如果今天我处在监管部门的位置上,这样的产品大行其道,一定会让我夜不能寐。

金融市场就是一个暴露人性弱点的机制,从现代金融市场诞生的那一刻起,就没有变过。今天中国的金融混业看来已是势在必行,直接金融也会成为今后实体经济发展最重要的推手之一。在这样的大背景下,从金融监管到金融从业人员应该更加警醒金融行业本身对人性的挑战。因为人性的特点,金融自由化一定会引发腐败;绝对的金融自由化常常会导致巨大的金融危机。

我也并非主张绝对金融管制,更不是主张自由市场在金融业里不发挥重要作用,但是所有的历史经验都表明,对金融行业的天然风险保持高度警惕,永远是个明智的策略。2016年是中国十三五开局之年,市场直接融资将变得更加重要,混业经营也成为趋势。在这样的背景下,作此感想一篇,以为2016年开年自省。

Tuesday, September 8, 2020

Seven Generations Energy “ticker— VII”

Description

Seven Generations Energy (ticker: VII) is a Canadian Oil & Gas producer; specifically, the largest player in condensation (mainly composed of propane, butane, pentane and heavier hydrocarbon fractions) production in the North Western Alberta region in Montney and is a rival to Paramount Resources. The crown jewel for Seven Generations in Montney is their Kakwa River project, in which 1.23B was invested over the past 2 years.

From its humble beginnings, Seven Generations was originally financed by private equity investors and morphed into a listed company— CEO Marty Proctor has exercised great fiscal discipline in comparison to other producers— Paramount Resources, NuVista Energy, Kelt, etc.

Seven Generations has been listed for less than a decade (IPO: November of 2014). Seven Generations lacks Paramount’s mature assets— Seven Generation’s wells have a delineation rate of 45%, which is decreasing every year at a rate of 2-3%. Paramount has mature wells with a 15-20% decline rate, requiring less incremental expenditure. Management is moderating decline rates to make production sustainable.

Liquefied natural gases, such as condensate, is a crucial component for the dilution of bitumen to make dilbit, which enables pipeline transportation of bitumen. Bitumen is the heaviest crude oil used today found in natural oil sands deposits. The oil sands, also known as tar sands, contain a mixture of sand, water and oily bitumen. In a liquid form, condensate takes up about 1/500th of the volume of conventional natural gas for the same energy output, making pumping and transportation more economical.

A crucial factor in investing in condensate companies in Alberta is supply and demand— Condensate domestic demand (Canada) exceeds supply by more than 250,000 bbl per day, which is why Canada imports condensate from the U.S.

Seven Generations accounts for almost a quarter of all Canadian condensate production. As the largest condensate producer in Canada with strategic pipeline opportunities to sell natural gas at favorable prices to North America, and a promise of greater amount buybacks in the future— should decline rates go down, and Nest 3 prove an important catalyst— Seven Generations has an intrinsic value of at least 14-16 per share or 4-7B in market cap, with an enterprise value of approximately 11-15B (current enterprise value 3.56B), which is 3-5x current worth.




Regions— Nest 1 to 3

With 7G leasing about 800 sections and a total of 500,000 net acres of land (Paramount has 2 million acres); 7G has divided land parcels into 3 nest areas—

 

1.  Nest 1 is an ultra-rich condensate region with 37% IRR and a capital efficiency of $10,700/boe/day. In Q4 2019, there was a land swap that enables an optimized development plant. IP365 is 750 boe/d.

2.  Nest 2 is filled with condensate rich locations, especially the north western portion of Nest 2— it was previously considered part of the Wapiti region with 100 reserve locations converted. At 43% IRR and a capital efficiency of $8,000/boe/day, there are favorable trends in condensate recoveries. IP365 is 1000 boe/d.

3.  Nest 3 is a high-Deliverability Natural Gas Weighted Region with 63% IRR and a capital efficiency of $5700/boe/day. With the infrastructure and crossing in 2019 completed with a single super pad/hub which employs a spoke and hub build out, with potential to expand boundaries to the southern gas rich region. IP365 is 1400 boe/d.

