Wednesday, April 29, 2020

2011 Richard Koo at INET --- Balance sheet recession and Japan's previous experience



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This morning with Richard Koo, chief economist of the Nomura Research Institute in Tokyo he's also the author of “The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics” a book that's had tremendous influence around the world.

Leading American and European economists are now studying it— looking at the implications for their societies of what Richard calls the balance sheet recession that afflicted Japan for 15 years between 1990 and 2005.

The balance sheet which overhangs the United States and in peripheral Europe are now big source of concern as everybody moves towards fiscal austerity,

Richard thanks for joining us.




 I read in the most recent copy of your newsletter occasionally very interested in the quantitative easing. The implications for the currency the fallout of the G20 meeting in Seoul and from what we know about balance sheet recessions that monetary expansion at this zero interest rate level may not be very effective. Can you describe briefly your thoughts, when you heard that Ben Bernanke was going to embark on this second stage of quantitative easing?

Richard Koo

Well, I thought that was somewhat unfortunate, because this so-called “QE1”— where he was putting a huge amount of liquidity to save the US banking system, that part, made sense.

There was a financial crisis and a loss of confidence in the financial system and institutions, everybody was on defensive, and the central bank was the only provider of liquidity to keep the things going.

That part is fine, any central bank faced with that kind of crisis, implemented it— during Lehman shock, it had to do that, and Japan had to do that too. When securities collapsed in 1997; that was the first default in the so called “non-collateral call-market” in Japan's history. Japanese companies all got really scared, the whole thing came to grinding stop.

The Bank of Japan pumped in huge sum of liquidity to get things going again, but with QE2, where the goal is no longer fixing the financial system, but to get the economy going. I'm afraid it's not going to produce the kind of result a lot of people are hoping for.

Because I think what we have in United States is a situation where even with zero interest rates, the private sector is minimizing debt— so-called deleveraging and they are leveraging because all the assets they bought with borrowed funds during the bubble days have collapsed in value, but the liabilities are still on their books and their balance sheets are underwater.

And if you have cash flow, the right thing to do under those circumstances is to use the cash flow to pay down debt.

Now when everybody does it at the same time, economy enters a fallacy of composition— in that everybody's doing the right things— repairing balance sheets, but when everybody does it at the same time, we enter a very strange world that happens once maybe every 70 years.

For a national economy, if someone is saving money— you're paying down debt, then you better have someone on the other side borrowing and spending money. When no one is borrowing spending money, with zero interest rates, and everybody's deleveraging, what happens?

In the usual economy— if I’m a member of the household sector half thousand dollars of income I spend nine hundred myself decide to save hundred dollars nine hundred is already someone else's income. that's not a problem the hundred dollars go through the financial types and the banks the securities houses they will then give it to someone else who can use it that person borrows it spends it nine hundred plus one hundred thousand dollars against the original income of the thousand dollars the economy moves forward.

If there are too many borrowers, interest rates are raised, if there are too few borrowers, interest rates are lowered and adjustments are made. But in the world we are now and the world we found ourselves in, Japan for nearly 15 years, was that you bring rates down to zero, people are still deleveraging— no one's borrowing money.

What happens when I get 1000 dollars for income decide to spend 900 and save 100 dollars?
The 100 dollars gets stuck in a banking system somewhere. It becomes a leakage to the income streams

Because there are no shoes in the vault, right?

I was borrowing and spending money yeah the economy shrinks from 1,000 to 900 then because only 900 was the part that was spent.

That's someone else's income that person gets it decided to say let's say he decide to say 10% he spends 810. He decides to save $90 and that $90 gets stuck in a banking system because people are still deleveraging.

Then economy goes from 1000 to 810 to 730 very, very, quickly, even with zero interest rates and that's the danger we faced in Japan and that's exactly how the Great Depression got so bad, so quickly, in the U.S— from 1929 to 1933— everybody was paying down debt— no one was borrowing money.

And I see the same danger in this part of the world as well. When you're in that kind of situation, you try to pump in money through QE2 or QE3 there will be no takers— the money can enter the financial system, but it cannot go any further, because in the real economy, people are all deleveraging.

Some people talk about the government spending money, must mean we are using grandchildren's credit card— this kind of thought is really common, but you have to remember as well, what kind of economy are going to leave behind for the next generation?

If you cut it now and allow the economy to go from 1000 to 900 to 810 to 730, there will be a lot more young people who won't be able to go to schools school programs we have be cut for the many local school districts. They won't be able to study art, they won't be able to study science because all the programs are being cut, and that's a huge cost to the future generations.

Interviewer
Science, research, similarly right?
Basic science research you don't have R&D and new product development in 10, 20, 30 years down the path.

RK
Right, and it's not just science and the arts field all of these areas where people have to come up with new ideas to get the society going. If these people no longer were able to have those opportunities because they have to go find work or the school programs were cut drastically, then that's all cost of the future generations and that part seems to be missing from the debate.

Interviewer
Well, when they talk about fiscal policy and deficits that's the flow of activity, but what you might say the stock of activity right or there's give me the stock of accumulated benefits of that activity?

Like how educated is your workforce? How strong is your infrastructure? How elevated is your understanding of the arts sciences and elements of culture? Those are all assets of a society and that's not a dimension.

RK
A lot of young people lost their education opportunities during the 1930’s— because the government did not do the right things once the stock market collapsed. And who's paying for that cost? That part is missing from our debate all together














Interviewer
Now here's an interesting element. You sit in Japan with friendships with the United States and have very close observation of China— I know you travel to both places. The Americans are saying we don't trust government we have to cut off government.

At the same time people are saying we admire what the Chinese are doing and the Chinese are doing things infrastructure education so forth, run by the government all of these models exist, and yet the Americans at this critical juncture are saying we have to shut down the government, we can't trust the government. The government isn't good. How do you explain that? How do you see it?

R.K
 Well, China was actually headed toward a perfect balance recession September 9, 2008 when Lehman shock hit, Chinese housing prices and the Chinese stock market was collapsing— we were all in the same boat at the time.