* All assumptions for IRR depend on a US 40/bbl WTI, $2.5 Hub, at $3 Condensate Differentials

 


 

Seven Generations has an excellent production mix consisting of approximately 60% NGLs & Condensate and 40% natural gas.

 

Here are 5 reasons why Seven Generations will emerge as a successful producer—

 

1.   Manageable debt and financing with a promise of future buybacks

Seven Generation’s management indicated conservatism in their recent earning’s call with leverage— they have reduced debt levels to a range of 1.0x-1.5x debt to cash flow, versus a previous 2.0x. This allows free cash flow to accrue and we can expect future buybacks via NCIB (normal course issuer bid), which is likely when WTI exceeds usd50/bbl.

With 1.1B available on 1.37B (5 year term) of senior secured credit facility (unsecured notes). Seven Generations doesn’t have any near-term maturities— as of March, Q2, 2020, 298M was drawn on that revolver to repay some of the unsecured 2023 notes with accordion feature from the earlier conversion— which reduced interest rates from 6.8 % to about 2%. Maturity has now been pushed the end of 2024 from mid-2023. 700M at 5.375% is due in 2025.

By avoiding any exposure to maturity issues, and maintaining liquidity on the bank line, Seven Generations will be able to ride through commodity cycles. Seven Generation’s revolving credit facility is covenant based, not reserves based.



2.   Maintenance Capex Reduction for Sustainable Production

The desire to reduce debt levels towards the 1.0-1.5x Debt to Cash flow range will naturally diminish maintenance capital expenditures—with an 11% drop in production, this results in Capex down from 1.3-1.7B to 650-800M in 2020; management promises the capex to remain intact even if commodity prices improve. To give you historical reference— capital expenditures were 2012—280M, 2014—920M, 2015— 1.35B. This allows Seven Generations to maintain production in the 180,000 boe/day range.

To protect Seven Generation’s balance sheet and preserve drilling inventory, management reduced capital budget by 41% and deferred the start-up of 11 new wells with 65-70 development wells in 2020. In Q1, 2020 drill and complete costs were about CAD 7.3 million per well, which is 1 million per well lower than originally budgeted for the year, and 33% below the costs for 2017. Operating costs in Q1 2020 were CAD 4.54/boe, about 20% below 2017 levels. Seven Generations completed the wind-down of its 8 drilling rig and 2 completion spread program in early Q2, and commenced an operational pause. Salary and benefits were also reduced.

CEO Marty Proctor said during a recent podcast interview the company's decline rate would diminish by about 3% every year, which will lower maintenance expenditures by CAD 60 to 80 million per year, or CAD 0.98/boe at the midpoint, assuming production remains near the 200,000 boe/day range.

Seven Generations has also maximized efficiency and output through multi-level stacked pads to improve infrastructure utilization— with a boost of 50% more inventory per section, and 30% increase in NPV per section and a reduction of 85,000 truck-loads of reduced water transportation.

These operating cost efficiencies have given Seven Generations Energy much higher netbacks than competitors in the Canadian oil and gas landscape.


3.  Decline rate moderation (40% to 30% by 2022) and diverting capital from Nest 1 to Nest 3 with higher IRR leads to sustainability as a low cost producer

Seven Generations has greater than 80Mbbl/day capacity with more than 60 Mbbl/day that is wholly owned and operated with optional access to an additional 20 Mbbl/day from 3rd parties is and is able to average half-cycle IRRs greater than 50%.

Seven Generation’s business model has pivoted towards a more sustainable decline rate— in an earning’s call, Seven Generation’s management indicated it entered 2020 with approximately a 40% corporate decline rate, with management expecting declines to enter the 30% range by mid-2022 under its current program. Seven Generations will break-even on a drilling and completion basis at USD 33 per barrel, but declines in to the 30% range could bring it down to USD 29-31 per barrel.

In a low 40s WTI and at a $2.50 per MMBtu price environment— with weaker condensate differentials, Nest 3 is the best returning region in Seven Generation’s portfolio. As prices move into the mid-40s and condensate differentials improve to where we are today (September 2020), all regions start to exhibit favorable well economics.