But the Chinese in early November 2008 put in a massive fiscal stimulus— 17% of GDP, that's 3X larger than President Obama 787 billion dollar package.

The Chinese implemented it very quickly, and as a result, even though the economy was headed toward a perfect balance sheet recession, because of this massive fiscal push from the government, it bounced off.

When the Chinese announced that package, everybody around the world was laughing.

8% GDP growth? No way!

But they actually achieved 8% growth and even higher than that. The Chinese people become more confident— they start spending money, the economy began to pick up further, and now China is about the only winner in this world game of economics.

What I admire about China is that they have very practical people, otherwise that civilization wouldn't have lasted 5000 years, and they are not beholden to ideology of one type or another.

Especially these guys, the Communist to begin with— so whatever that works they just put in place and some of the charts that I have used over the years which show that Japanese GDP never fell even after the bursting of the bubble.

The Chinese paid great deal of attention to that chart— because at that time, about five years ago, China had both the housing bubble and a stock market bubble. The economy was doing very well, but their leaders were very, very, scared. Everybody was doing fine economically; why should their leaders be scared?

Well, we have to remember current leadership in China is not elected by the people; they dumped the communism in a garbage can.

So they really have some legitimacy problems, if you are elected by the people and economy goes down you can still tell the public that, “look I have two more years to go.”

Well, if you are practice communism— defined by the Communist Party and the chairman— if someone complains you can grab the guy put him in jail and that's the end of the story. But at least there's some legitimacy there. But now these people have nothing.

Interviewer
You have to deliver the goods?

Exactly that's the only claim to legitimacy they have and that is, under their leadership the living standard of Chinese people have improved dramatically which is true but if a third of the improvement or the half of the improvement is due to the bubble, and once the bubble bursts an economy starts shrinking and people's living standards start falling…

You have a political crisis?

Exactly! That's what they already about.

So when they saw that Japanese managed to keep their GDP from falling even though Japanese commercial real estate fell 87% from the peak nationwide.

Just imagine this scenerio— Manhattan down 87%, San Francisco go down 87%, Chicago down 87%, Orlando down 87%, now what kind of economy in the U.S do you have left?

Japan managed to keep the GDP from falling below the peak of the bubble for the entire 20 a period after bursting of the bubble

Chinese saw that and says, “this is what we have to do then,” and that's what they did.

At the moment China is the only winner because they continue to put in the fiscal stimulus that's necessary and as a result the economy is doing very well.

Tax receipts are growing— they can spend more on the military and they can add to their national prestige and national power while everybody else is still struggling.















Interviewer
How is the United States, given the tremendous burden of military responsibility our country's been carrying— where we spend more than the rest of the world combined on events—how will,
in a shriveling economy, will the Americans be able to continue? And at the same time exert a kind of presence in national security around the world?

Well, I think the way we are headed, smaller governments is the wrong way to go.
Because the idea of having a small government is fine as long as private sector is healthy. And I'm looking forward to that, but right now, once in every 70 years, when this huge bubble burst and the private sector balance sheets were in horrible shape, the private sector is no longer forward looking.

They are backward-looking— trying to repair their balance sheets by paying down debt.

Even with zero interest rates, you know, the fact that America is a deleveraging with zero interest rate shows how sick the private sector is—and when you're in this situation if you try to shrink the government the whole thing shrinks and economy falls into this 1000-900-810 (income saving) that scenario.

And there would be there will be less money for defense, and other countries who are trying to take advantage of the U.S weakness will have a field day. I would argue that it's good that China is doing the right things— right putting the right set of policies, but the way to counter that which because the Chinese are doing the right things, Chinese economy is doing well and therefore the defense spending is increasing, the right way to counter that is not to tell the Chinese to do the wrong economic policy, but for us to putting the right economic policies.

And that's not small government at the moment. The government has to play a key role to keep the GDP from falling so the private sectors the income to pay down channels. Once the private sector is healthy then we reverse our predicament.














Interviewer
When you look at the United States in comparison with Japan and the length or the duration of repairing of balance sheets, if we were to engage in 5 or 7% of GDP fiscal plan how many years do you think it would have to go on until the private sector had put themselves back into that place of balance?

It's a very difficult estimate to make, because there's so few examples in the past that we can rely on. The Japanese took nearly 15 years before deleveraging stopped around 2005 and the bubble burst from 1990; so that's 15 years.

This is against the commercial real estate prices falling 87 percent nationwide U.S commercial real estate prices fell about half of that 44 percent and house prices down about 30 to 35 percent which of course much smaller than the Japanese our numbers, and so I don't think US you take 15 I think and make it much shorter than yours.

Right, but to do that we have to do everything right and Japan did not have to take 15 either, we make two mistakes in the middle.

In 1997 Prime Minister Hashimoto listening to all these people who told him that fiscal policy is not working— you're putting so much building bridges to nowhere roads to nowhere look economy is going absolutely nowhere.

The IMF, the OECD, they all told him to cut budget deficit. I was advising him at the time, and I said, “no you don't cut if you cut now the whole thing will come crashing down” but I was just the private sector economist, and I am not even the Japanese.

So he listened to all these big shots from abroad and decided to cut. We enter five quarters of negative growth complete meltdown of the banking system to go with it not like road.

Not unlike Roosevelt in 1937

Exactly! and as a result it took Japan nearly ten years to climb out of that hole. The budget deficit instead of decreasing by 15 trillion yen 3% of Japan GDP; it increased by 16 trillion yen, 68% and to bring this thing down because damage was so large it took us 10 years.

Another small mistake was made by Prime Minister Koizumi in year 2001, when he tried to limit Japanese government bond issuance to 30 trillion yen a year. But the gap was bigger than 30 trillion, he's tried to keep it at 30 and the economy began showing negative growth again, so those two mistakes cost Japan nearly 10 years, in my view, and I don't want United States to make the same mistake.














And you could see China maybe with a bold aggressive pre-emptive response? They’re already out of it they didn't you have to go five years so it's very interesting to not look that

R.K
They have a little bit overboard— in the other area and that is that when China putting the massive fiscal stimulus in November 2008 the government also told its banks to lend as much money as you can to get the economy going.

But under the usual balance sheet obsession world where private sector is deleveraging, in trying to repair their balances, there should be no borrowers.

Even if the bankers are willing to lend but in China there were still borrowers, and those are the regional governments and provincial governments.

People who don't think their balance sheet gets measured

That's right! And prior to November 2008 regional governments always wanted to borrow more for their mega projects because these regional governments are always competing with each other.

But central government was trying to say, no, you can't borrow so much.

And the central government also told the banks not to lend too much to the regional governments. But in November 2008, two months after the Lehman collapse, the whole world was in shambles.

So, the central government says okay, you can lend to the regional governments as well and there though the regional government so you can borrow some money.

Massive funds went out of the Chinese banking system to the regional governments. And of course regional governments spent that on their mega projects. The money then flew into the private sector and we have a massive housing bubble in China at the moment.

In Shanghai, ordinary condominiums cost nearly 1 million US dollars, for people who are making so much less than the national average. Now they have these housing bubbles problems that they have to deal with and that part I think they are very serious now.

Because they are afraid that if this kind of house prices remains, there could be a revolt somewhere down the line with the people saying, “We’ve been working so hard for the millions for nothing?”

So, I think they clamp down on housing market. The bubble is real, and we could see some blood in that industry or in that sector going forward.

But they can always offset the huge negatives, from this side by massive public spending on the other side, so that the total GDP should be maintained, over some sort of growth. But we could see some areas of Shanghai real estate, for example turning into non-performing loans or something worse.

Interviewer
Are you seeing rapid wage growth in China?

There has been.

So they can become more affordable through increasing wages right?

Yes, they could also catch up with what happened to the housing.

Thank you for coming and seeing us today

Welcome.

Interviewer
It's always good to catch up with you and we look forward to seeing you at the Bretton Woods conference. Thank you very much

Stanford University Interview with Charlie Munger The Current (2008) Economic Crisis


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Charlie you've often complained that accountants are the root of much evil and folly. As we look at the current situation in our financial markets, how much of the responsibility would you lay at the feet of the accounting profession?

Well here I am, a voice in the wilderness.

But I would argue that a majority of the horrors we faced would not have happened if the accounting profession were organized properly. In other words, they have a position from which if they behaved intelligently and correctly, they could prevent a huge amount of all what's wrong with the system; and they fail utterly— time after time, after time.

They are way too liberal in providing the kind of accounting that the financial promoters want.

So, in other words, they've sold out.

They do not even realize that they've sold out, which of course is a common human psychological phenomenon, squelched by denial. So what?

Exactly

Whether you recognize this and if such an action would make you think poorly of yourself— or if it would interfere with your income and so on— it is on a subconscious level— without any malevolence.

The accounting profession is behaving in a way that makes Sewers look well compared to what could reasonably be done with intelligence and honor.

The accounting profession is a sewer.

It would you give an example could you give an example of a particular accounting principle or practice?

Take derivative trading with mark-to-market accounting which degenerates into mark to model— two firms make a big derivative trade— both sides show a large profit on the same trade, and they can't both be right.

It can't both be right and both of them are following the rules to the tee…

Yes and nobody's even bothered by the fact that that's happening, right?
It violates the most elemental principles of common sense and the reason. They do it, there's a demand for it from the financial promoters.

I remember when interest rate swap accounting was done on a different and more conservative basis and the Morgan bank was the last holdout. And finally, they couldn't hold their trader’s report— the same kind of income other people reported was higher…

And so they threw out the sound accounting and went to the phony accounting.

They way did it was kind of funny at the time, which was many decades ago and so some of the people were kind of reluctant, but they said we just have to go with the flow.

It was a huge mistake.

 Is this a problem that can be fixed with the accounting profession with the accounting process or something that well?

Oh I think you're talking about a problem rooted so deeply in human nature that I don't think you'll live long enough to see it gets 20 percent fixed in the direction it should go in your remaining lifetime you'll be a fortunate man.

So how do we get there? So let's assume that we would actually want to accomplish something?

I don't know how to transform all human life in the world we're just talking about the NLA surely

Well, but accounting is a big subject and they're huge forces in play and the entire momentum of existing thinking and customs is in a direction which allows these terrible follies to happen.

And the terrible follies have terrible consequences but we're in now is and it's triggering circumstances.

 It's worse the Great Depression?

No. We're not the economy hasn't contracted as much as the Great Depression, but the malfeasance and silliness it was the triggering—the event was way greater. So, sure, it was more widespread in the 20s— a tiny little class of people were our financial promoters and a tiny little class of people were the people that bought securities this now is deep in the whole culture and it was way more extreme.

So, if sin and folly get punished we're in for a hell of a punishment.

So it's a more pervasive problem and it's also a more global problem?

Yes

And do you see a chance that it does reach to a level a closer to the Great Depression? How bad does this get, Charlie?

Well, nobody knows that because we've never done this before and it's we have a bigger credit bubble we have worse follies more interconnected global system. If we responded to this one the way people responded to the 30s, in my judgment, it would be way worse and we would have a catastrophe which you can argue gave us Hitler and World War II.

A lot of things that we didn't need.

I mean it was not getting your financial integrity and the integrity of your accounting right. It has enormous implications for the future of mankind and yet very few people realize how much we screwed up.

Very few people realize even in leading law school and tools and business schools how Enron never could have happened if they hadn't changed the accounting rules. And what we have now is just a bigger widespread and Enron.

You know I like I like telling my students that no civilization is greater than its plumbing and accounting is really the plumbing of the financial system and to the extent that the plumbing can't serve the function, the whole the whole edifice, really, in many situations is not going to work the way that it's intended.

Idiot bubbles blessed by accountants are terrible for the whole civilization. 

It would be much better if we didn't have these idiot bubbles or at least if they were dampened very considerably.

 But people use the idiom "nobody wants to take the punch bowl away when everybody's having a good time at the party."

But that's the accountant’s job and that's the central banker’s job.

And you're never popular we don't have a business's job and the people who do it tend to be despised and hated and a lot of people are willing to be despised and hated and ruin their fellow-creatures parties etc.