Seven Generations is currently directing capital away from Nest 1 to Nest 3, which is more gas prone. All development activity for the second half of 2020 will be shifted towards the Nest 3 region to lower initial decline rate. While Nest 1 drilling economics have improved considerably, management should be flexible towards production allocations across wells.

In 2019, Seven Generations completed a 120 million pipeline network that connects the southern part, the Nest 3 area, to the core. The lower Montney well on the 10-16-62-4 pad in Nest 3 continues to exceed expectations, with the well continuing to be the best condensate producer on the pad. Overall IP270 volumes of 1,934 boe/d are 12% above the average upper/middle Montney locations on the pad, and condensate rates over the same time frame averaged 506 bbl/d, 39% above the average upper/middle Montney location on the pad.

The encouraging results from the first Nest 3 lower Montney well prompted Seven Generations to add two additional lower Montney wells in the area in 2020— improving the capital efficiency mix due to the high deliverability. Over the next 24 months, further benefits from decline rate moderation will result in another 6% to 12% decrease in total maintenance capex.

When condensate prices are stronger, Seven Generations can always consider Nest 1. Although not as lucrative as Nest 3, Nest 1’s well economics still compare favorably to wells operated by the majority of Montney producers. These wells have an IRR of about 15% and a payback of 3 years at current prices.

As oil prices firm up, the ability to blend more production from the Nest 1 region into Seven Generation’s total production profile is likely to put condensate yields back on track— similar to 2018. Revenue from condensate reached 70% of Seven Generation’s total revenue in Q1 2020 with 69,000 barrels of condensate per day.  Given the same equivalent volume, due to higher prices, condensate production brings in higher revenues than natural gas.

In terms of Seven Generation’s internal rate of return for its projects, Nest 2 Wells have an IRR of roughly 40-60% at USD 40-50 WTI and USD 1.8-2.80 NYMEX gas, representing a payback period of 12-15 months. At a discount rate of 10%, the net present value of these wells is approximately 20-35 million. 



 4.   Differentiated pipelines for Natural Gas brings pricing options

Seven Generations has more than enough processing capacity with 3 owned plants, with additional access to third-party processing. When it comes to pipeline capacity, they have more than enough egress for gas.

Seven Generations has egress of about 700 million cubic feet per day— mostly to the Midwest, some of it to Henry Hub, some to Eastern Canada, some to Malin. As of 2020, with dire conditions, Seven Generations has reduced to 500 million cubic feet per day. There is a lot of additional room to grow gas production over other liquids

Seven Generations sells oil & gas via domestic (Alberta) and exports (80% of natural gas is outside Alberta) to the U.S— with 90% of Seven Generation’s natural gas sales in the U.S Midwest, the US Gulf Coast, and Eastern Canada with a realized price of $3.41/Mcf for 2019, with the local AECO benchmark price averaged at $1.67/GJ. Seven Generations is far from reaching its total capacity of 1 Bcf/d. With Cutbank/Lator/Gold Creek alone— the capacity is 760MMcf/d.




These main pipelines which transfers Seven Generation’s produce—

-    GTN at 90-92 MMcf/d

-    Alliance at 500 MMcf/d to Chicago and the mid-west market

-    NGPL at 100MMcf/d for Henry Hub (Henry Hub has been selling to Cheniere— the gas is then placed on the water for LNG)

-    TCPL at 77 MMcf/d to eastern Canada


This means that for natural gas, 700MMcf/d of pricing optionality is available due to diversified market access. 

Alliance provides Seven Generations with over 500Mcf per day, nearly 2/3 of pipeline capacity, but is currently slightly out of the money. Alliance provides access to the Midwest market and enables transportation of gas through Kinder Morgan's NGPL line directly to the Gulf Coast. The Alliance partnership also provides tremendous amount of flexibility, particularly with regards to renewal options.

The primary term of Seven Generation’s current Alliance contract expires in the Q4 of 2022 with option for renewal or termination of transportation capacity completely—if terminated, Seven Generations will market their gas in Alberta or on TC Energy connected systems.

In the long term, through projects in British Columbia, Kitimat, Jordan Cove LNG Terminal, natural gas take-away capacity will improve. 