The main thing you have to realize is Ben Franklin's basic idea that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure; that's understated, an ounce of prevention is sometimes worth a ton of cure.

And your only real chance was not to allow it to happen when the regulators put in the options exchanges there was like one letter saying you shouldn't do this and Warren Buffett wrote it.

he just said “this is not doing any good for the wider civilization we don't need this” you know he was all alone and he was totally right when we separated banking from Investment Banking on the theory that investment banking had a natural proclivity to get a fair amount of knavery and folly into it and that we wanted to protect our banks from the contagion that was a good idea when we created margin rules that discouraged heavy borrowing against securities— Just to make more money when the securities went up in value that was a good idea.

When they wanted to make the market system a better gambling casino, as a side function of unnecessary capital market with vast profits for the people who were helpers (croupiers) in the trade the market makers and the brokers and so on, that created a big constituency in favor of a dumb change. Buffett was like a man trying to stop an elephant with a pea shooter. We're not controlling financial leverage if we have option exchanges. So these changes repealed longtime control of margin credit by the Federal Reserve System.

And there was little Warren Buffett, saying this is a dumb idea, we're not controlling margins, if you're having option exchanges and get unlimited leverage whatever the more leverage that will automatically with an option exchange of course and then they do.

So just one after another the very people who should have been preventing these asininities were instead allowing foolish departures from the corrective devices we'd put in the last time we had a big trouble—devices that worked quite well.

Our regulators allowed the proprietary trading departments at investment banks to become hedge funds in disguise, using the 'repo' system—one of the most extreme credit-granting systems ever devised. The amount of leverage was utterly awesome.

The derivative trading which made the options exchange look like a benign.

Well, yet and so just one after another we made these insane departures from the corrective devices. We put in the last time we had a big trouble and that really worked quite well— the investment banks of York and the Melons were running First Boston and Morgan Stanley was a very conservative place chastened by the 30’s investment banks were partnerships they were totally private the partners were dependent for their retirement on the prosperity of the firm's they left behind and the customs and culture they left behind.

And the places were much more responsible and honorable. The old First Boston Company had as one of its early employees –one of its employees a good friend of mine—and when he went there in the early 50's, they cared terribly about the consequences to their clients’ long term prosperity from the securities they sold.

That ethos by the time the year 2006 came along had pretty well disappeared.

Now you and your partner Warren Buffett have four years complained and warned about the dangers that you perceive in the modern derivatives markets in particular credit derivatives yeah it'll also conserve all so concerns about you know interest rate swaps currency swaps equity swaps but your real concern has been about the credit derivative market

Well the interest rate swap had enormous dangers in it— given the size it was on at and the accounting that was allowed but, the credit default derivatives just went to new levels of excess from something that was already gross and wrong. What happened there was rather interesting in the 20’s we had the bucket shop right?

In the '20s we had the 'bucket shop.' And the "bucket shop" was a term of derision because these people ran a gambling parlor they didn't buy any securities. It just enabled people to make bets against the house and the house furnished little statements of how the bits went out. It was like the off-track betting system.

Until the house lost its money and all the sudden disappeared

Yes

Or the house made its money and all of a sudden disappeared

Yes

Either way, but the bucket shop was regarded in retrospect at the end of the 20’s as a criminal enterprise— counterproductive to the nation.

Derivatives trading with no central clearing brought back the bucket job.

But tell me

Because you could make bets without having any interest in the basic security and so and people did in billions and billions and billions of dollars.

So we had a system in the professions and in the regulatory agent that were empty.

Some of the most eminent and most admired people in finance including Alan Greenspan argued that derivatives trading in the form of the old bucket shop was a great contribution to modern economic civilization and now the Federal Reserve…

There’s one word for this, and it's “insane”.

The problem that you're talking about now, Charlie, is really much bigger than just GNAC or will the government step in at General Electric have a look at the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.

It has ballooned.

The Federal Reserve is today buying assets and I think they're probably doing what's absolutely necessary in order to keep liquidity flowing in the short term but they're buying assets today that they wouldn't even have considered looking at a year ago.

There are over 800 billion dollars of this stuff sitting in the Federal Reserve balance sheet right now and that number in my view is much more likely to double or to approach two trillion dollars within the next 18 months than any other number that you're likely to see

Well, I think the problem is so extreme that nothing un-extreme will solve it.

The people in the government that are doing these extreme things I'm sure they're making a lot of decisions that retrospect will be seen as mistakes. But given the human condition where they have to do extreme things under fire, I am not inclined to criticize.

I like the fact that they are so willing to do things that have never been done before.

Because we have problems right we have never seen before.

I like the fact here I am a right-wing Republican, I like the fact that Obama has put into the White House, Larry Summers was a ferociously smart human being, and will try and do the right thing even if there is a lot of defensive people. I think that's a quality that we need right now.

 Well you know you mentioned a president-elect Obama. Soon to be President Obama.
What do you think of the job that he's doing so far the transition team that he's put together directions that he's pointed that he's going to try to take the economy in?

 Well, I would argue that given the circumstances, and given the background he comes from, I would argue that he is doing very well indeed

 Going back to your observation where you were supporting what the Federal Reserve is doing in terms of buying up all these assets while ago

 I have a comment on every individual decision but sure, extreme aggression and trying to rent the total collapse of the system feeding out itself, I think, is totally correct.

I think that both Bernanke and Summers are likely to understand that way better than most people would.

We're very lucky to have both of them there.

Geithner I don't know. But I have no feeling that he isn't a good member of the of the threesome.

As people look at the situation that's currently evolving many people sort of see two problems in the short term there's a concern about deflation we have a massive contraction of credit formation there's deleveraging that's going on at a pace that nobody's ever experienced before.

 Unemployment is going to rise very significantly— the destruction of wealth on the private balance sheets unprecedented, consumers are going to be spending less, they're going to be trying to rebuild their own balance sheet, and clearly this is a situation where the government has got to come in strong and the government has got to come in heavy.

Do you have any views on the fiscal side of things the government's talking now— about an eight hundred and fifty a billion dollar package the mix of fiscal stimulus tax cuts and the like?

Not only do we have to save the financial system in spite of our revulsion about the way many of its denizens behaved, but we also need a huge a huge spending stimulus from the federal government.

I don't regard that as all bad at all, I think there's a lot to be done in this country.

I think we need a whole electricity distribution system which is more efficient and bigger and more flexible and more perfect than we have and I think that this is an opportunity to get that done.

I think much could be done in medical care and I think the hospitals of the country are probably about to get a vast improvement in their facilities and I think that's all too good.

we have a whole lot of things that are worth doing Obama is not talking about scooping of people and having them stand around holding shovels in the middle of some forest.

 I mean he is talking about fixing infrastructure and, so on, the city of Los Angeles where I live the streets are disgraced compared to the streets of Japan. Japan had so much fiscal stimulus you can't find a pothole on the side of a mountain in Japan.

But you can find but you can find lots of airports that nobody uses out in the rural Japan.

That may be but at least they fixed all the streets and the trains and everything else so I welcome a fiscal stimulus.

 that will now improve a lot of things but as part of the government's response the government the United States and governments worldwide are printing money de-facto at a rate that is absolutely unprecedented and if you know we know traditionally that if you increase the supply of something its price is going to go down. Short-term everybody's really too worried about deflation.

We would have been much better if we hadn't worked ourselves into this position where we have to do this and you are right to point out that there are dangers from what we have to do but the dangers from what we have to do are less than the dangers that would plainly come if we responded as we did to the 30’s.
In an ideal world of classical economics, you can say just, what everybody suffer and then whether we're back itself from a low level we can't do that with a modern voting democracy.

We're hooked for exactly what is happening and so are the other advanced nations and sure there are dangers and we may get some inflation but what the kind of economic misery that gave us the rise of Adolf Hitler. That we don't want. And we should skirt that danger, cheerfully accepting the dangers that come from us going.

So you see the situation as being one were trying to manage the lesser men of two evils. Or the least of many evils as a practical matter.

And you know what I'm hearing from you Charlie is that so far so good it appears that the government is on a reasonable track

It is very reasonable to react with the extreme bigger that's been shown in fact I would argue and retrospective the vigor wasn't quite enough I would agree with you and I would argue that it was pluperfect obvious they had to save all these banks and the major and investment banks

So scale of one to ten how big a mistake was it that?

 They let Lehman go.
 I don't think that was a mistake.

Interesting

I think it actually helps to have one or two go.

I think you need some examples and a big mess and just save everybody right no matter how awful.

We were that would have created just unlimited revulsion in the body politic.

So, I think the people had to decide that some people were going to be saved and some people weren't.

I think it was correct that they decided they have two categories through the saved and the unsaved and I'm not going to quarrel with their decisions. It is interesting. I probably would let a bloody lemon go too.

Interesting, even though the markets seized up very dramatically afterwards and we had some of the most difficult short-term financial consequences of that failure.

Well, we needed a total correction mm-hmm the system look was evil and stupid we didn't need all our bright engineers going into the derivative trading and hedge funds and so on and so. we have the civilization totally out of control.

 Are they not going there in the future?

And we were not going to get out of that without a lot of mess and contraction and the mess and contraction was going to cause some operations to perish I knew Arthur Andersen partners who were honest decent people and who suffered terribly.

 Any situation in others the problem of moral hazard yes so large

You really can't have the rule no matter how awful you are you're always going to be safe

Simply because you're big enough and you're connected enough you have to allow for failure

You have to have allow for failure


Friday, April 24, 2020

April 2010 King's college Richard Koo - Explaining a balance sheet recession and Japan’s lost 15 years


This article was from  an Interview of Richard Koo  by Daniel Erasmus at King's College, April 2010

It was transcribed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HaNxAzLKegU&t=317sI do not own the rights, and should the owner want this article removed, please contact me. 


There is a great deal of confusion in both US and the UK about what is the right approach to this current crisis—a lot of things have been tried— zero interest rates, quantitative easing, massive fiscal stimulus— when this comes on top of a budget deficit, we tried guaranteeing bank liabilities, with additional capital injections to the banks. We went through all these highly unusual measures.

Well, in Japan—every one of those things were put in place— we had to this 5 to 10 years ago sometimes 15 years ago; and so for those of us in Japan looking at what's happening— what's unfolding abroad— it's like a replay of what we just went through.

All the confusion in the policy debate, whether there should be more fiscal stimulus or less— whether monetary easing can compensate for less fiscal stimulus. These are things we discussed in Japan 10 years ago and at first when we were going through it; it seemed like there were no other options to look at. Because anything that resembled Japan in the past— you have to go back all the way to the Great Depression in the United States and it was a different country, in a different era.

So there was a great deal of trial and error, not knowing what is the right thing to do and it took us about 7 to 8 years into the recession, before we realized that this is actually a different disease; this is no ordinary recession.

Ordinary recessions happen because there's over production of some sort—
Inventory buildup, always some inflationary pressures—central bank is tightening monetary policy— those are the typical reasons we fall into a recession.

But the one we fell into people were no longer maximizing profits, they were minimizing debt. And even with zero interest rates companies were paying down debt.

In no business schools or economics departments anywhere in the world have suggested that such things should take place. These things are not supposed to take place because if companies are paying down debt in zero percent interest rates environments, that suggests under ordinary theories that corporate executives are so stupid they can't find good use for the money even with zero interest rates.

Then why should these companies be around? Companies should just give the money back to the shareholders and let the shareholders find something better to do with their money. That's the usual interpretation and something like that was not supposed to happen.

But it happened in Japan, for ten years— rates were almost 0 in 1995, short-term interest rates were 0 in 1995, and corporate debt repayment continued until 2005—a full 10 years, in some of the bigger years the net debt repayment was over 30 trillion a year— 6% of Japan's GDP was net debt repayment.

Some companies are borrowing, but so many more others are paying down debt, so the net was 6% of GDP going backwards. Why is that so bad?

Well, first of all why did it happen? It's not the Japanese corporate executives suddenly went berserk; they were doing it because they faced a balancing problem.
During the bubble days, they bought tons of money to invest in all sorts of asset thinking that they're going make more money. As the price bubble collapsed, liabilities remained, so they realized you have more debt than what you can show on the asset side.