 

5.   Reserves

With approximately 1.6B boe of gross proved plus probable reserves, this is enough to last 20 years of domestic Canadian energy supplies and exports.

Seven Generations possesses one of the best liquefied natural gas land in the entire Montney. Covering approximately 500,000 acres— Seven Generations owns a vast amount of land and over 1100 undeveloped locations with 2P reserves of 1.6B Boe and 1P reserves of 842 Boe.  

Of these 1100 locations, approximately 55% lie within the company's primary development block, termed Nest 2. The liquid-rich natural gas produced in Nest 2 is “sweeter” than other natural gases found in the region (less than 100 ppm H2S), allowing for minimal investment requirements in sour gas processing facilities. As such, the cost of producing one MMbtu of gas is only US$0.94, ranking the company as one of the most competitive suppliers of gas in North America.

Assuming WTI of $40, gas at $2.50 and a minus $8 condensate differential. Approximately 1,300 Nest-quality locations in the Upper Montney have attractive well economics on a half cycle and a full cycle basis. Nest locations imply -- with 1,316 Nest locations in the Upper Montney alone; implying about 19 years of top-tier drilling inventory, assuming about 70 locations are drilled per year.

 

Risks

Specific risks include unplanned facility downtime, not delivering on production targets, deploying capital ahead of time for additional production, and higher than expected decline rates.

Sector risks include a decline in commodity prices and rising industry costs.

 

Here are 3 risks to consider—


1.  Depth of Inventory/ Adequate Reserves & inability to improve decline/depletion rate

Seven Generation claims to have 15-20 years of inventory—2P reserves are 1.6 billion barrels equivalent. Divide 1.6B by 200k boe/d, and you get 22 years (8000/365days) of inventory.

Shale plays or “resource plays” have an average well profile different from conventional wells. Horizontal and multistage fracking are used to create more contact between the well bore and the oil & gas formation. This gives wells very high IP 30 rates, but eventually diminishes the yield.

Seven Generations is now trying to moderate their growth rate after years of hyper growth. Their decline rate is about 45% a year after being at 50%, and is being reduced by 2-3% a year. High decline rates with new horizontal shale wells as reserves require more active drilling and a higher replacement requirement.

On average, Nest 2 wells loses 30-40% of production yields after 250 days, and 80% of yields after 2 years, due to over pumping and the spread of contamination and land subsidence. Although Seven Generation's unconventional plays are not as stable long term as peers, at current low oil prices— it is still the preferred method of production, since it leads to a faster payout.

 

2.  Out of the Money Prices

While oil and gas are at an all-time low, prices are still unpredictable with many variables affecting commodity prices. There is a misconception that Seven Generation gets Chicago pricing instead of low AECO prices— Seven Generation has a premium on their NGLs, but the gas is still in Alberta. For the bulk of the rest of the year, AECO prices may US$1.00/MMBtu below Henry Hub. When the Alberta price exceeds Henry Hub, exports have lagged.

To adapt to the new commodity price uncertainties brought about by supply and demand impacts resulting from OPEC decision-making and the COVID-19 pandemic— for 2021, Nest regions will have a more balanced mix. With resumed activity and recovery to higher liquids prices, Nest 1 will resume. Ultimately, all decisions are based on well economics and maintaining flexibility to changes in commodity prices.

 

3.  Increasing Transportation Costs and other costs

One major increasing expense is transportation costs—Seven Generation’s costs are higher at 7.5-8.25/boe while Paramount is at 3-3.5/boe. Transportation costs (per BOE) are expected to grow 3% a year, as a result of the increasing cost of fuel less any cost savings attributed to bundling of large lots of production.

 

 

Valuation (reserves and cash flow)

 

1.   Cash flow and Production

If production is maintained at 180-200k boe/day and improves to 200-250k boe/day due to lower capital expenditures, at WTI $45-50 for oil and $3-6 condensate differentials, I expect the bear case for EBITDA to be at least 150-180M with 65-70 wells on production, and the bull case to be near 220-290M with 80-95 wells. 

In 2019, with operating cash flow of approximately 1.4B and capital investments of about 1.23B, Seven Generations had free cash flow of about 160M. Even in Q1 of 2020, Seven Generations generated a modest amount of free cash flow.