If you your balance sheets out of order, then you're actually bankrupt right?

But there are actually two kinds of bankruptcies— the bankruptcies with cash flow or without cash flow— if you have no cash flow and you are bankrupt that's the end of the business— you have to raise your white flag and you have to surrender.

If you have cash flow and balance sheets on the water— that corporate executive will do one thing— use the cash flow to pay down debt for sake of shareholders. That's the best possible solution—stakeholders of the firm don't want to be told that the company's bankrupt— your shares are just piece of paper. Bankers don't want to be told that their lending to the company became non-performing loans. Workers don't want to be told that there are no more jobs tomorrow because the company is bankrupt.

So for all the stakeholders involved the right thing to do at the corporate level is to use the cash flow to pay down debt because asset prices never go negative. So if you continue to pay down there at some point your balance needs to be balanced again you say I'm out of this problem now we're going to start making money and so forth.

So it's just a couple of years. Well, at least that's what people think that's the right thing to do at the micro level. When everybody does it at the same time what happens to the macro economy?

In a national economy, if someone is saving money, you better have someone on the other side borrowing and spending money to keep the economy going. In a usual economy that when we assume implicitly in all economics, is that if someone saves money the money comes into the financial sector the financial sector will find some other potential borrowers and the financial sector will give that money to the to whoever can use it. That person will spend the money against the original income.

So if I have a 1000 of income, and I spent 900 myself, 100 is saved, but this 100 goes through to the financial sector— someone borrows it, spends it, and then so 900 plus 100 against the original income—$1000.

If there are too many borrowers you raise interest rates. If there are too few borrowers, you bring rates down. Someone raises his hands, pick up the remaining sum and you go forward. That's basically the economy as we know. What happens when you bring rates down to zero and you still don't see anybody borrowing money?

Because if you are actually bankrupt, your balance sheets is under water— you're not going borrow money at any interest rates and no one's going lend you money either if they know you actually bankrupt right?

So you bring interest rates down to zero the $100 this household saved gets stuck in the financial system— since no one is borrowing money and everybody's paying down debt, so only $900 is spent.

The economy shrinks from $1,000 to 900. The $900 is someone's income and if that person also decides to save 10%, $810 is spent, and $90 going to the financial sector. It is a vicious cycle that one gets stuck in, as I said, the whole process took ten years—so if you leave this system unattended and everyone decides to save 10%--
you go from 1000 to 900, 900 to 810, 810 to 730, and in no time!

And you might wonder how did anything like this happen? Well as I said earlier in the Great Depression in the United States was exactly this pattern U.S. lost half of its GDP in just four years from 1929 to 1933 because everybody was paying down debt and no one was borrowing money.

In this type of situation, monetary policy is largely dead in the water, because you bring rates down to zero nothing happens— so if the government wants to keep the economy from falling into this deflationary spiral.

The government cannot tell the private sector— please don't repair your balance sheets, right? The private sector has no choice; the private sector must repay its balance sheets. The only thing the government can do is opposite of the private sector. That is, the government borrows the $100 and spends it. Then, with $900 plus $100 against the original income $1000— the economy moves forward

That's basically what we realized was happening in Japan and at first we didn't realize that was the case, so we put in the fiscal stimulus and the economy improves and then we say, the budget deficit is too large, we cut it, and the economy weakens again because private sectors deleveraging. Then we put in another fiscal stimulus economy proves and these people have nothing better to do that other budget deficit is too much so we got it again we felt so we had this zigzag for full 15 years.

This is not taught in economic textbooks because something like this not supposed to happen. As I told you earlier, no one gives a direction of what is the right thing to do until we discovered it ourselves that this is a different disease— completely different –it's not a common cold anymore— this is pneumonia.

Once that point was understood, we were able to have little more stability to the fiscal stimulus, especially after we made another mistake in 2001, and after that more or less fiscal stimulus was maintained and we finally climbed out in 2005; the whole thing took 15 years.

Thursday, April 16, 2020

The Global Pandemic, the Repo Market, and the lack of Liquidity



The Global Pandemic, the Repo Market and the lack of Liquidity

“Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it” -Santayana

It was bad before the virus
The corona virus may simply be a trigger of America’s economic strains and imbalances which existed before the pandemic.

As indicated by the Repo market, the economy was suffering before the corona virus. The corona virus only made things worse.

Before the virus, prices for equities were at an all-time high in comparison to their earnings. The yield curve was inverting— a warning indicator of potential economic distress – where there’s a switch to short term bonds yielding more than long term bonds – when normally long term bonds have higher yield, since there is additional risk for lending money at a longer duration.

The worst part is not just how businesses and cities have to shut down. But it alerted business and lenders of the risks of default. With record low yields of 0.3%, speculators buying bonds anticipate the Federal Reserve to print a bunch of money and buy into the U.S treasuries, causing the yield to drop even further and for bond prices to go up.

Hotel chains such as Hilton, airlines, etc. may not survive without a bailout if they didn’t have enough cash on hand. During a catastrophe or a rainy day, don’t expect bankers to lend. The time when investing should be done is when capital is most scarce—when blood is on the streets, when banks don’t loan, and when investors don’t provide capital.

As of now, total debt the world has reached an all-time high again—USD 245-250 trillion. That is equivalent to about USD 32,500 per person on earth. The U.S’s national debt is about 23 trillion.

Jerome Powell’s refusal to lower bank’s reserve standards, deficit spending (U.S. government spending of $4.829 trillion is higher than its revenue of $3.863 trillion) and the short fall of liquidity banks were experiencing, all brewed the perfect storm. Policymakers had planned 2019 to scale back operations in the market for repurchase agreements, or Repo, through which dealers can borrow cash. But as the economic threat posed by the corona virus increased, the Fed pivoted to offering almost unlimited support in the overnight lending markets for cash.

So, after 20-30 years of huge money printing, what do central banks have to do?
Print a lot more. Can this printing continue infinitely without implications?
China has also printed a huge amount of money. Germany and many countries have government bonds in issue that has zero or negative interest rate. And yet, Germany was heading towards a recession before the corona virus.

As an investor, when we want to preserve the purchasing power of our money, do we buy negative interest government bonds?  No.

So, who buys them? Speculators.

What’s not going up, as far as prices go, is corporate debt.

Speculators can make 30 percent profits buying and selling negative interest rate bonds. This sounds unbelievable. Also high yield corporate debt or junk bonds.

Up until this point, pension funds and hedge funds have been struggling to find higher yields, so they ventured into riskier junk bonds. When the economy was good, there was demand and it could be sold off. The moment that turns, the interest rate on these corporate debts go up.

If speculators realize how risky these trade are, they won't do it.

Zombie companies created by low interest rates
Companies did buybacks funded by their junk bonds to increase their treasury stock, but didn’t realize that a prolonged virus required contingency funds. Junk bonds were issued, and from the funds, companies purchased their own stock instead of reinvesting it back it to their company.

These zombie companies with poor capital structures and convoluted balance sheets only existed due to a low interest market. Once the tide goes out, we will see who was swimming without their pants. Pension funds who held these corporate junk bonds will now suffer.

A further downgrade by Moody’s or S&P, and the pension funds will have no choice but to sell off these bonds. Once these bonds are sold, prices go down, and interest rates will really go up—companies will have to sell their stock to pay back bond holders to avoid bankruptcy. Bonds will rise, and stocks will drop and there will be a credit market crunch with lots of downgrades.

Even though we see the mortgage rates dropping, this is the calm before the storm. Once you see the real unemployment rates rise due to the corona virus, you’ll see a very different story taking place. Ask yourself, why is there suddenly a rise in MBS issuance (mortgage-backed securities)?  

Printing money- how long can this continue for?
For countries with high tax rates, who still experience budget deficits— how are governments going to refinance their low interest rate bonds to support their expenditures? Pay a higher interest rate. But, they can’t. If they do, interest rates go up and the world goes into deep depression.

If they don't, how do they pay? By printing more money. The U.S. central bank, or the Federal Reserve, has more than $5.9 trillion of assets on its books - the equivalent of more than a quarter of annual U.S. economic output before the crisis.

Economists are lost and they don't know what happens next.

At the very least, the printing of money took place under Greenspan in a big way.
Then Bernanke.
Then Yellen
Then Jerome Powell

In other words, 20-30 years. The last 2 to 3 decades.

Printing of money has two direct effects -
Asset prices go up for stocks and real estate.
Interest rate go down.

Why?

An increase in the supply of money - money is devalued against assets, real estates, and shares of businesses. Therefore it appears that asset prices went up.

Interest rate is really just the rent that borrowers pay for use of the money—
As there was more money printed, the supply of money went up and the rent (i.e. interest rate) for money went down.

Low interest rates - business firms want to borrow more.
High asset prices - business firms now have more assets to mortgage and use as collateral

Historically, most economic and financial market crashes were brought about by the collapse of credit markets. Businesses suddenly cannot borrow the money they want and have to repay their loans.

When interest rates go up, businesses makes less profits and the economy contracts. Stock markets go down. Or businesses need to sell assets to pay their debts. Asset prices go down.

Corporate borrowings are now as high as on the eve of the 2008 economic collapse known as the Global Financial Crisis. They call it the Great Recession. Remember? That's a banker's way of avoiding the admission of a depression.

Use of Discount Window in 2008 crisis

Traditionally, during monetary emergencies, institutions borrow credit from the Fed’s lending facility called the Discount Window to rescue insolvent entities that fail to secure a counterparty.

However, there is a problem: the Discount Window is exposed to the public. If an entity is a public company and applies for emergency funds via a lending facility, the institution exposes it’s insolvency to society, but, more importantly, shareholders.

During the financial crisis, both Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers taught us that stock prices can go to zero when there’s even a hint of distress. A collapse in share prices leads to the inevitable bank run, and due to the fragility of the global, interconnected banking system, financial contagion will spread quickly. When Bank of America purchased Merrill Lynch in 2008, if they waited a few more days, the panic in the markets would have given them an even cheaper discount.

But, if the Fed’s role is to maintain confidence, then the discount window becomes obsolete.
Instead, they needed a way to save struggling institutions “off the books” to maintain stability in the financial system.

The “Anonymous” Repo Market and how it works

The Fed has achieved anonymity by intervening in the repo (repurchase agreement) market.

Banks, finance companies, investment banks, and money market funds all participate in short term borrowing and lending on a market called the repo (repurchase agreement) market. It is an important mechanism for short term (overnight to 2 days) borrowings amongst banks.

The repo market provides the cash and liquidity for financial firms to run their daily operations. It is the grease to the gears of the economy. When the repo market chokes and cash stops flowing, trouble can reverberate through the economy.

The repo market is a very fast way of lending and borrowing short term. Basically the borrower puts up US government Treasuries bond to lenders to borrow up to 40 days. Instead of entering into a complex mortgage and loan agreements, the borrower just sells the Treasuries to lenders, and agrees to buy them back in a few days at a time, at a higher price. The price difference is the interest payment.
Because of the repurchase agreement, the market is called the Repo market with USD 1-2 trillion dollars per day of transactions. The usual interest rate or the effective federal funds rate is around 2 percent to meet their reserve requirements. The effective federal funds rate is set by the Federal Open Market Committee, or FOMC.

Contrary to popular belief, the Federal Reserve’s policy prohibits smaller banks and troubled institutions from intervening directly within the repo market. They must deposit securities — mostly in the form of treasuries — into the reserve accounts of primary dealers: major financial institutions such as J.P Morgan and Deutsche Bank, who then use the collateral to trade with other Repo market participants.

Conveniently, repo transactions are completely anonymous, and while the Fed records how much they inject in the repo market, what primary dealers then do with the collateral is a complete mystery.

So when any institution gets into trouble, the central bank/Fed transfers emergency funds to the primary dealers, who then transfer the funds to the distressed entity: a hidden interbank bailout. It gets more interesting when you realize foreign banks have access to the repo market, meaning the Fed can rescue any global financial institution in secret — hidden from the public eye.