Seven Generation’s enormous infrastructure provides economies of scale which generates a high cash flow netback at $18-20/boe. Rising production of oil sands creates a strong demand for condensate. Condensate enjoys a price on par with WTI, which lends Seven Generations a stable and high operating netback. While Paramount and Seven Generation have different profiles in Natural Gas and Condensate, Seven Generations has more pricing flexibility due to additional pipeline options.

Average realized prices range from $10-70/boe depending on the condensate in the production mix. C5+ LNGS (condensates) go for as high as $70/boe while C3 and C4 gases (propane and butane have dropped to as low as $10-20/boe since the energy crash). Seven Generations Energy's 150bbl/MMcf liquids to gas ratio is significantly higher than the 40bbl/MMcf average in western Canada, giving Seven Generations as high as $6/MMcf in savings.

With 2.2B net debt, and a 1.4B market cap, with 333M shares outstanding, assuming 500M EBITDA, Seven Generations has a EV of 3.6B, and is trading 3x LTM EBITDA. Book value is 4-5B, or $12/ share. Shares are currently (August 27, 2020) 4.2/share.

Paramount Resources is uncertain to produce FCF in 2021, but Seven Generations surely will. A bird in hand is worth two in the bush— despite Seven Generations having almost double the enterprise value of Paramount Resources— CEO Marty has not over leveraged Seven Generation’s balance sheet nor over produced at inopportune moments. Paramount previously had to sell off assets due to overly aggressive production to cover basic liquidity assets needs during bad times.

 

Seven Generations (43% natural gas, 35% condensate, 22% other NGLs):

Enterprise Value: 3.56B

1P Reserves: 842 MMBoe

2P Reserves: 1600 MMBoe

Q2 2020 Production: 183,200 boe/d

EV/2P= 3.56B/1.6B Barrels = 2.23x

EV/1P = 3.56B/ 842M Barrels = 4.22x

Seven Generations is valued at 2.23 times its enterprise value to 2P reserves

EV/ LTM EBITDA =3.56B/ 1.3B = 2.72x

 

Paramount Resources (47% liquids):

Enterprise Value: 1.15B

1P Reserves: 335 MMBoe

2P Reserves: 632 MMBoe (47% liquids)

Q2 2020 Production: 68,839 Boe/d (39% liquids)

EV/2P= 1.15B/632M Barrels = 1.8x

EV/1P = 1.15B/ 335M Barrels = 3.43x

Paramount is valued at 1.8 times its enterprise value to 2P reserves

EV/ LTM EBITDA =1.15B/ 421M = 2.73x

 

2.    Reserves

The 2P reserves for Seven Generations don’t paint a complete picture, since it only includes about 975 locations or 3/4 of the Upper Montney in the Nest. Seven Generations has more areas for development, including the lower Montney, Wapiti, etc.

Pre-Covid-19, Seven Generations was selling 200kboe/d, whereas Paramount was selling 90-100kboe/day, with nearly 500MMcf/d of natural gas sales. In addition to this, Seven Generations has 842 MMBoe in 1P reserves, whereas Paramount has 335 MMBoe. Paramount has 2 million net acres of land, yet despite a lower decline rate and longer operating history, their production isn’t as prolific as Seven Generation (500k acres), and reserves are less. 2P reserves for Seven Generations is 1600 MMBoe, while Paramount is 632 MMBoe. Despite Seven Generations having an enterprise value double of Paramount, the probable reserves still make Seven Generations a justified purchase. 

Oil and gas is a sector where you think you know enough to be right, but there will always be macro-economic factors such as Covid-19 and the banter between the middle-east and Russia. You can never know enough to predict where you're wrong— there are always external factors out of an investor’s control. This makes me conservative and I would sell immediately when the stock price exceeds intrinsic value.

 

Catalyst

Focus on Nest 3 and wells with higher IRR with Nest 1 as optional upside

Natural Gas pipeline capacity at Henry Hub, Alliance, and the Mid-West is currently out of the money and will revert

45% decline rates being reduced 2-3% a year to a 30% rate by 2022

Maintenance capex reduced

Prices improving with condensate production going up