BUT...
Liquidity in Repo Markets Tighten

On 17 September 2019, suddenly lenders were reluctant to lend.

Lenders perceived huge financial default risks. Fear is fear. Cash got tighter; people speculated the Fed wanted to shrink its own balance sheet.

Overnight repo rates surged to as high as 8.5%, while the Fed’s benchmark/effective fund rate is normally traded at 2.25%, the top end of the range that the central bank/Fed targets.

Reason 1: Tax payment date for banks and treasury debt schedule to settle
September 16 was the cut off for U.S bank’s quarterly tax payments, so a lot of money was sucked out of accounts and deposited into the treasury. September 16 was also the date that 78 billion of treasury debt was scheduled to settle.

Reason 2: Regulation for additional reserves kept by banks
Others blame post 2008-crisis regulations for banks and lenders to have additional reserves. This rule for reserves is called the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), where the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) and Federal Reserve System (Board) requires a certain amount of reserves or cash on hold at the Fed at all times to absorb shocks from economic events. Problems complicate when credit tightens.

                                   

Reason 3: Supply and Demand Imbalance from Previous QE

Between 2008 and 2014, the Fed engaged in Quantitative Easing (QE) to stimulate the economy. The Fed created reserves to buy securities, dramatically expanding its balance sheet and the supply of reserves in the banking system. As a result, the pre-crisis framework no longer worked, so the Fed shifted to an “ample reserves” framework with new tools – interest on excess reserves (IOER) and overnight reverse repos (ONRRP), both interest rates that the Fed sets itself – to control its key short-term interest rate.

In January 2019, the Federal Open Market Committee – the Fed’s policy committee – confirmed that it “intends to continue to implement monetary policy in a regime in which an ample supply of reserves ensures that control over the level of the federal funds rate and other short-term interest rates is exercised primarily through the setting of the Federal Reserve’s administered rates, and in which active management of the supply of reserves is not required.”

When the Fed stopped its asset purchasing program in 2014, the supply of excess reserves in the banking system began to shrink. When the Fed started to shrink its balance sheet in 2017, reserves fell faster.


But the Fed didn’t know for sure the minimum level of reserves that were “ample,” and surveys over the past year suggested reserves wouldn’t grow scarce until they fell to less than 1.2 trillion. The Fed apparently miscalculated, in part based on banks’ responses to Fed surveys. It turned out banks wanted (or felt compelled) to hold more reserves than the Fed anticipated and were unwilling to lend those reserves in the Repo market, where there were a lot of people with Treasuries who wanted to use them as collateral for cash. As demand exceeded supply, the Repo rate rose sharply.

The Fed Intervenes to save the day
Jerome Powell has stated that he would rather raise the reserves and provide extra funding from the Fed itself, rather than lower the standards for liquidity requirements for banks.

When the Fed first intervened in September 2019, it offered at least 75 billion in daily repos and 35 billion in long-term Repo twice per week. Subsequently, it increased the size of its daily lending to 120 billion and lowered its long-term lending. But the Fed has signaled that it wants to wind down the intervention: Federal Reserve Vice Chair Richard Clarida said, “It may be appropriate to gradually transition away from active Repo operations this year,” as the Fed increases the amount of money in the system via purchases of Treasury bills.

On October 2019, the Fed started buying short term treasuries at 60 billion a month until June of 2020 to bring back liquidity in the Repo market.

Pseudo “Liquidity”

So the repo market carried on, as they now have pseudo "liquidity"—life support from the Fed. Lenders would not have to worry if borrowers would not repurchase or if they’re unable to— that is the way the Fed tells the story. But most people have not thought deeply about the function of propping up treasury prices.

While Jerome Powell wants to improve liquidity, he doesn’t want the U.S to go further in debt by printing more money and buying an excess amount of treasuries. But by buying the treasury stocks from banks to keep the market going, the Fed also brings up the treasury prices, driving yield lower temporarily.

The idea is that through large-scale purchases of various types of bonds - mostly Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities – helps ensure that longer-term interest rates like those for mortgages and car loans remain low and helps keep major purchases affordable for consumers and businesses.

What’s scary is that there is less liquidity in U.S markets today than in the 2008-2009 financial crises. Basically, Jerome Powell is trying to fix the plumbing issue without changing monetary policy. The Fed will continue purchasing T-Bills to grow their balance sheet, but they don’t want to print more money.

The Fed also blamed J.P Morgan for not lending in particular. The U.S’s largest 4 banks, which includes: J.P Morgan, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Citi Group, are so big, they can influence the entire Repo market.

By December 2019, the Fed apparently has 4 trillion USD out in into the Repo market already. The FRA-OIS spread: the difference between 3-month LIBOR (the interbank lending rate) and the overnight index rate (the central bank/Fed’s risk-free rate), is widening at a rapid pace, and showing building pressure within funding markets. Clearly, liquidity is still scarce.

When the Fed cut rates back to near zero on March 15, 2020 it restarted these large-scale purchases and is now doing so with an open-ended commitment.

With the Corona Virus, the Fed stepping up quantitative easing and straight up buying from the banks—the Repo facility was originally from twice a day to the Fed swooping in once a day to pick up treasuries and once a week on the long term Repo to once every two weeks. The Desk had started the afternoon overnight Repo ops on March 18.

Scale back in Treasury purchases from the Fed

The Fed is now gradually reducing the scale of Treasury purchases, going down to 50 billion per day in the month of April from 75 billion per day at the end of March.

On March 31, the Fed also broadened its Repo agreements with foreign central banks, allowing them to exchange their holdings of U.S. Treasury securities for overnight dollar loans.

In light of more stable repurchase agreement (Repo) market conditions, the New York Fed is reducing the frequency of some Repo operations starting May 4, 2020. The Fed's Open Market Trading Desk plans to return to once-a-day overnight Repo operations from the current twice-a-day schedule by eliminating the afternoon overnight operation.
Three-month Repo operations will be conducted to once every two weeks from once a week.
It will continue to conduct one-month Repo operations once per week.